



PHD

“How many divisions has he got?” The Holy See’s soft power on the US Wars in Iraq, 1991 & 2003

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“How many divisions has *he* got?”
The Holy See’s soft power on the US Wars in
Iraq, 1991 & 2003

Luke Edmund Cahill

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

University of Bath

Department of Politics, Languages and International Studies

April 2018

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AMDG

Abstract

It is unsurprising that the Holy See, as a religious actor, opposed both 1991 and 2003 Iraq Wars. However, a contradiction exists as to why it did so. In 1991 it predicated its opposition on not all the just war criteria being met. This was despite UN Security Council support and the war been seen as just. For the 2003 war, Holy See opposition was based principally on the lack of a Security Council resolution. From this, its presumed moral status can be questioned through its seemingly total rejection of the moral use of force.

Using Nye's concept of soft power and Arnold Wolfers' possession (security or territory) and *milieu* (shaping the environment in which states operate) goals, this thesis will argue that the Holy See's *milieu* goals were too weak to overcome US possession goals. As expected the Holy See emphasised *milieu* goals while the US stressed possession goals. However, these delineations became blurred. The United States sought to merge *milieu* and possession goals. It wished to be seen as benevolent, in addition to its seeking possession goals. The Holy See also wished to advance its possession goals. It sought to protect Iraqi Chaldean Catholics, as well as Christians in the wider Middle East, through vocal opposition. The Holy See hoped that this opposition would separate the US-led coalitions' actions from the indigenous Christians in the region in the eyes of non-Christians. Thus, seeking to avoid a regional backlash against Christians.

The central hypothesis of this thesis tests how the Holy See attempted to use soft power to attract the United States to its policies. It will be maintained that the divisions between US Catholics weakened Holy See attraction on the US government. Consequently, the pope had more divisions than he would care to admit. Central to domestic factors were cultural differences. US political culture was fundamentally Protestant and had a binary worldview, making the use of force more likely. Other domestic factors were Catholicism's divided nature, institutional and polling aspects which benefited both presidents. Concurrently, its special international status made it harder to relate to the United States and weakened its soft power. However, Holy See opposition was also predicated on the advancement of its possession goals. This thesis helps understand Holy See foreign policy through the lens of *milieu* and possession goals. Its neutrality and theology made it apply an impossibly high just war theory standard. It also has wider implications for the study of soft power to the study of International Relations.

Contents

PREFACE.....	9
PART ONE.....	10
Chapter I.....	10
Introduction: <i>Ut Unum Sint</i>	10
Resurgence of Religious Actors	14
Background.....	17
Reasons for Holy See Influence.....	17
Holy See (In)Ability to Influence	19
Domestic Politics	24
International Politics	28
Holy See “actorness”	29
US-Holy See diplomatic relations	33
Research Questions.....	37
Thesis Structure	38
Chapter II	40
Theory	40
Culture	42
American exceptionalism.....	44
Jacksonianism	49
Calvinism	53
Soft power and culture.....	56
Soft power and values.....	58
Soft power and foreign policy	60
Methodology, Methods and Research Design	62
Conclusion	67
PART TWO – 1991 IRAQ WAR.....	69
Chapter III The Good War.....	69
Chapter Rationale: Whither the Just War?	71
Context and Causes of the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait.....	74
Holy See Position	76
Reasons for Holy See opposition.....	76
Holy See Diplomacy to Stop the War: Choosing Neutrality over Peace.....	80
Holy See Diplomacy: Tactically Slow	85
United States Position.....	88

US Diplomacy: Combining <i>Milieu</i> and Possession Goals.....	88
US Diplomacy: Uniting Community to Enforce Order	90
Conclusion	96
Chapter IV	98
“It is the whole world versus Saddam Hussein” Why the Holy See was unsuccessful....	98
Domestic factors that weakened Holy See soft power	100
US Political Culture.....	100
Jacksonianism: Strong (National) Community	100
Exceptionalism: Bearing Burdens and Buttressing <i>Milieu</i> Goals.....	103
Catholic Divisions and American Society	106
Episcopal Divisions: <i>Cum Petro et sub Petro?</i>	106
Lay Divisions: More Individualistic, More Partisan, Less Informed	110
Media Divisions: Two Ideological Communities	112
Political Institutions: Presidential Order and Congressional Interests	118
Polls: Driven by Bush.....	122
Systemic factors that weakened Holy See soft power.....	126
Holy See Legal Status: Just Another Small State.....	126
Principles of Holy See Foreign Policy: Finding Ways to Oppose	130
Conclusion	133
PART THREE – 2003 IRAQ WAR	136
Chapter V	137
The Holy See hath no fury.....	137
Chapter Rationale: US Desire for Security.....	139
Context and Causes for the 2003 Iraq War.....	140
The Holy See’s Position	144
Holy See Opposition: International Law and Neutrality	144
Holy See Diplomacy to Stop the War: Speeches and Envoys	154
Holy See Diplomacy: Sacrificing Soft Power for Neutrality.....	160
United States Position.....	162
US Response: Containment’s Failure, Iraqi Threat	162
US Actions: Addressing the Iraqi Threat.....	168
Conclusion	172
Chapter VI.....	173
“I don’t see how it could be immoral”: Why the Holy See was unsuccessful.....	173
Domestic factors that weakened Holy See soft power	174
US Political Culture.....	175
Jacksonianism: Power, US View of Order and the (National) Community	175
Exceptionalism: Stronger community.....	178

Catholic Divisions and American Society	181
Episcopal Divisions: More United but Still Ineffective.....	181
Lay Divisions: Detached, (Dis-)obedient and Distrustful.....	184
Media Divisions: A Question of Obedience	1866
Political Institutions: National Security and Political Interests Coalesce.....	193
Sex Abuse: An Outraged, Divided Community	198
Polls: Supporting Bush's Order	203
Systemic factors that weakened Holy See soft power.....	207
Holy See Legal Status: Mostly Irrelevant.....	207
Principles of Holy See Foreign Policy: The International Community Returns	211
Conclusion	214
PART FOUR	217
Chapter VII	217
Conclusion: <i>Vox clamantis in deserto</i>?	217
What Domestic Factors Weakened Holy See Influence?	218
Which International Factors Weakened Holy See Influence?	219
What Insights Can Soft Power Bring to Analyse Holy See Foreign Policy Within the International System?.....	220
What Contribution Can <i>Milieu</i> and Possession Goals Make to Understanding the Holy See?	221
Main Findings	222
Research Contribution	225
Future Research	226
BIBLIOGRAPHY	228

Note

Although this thesis uses leaked diplomatic cables, the author wishes to make clear that this should not be seen as an endorsement of leaking information. Moreover, the use of the cables as a primary document should not be viewed as support for the subsequent statements made by Wikileaks or those connected to it.

Preface

Winston Churchill, in his memoirs, recounted French foreign minister Pierre Laval meeting Joseph Stalin. Churchill remembered how Stalin urged Laval to reveal the number of French divisions on the Western front. Laval asked Stalin to help Russian Catholics to assist France's relations with the pope. Stalin famously replied, "The Pope! How many divisions has *he* got?"¹ This thesis suggests the pope has more divisions than he would care to admit. Consequently, these divisions were among the factors that undermined the Holy See's soft power.

¹Winston Churchill, *The Second World War*, vol. 1, ch. 8, p. 121.

Part One

Chapter I

Introduction: *Ut Unum Sint*

This chapter introduces the topic of religion and foreign policy situated within the religious turn in the study of International Relations. It uses Joseph Nye's concept of soft power to show the Holy See's limitation in attracting the United States.¹ Particular attention will be paid to Nye's incorporation of Arnold Wolfers' possession and *milieu* goals.² There are clear links between *milieu* goals and the Holy See as the Church's mission "demands that it transform the world".³ Though This will show how both actors have possession and *milieu* goals thus blurring the distinction between them. At the same time it will show how possession goals can overcome weaker *milieu* goals.

Possession goals are those tangible or intangible goals that states seek to possess such as security or territory. *Milieu* goals are those where states seek to shape the environment in which states operate. Broadly, the Holy See operates on the level of *milieu* goals, while the United States prioritises possession goals. The former's desire to shape the international environment is a *milieu* goal. For the United States, going to war against Iraq is a possession goal as the United States desired security through these wars.

Overlaid on this is the Holy See's unique international status. This will be called its "actorness" as being both a religion operating in a domestic context and at the same time the international system. The relationship between culture and soft power is explored and illustrates that if cultural differences are too great than any attractive power will be minimal. The Holy See's distinctive status affects these goals and thus weakened its *milieu* goals. Subsequently, divisions and soft power are examined. The Church has a long history of division

¹ Joseph S. Nye Jr, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, New edition (New York: PublicAffairs, U.S., 2005).

² Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), 67-81.

³ David Ryall, 'How Many Divisions? The Modern Development of Catholic International Relations', *International Relations* 14, no.2 (August 1998):21-34.

but in this instance it reduces its soft power in attaining its *milieu* goals against the US possession goals. The international politics section will emphasise the Holy See's special "actorness". It will stress how the thesis links the domestic and international levels of analysis. The subsequent section will explore Holy See "actorness" and draw out the differences between the Church, Vatican City and the Holy See's relationship with states and argue that this weakens its soft power. From this the Holy See's foreign policy principles will be addressed. It will be argued that these (belief in multilateralism, the importance of international institutions, the unity of mankind and the common good) stem from its theology and can be interpreted to the Holy See's advantage. In this context US-Holy See diplomatic relations are examined and the difficulties of the Holy See's "actorness" and anti-Catholicism for establishing these relations brought out. From this the research questions and thesis structure emerge.

During Advent (the time before Christmas) one of the Gospel readings recalls individuals questioning who John the Baptist was. The Gospel says that he replied, *ego vox clamantis in deserto* (I am the voice of one crying in the wilderness).⁴ It will be postulated that in some respects the Holy See *is* a voice crying in the wilderness, largely ignored by others in its attempts to use its soft power to advance its *milieu* goals. However, it will be maintained throughout that it used its unique place in the international system to protect its possession goals, Catholics and other Christians in the Middle East, from being associated with the US interventions in the region. Accordingly, its status in the international wilderness made it more effective at advancing its possession goals.

This thesis presents five main arguments grouped into empirical, theoretical and conceptual categories. There are two empirical arguments: firstly, divisions weakened Holy See soft power and secondly, Holy See soft power was not sufficient to alter US foreign policy. Theoretically, the thesis argues the Holy See had an almost blanket ban on the use of force with no circumstances seeming to warrant its usage. When added to its behaviour during the sex abuse crisis, and its opposition to the wars, this suggests that it was not a disinterested actor. Thus, this leads to its morality being questioned. Lastly, there are two conceptual arguments proposed, culture is profoundly important in shaping a state's foreign policy with it being used to bolster and justify decisions taken and lastly Church theology teaches that all Catholics are united as one. It will be posited that they are shaped more by culture and their attachment to nationality than any religious identity.

⁴ John 1:19-28.

The chapter title comes from the Gospel of John where Jesus prays that “they may all be one, As you, Father, are in me and I am in you, may they also be in us”.⁵ The Latin translation of the first phrase of this prayer is *ut unum sint*. This thesis intends to examine two facets, the international diplomacy between the Holy See and the United States and the role of US domestic politics within this process.

Thus, *ut unum sint*, has special significance for this thesis. It will be argued that Catholics in the United States are divided. Rather than act as Catholics, a group is on the political left and another on the political right.⁶ If Catholics were more united, the Holy See may be better placed to exert greater influence on US foreign policy.⁷ Catholics’ identity is central for this thesis and throughout it will be argued that they see themselves more as Americans than Catholics.

This work will use an IR lens to advance scholarship, arguing that US-Holy See relations were more complex than the Holy See possessing and using soft power. It will also update US relations with religious actors that often have a Protestant focus or end at the Cold War. Some of these studies have largely focused on Cold War anti-Communism. Those that address the post-Cold War era do so only superficially.⁸ The thesis is unique as it applies Nye’s soft power to both actors during this post-Cold War period over both 1991 and 2003 wars. It thus highlights the problems of (Holy See) *milieu* goals set against (American) possession goals. Yet it will also stress how these distinctions blur with both actors seeking to advance both goals. The US sought to merge its possession goals and *milieu* goals as being beneficial to all. As Ryall argues, “we can firmly place the Holy See’s ambitions” as *milieu* goals.⁹ However, as will be developed it also had possession goals. Through its opposition to the wars it wished to separate Iraqi Chaldean Catholics, and Middle East Christians, from any backlash from non-Christians living in the region who may have associated Christianity with the United States and its actions.

⁵ John 17:21.

⁶ Mary Ellen Konieczny, Charles Camosy, and Tricia C. Bruce, eds., *Polarization in the US Catholic Church: Naming the Wounds, Beginning to Heal* (Collegeville, Minnesota: Liturgical Press, 2016).

⁷ Church will be used when referring to domestic aspects or theological concepts. At all other times, Holy See will be used.

⁸ William Inboden, *Religion and American Foreign Policy, 1945-1960: The Soul of Containment* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Andrew Preston, *Sword of the Spirit, Shield of Faith: Religion in American War and Diplomacy* (New York: Knopf, 2012); Eric O. Hanson, *The Catholic Church in World Politics* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990); Frank J. Coppa, *Politics and the Papacy in the Modern World* (London: Praeger, 2008).

⁹ Ryall, ‘How Many Divisions?’.

Crucially, the Holy See was not successful at influencing US foreign policy. This will be illustrated over two case studies. A combination of domestic and international factors weakened whatever soft power the Holy See possessed. Furthermore, the scale of the task, halting war, was beyond the scope of its soft power capacity as it could not overcome US possession goals. Complicating matters, at the same time the Holy See sought to advance its own possession goals. The complexities of soft power will therefore be addressed, such as how it works and under what conditions. The empirical, theoretical and conceptual insights which are developed in this work should be of broader interest to the field of International Relations. However, it is clear that they are more acutely relevant to the revival in the field of religion and IR. A revival which is now briefly introduced before this thesis's central line of enquiry is unpacked.

Resurgence of Religious Actors

After decades of marginalisation, scholars have rediscovered religion's role. This section will explore events such as the 1979 Iranian Revolution. The Catholic Church will be placed within this context and its relevance will be stressed. Its unique operation, through the Holy See, will be briefly introduced before being expanded upon later. Lastly, Holy See, and US, *milieu* and possession goals in the 1991 and 2003 wars will be studied.

A series of profound historical events from the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the founding of the Hindu Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in India, the role of religion in Solidarity in Poland to the rise of the Christian Right in the United States and the 11th September 2001 terrorist attacks began to raise questions about secularisation theory. Thomas has suggested the trend of de-secularisation is partly due to the failure of the modernising state to produce democracy and development.¹⁰

Examples of religious organisations who have sought to connect their religious beliefs to practical action are as diverse as Hamas and the *Sant'Egidio* movement. The latter has been credited with brokering peace in Mozambique.¹¹ The same group is engaged with the Italian foreign ministry to bring Syrian refugees to Italy, through the Humanitarian Corridors project.¹² During the twentieth century an expectation existed that religion would play an ever smaller part in people's lives. Secularisation theory proposed that as nations modernised, or developed economically, there would be a corresponding decline in both religious observance and religion's influence.¹³ One prominent example was pre-1979 Iran where few argued that a religious reaction to modernisation would occur.¹⁴ In recent decades this theory has been questioned. Indeed, scholars who had previously argued in favour of secularisation theory have now retracted their ideas.¹⁵

Among these religious actors is the Catholic Church. Since the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965) the Church was seen to be re-engaging with the world, after what was argued by

¹⁰ Scott Thomas, *The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations: The Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty-First Century* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 40–41.

¹¹ Monica Duffy Toft, Daniel Philpott, and Timothy Samuel Shah, *God's Century: Resurgent Religion and Global Politics* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2011), 175.

¹² 'Humanitarian Corridors for Refugees', *Community of Sant'Egidio*, 2017, <http://www.santegidio.org/pageID/11676/langID/en/Humanitarian-Corridors-for-refugees.html>.

¹³ Toft, Philpott, and Shah, *God's Century*, 1–8.

¹⁴ Thomas, *The Global Resurgence of Religion*, 2.

¹⁵ Peter L. Berger, "The Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview," *The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics*, ed. Peter Berger (Washington DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1999), 2.

some to be isolation. Since this, Catholics have become more active in connecting their faith to politics. One example is *Pax Christi*, who have attempted to lobby on arms control and nuclear weapons.

As the Holy See is the international legal personality of the Church, it is in many ways not a traditional international actor. Thus, how it interacts with states and pursues its interests (possession goals) through soft power is not easily comparable to states. The complex relationship between the Holy See and the Church is drawn out in this thesis but especially in reference to the Holy See's hopes of advancing both *milieu* and possession goals.

The Holy See's importance for this study is threefold. Firstly, the role of religion has become more visible in both domestic and international politics. These actors have increasing involvement in a range of issues including, sexual morality but also economic inequality, the environment, peace, justice and inter-religious dialogue.

Secondly, sustained interest in the role of moral actors in international relations exists. The perception of religious figures as moral actors is seen to give them moral authority.¹⁶ An example being when President Barack Obama praised Pope Francis.¹⁷

Lastly, evidence suggests that some view religious actors as more trustworthy than politicians.¹⁸ A 2014 poll found that only seven percent of people said they had "a great deal" or "quite a lot" of trust in the US Congress. In contrast, the figure for religion was 45%.¹⁹ For Catholics in the United States confidence in the Church in 2015 had risen to 51%, up from 39% in the early 2000s.²⁰ However, this was before *l'affaire Viganò*, the 2018 Pennsylvania attorney general's report and the Theodore McCarrick scandal and their consequences.

This work will build on scholarship arguing that US-Holy See relations were more complex. Crucially the Holy See has not been successful at influencing US foreign policy in a post-Cold War context, a proposition which will be examined over two case studies. Therefore, this thesis will aim to examine the post-Cold War relationship between the United States and the Holy See. Simultaneously, this thesis intends to link the domestic views of Catholics in the United States to the Holy See's inability to influence US foreign policy during the 1991 and

¹⁶ Jodok Troy, 'Two "Popes" to Speak for the World: The Pope and the United Nations Secretary General in World Politics', *The Review of Faith and International Affairs*, 15, no. 4 (2017): 67-78.

¹⁷ Barack Obama, 'Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address January 20, 2015', whitehouse.gov, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/20/remarks-president-state-union-address-january-20-2015>.

¹⁸ Thomas, *The Global Resurgence of Religion*, 219.

¹⁹ 'Public Faith in Congress Falls Again, Hits Historic Low', Gallup.com, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/171710/public-faith-congress-falls-again-hits-historic-low.aspx>.

²⁰ Lydia Saad, 'Confidence in Religion at New Low, but Not Among Catholics', Gallup.com, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/183674/confidence-religion-new-low-not-among-catholics.aspx>.

2003 Iraq Wars as a clash between *milieu* and possession goals. Both cases will argue that through its opposition it hoped to secure its possession goals, the safety of Middle Eastern Christians.

Chapter III will examine, the 1991 Iraq War. It came at a unique moment in history where US possession goals merged with *milieu* goals. Initial aims to restore Kuwaiti territory over fear of Iraqi regional dominance, coalesced with broader *milieu* goals. These factors combined set the tone for a nascent unipolar world. The USSR was undergoing profound change and China was still isolated after the 1989 Tiananmen massacre. European nations felt safer as the Cold War ended, and the United States was reaping dividends for its role. Consequently, the war had support, or lack of opposition, from the UN Security Council. This international environment allowed the German government to ignore popular objections to the war and support it. France was pushed into joining the United States through Iraqi's miscalculations.

Similarly the 2003 war, after the 11 September attacks, explores the United States' claims that the world security environment had changed profoundly. For this war, possession goals predominated. Contrasting this, the Holy See desired to shape the environment in which states operated, stressing the UN Security Council's role. Due to these competing reactions, the nadir of US-Holy See relations emerged. Condoleezza Rice, then National Security Adviser, underscored the strength of feeling on both sides when she said she could not understand the Holy See's opposition to the war.

This section has examined the rise of religious actors with events such as the 1979 Iranian Revolution. It has placed the study of the Catholic Church in this context and explored its importance. How it operates internationally has been briefly introduced and how this relates to its, and US, *milieu* and possession goals in the 1991 and 2003 wars has been scrutinised.

Background

This thesis examines the historical and ideational context of the Holy See's views of the 1991 and 2003 wars, the means through which the Holy See opposed these wars and the extent to which its means and ends were achieved. In the following sub-sections that underpin this enquiry, namely why the Holy See might have influence, the reasons why it does not, domestic and then international issues will be examined before concluding with US-Holy See diplomatic relations.

Reasons for Holy See Influence

Four reasons exist; religious freedom, religion and society, natural law and inter-religious dialogue, why the Holy See was better placed to influence US foreign policy than might otherwise be assumed.

To preface this, the US is a profoundly religious country. Alexis de Tocqueville observed in *Democracy in America* that "America is still the country in the world where the Christian religion has retained the greatest real power over people's souls".²¹ Religion in America has played an important part throughout US history, from its roots in American exceptionalism²² to debates about a Sunday postal service²³, to the part played by anti-Catholicism in the 1928 presidential election,²⁴ and the Religious Right. Critically it is among the most religious developed nations, distinct from Europe.²⁵ As of 2014 there are almost 77 million Catholics in the United States²⁶, of a total US population, in 2014, of 318 million.²⁷ It would therefore be expected that religion plays an important role in US society. Consequently, Catholics might be expected to have a substantial part in the life of the United States. Numbers of "parish connected Catholics" in 1990 was 55.7 million, while those that self-identified as

²¹ Alexis Tocqueville, *Democracy in America: And Two Essays on America*, ed. Isaac Kramnick, trans. Gerald Bevan, New edition (London: Penguin Classics, 2003), 340.

²² John Winthrop, "City upon a Hill", *Mount Holyoke College*, <https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/winthrop.htm>.

²³ Frank Lambert, *Religion in American Politics: A Short History* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2010), 41.

²⁴ James R. Sweeney, 'Rum, Romanism, and Virginia Democrats: The Party Leaders and the Campaign of 1928', *The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography* 90, no. 4 (1 October 1982): 403–31.

²⁵ Pew Research Center, 'Among Wealthy Nations: U.S. Stands Alone In Its Embrace of Religion', Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project, 19 December 2002, <http://www.pewglobal.org/2002/12/19/among-wealthy-nations/>.

²⁶ Laity and Parish Statistics, USCCB, <http://www.usccb.org/about/media-relations/statistics/laity-parishes.cfm>.

²⁷ US and World Population Clock <http://www.census.gov/popclock/> United States Census Bureau.

Catholics were 62.4 million. In 2005 those parish Catholics were 64.5 million with those self-identifying as 74 million.²⁸

Firstly, the US and Holy See now have a common view of the importance of religious freedom. The United States values religious freedom both inside the United States and encourages it globally.²⁹ After the Second Vatican Council an American priest, John Courtney Murray, SJ, attended the Council as an adviser on religious freedom. He posited that the Church should accept this principle. Later he was instrumental in drafting the Council's document on religious freedom, *Dignitatis humanae*. The opening remarks of Pope Benedict XVI's 2008 visit to the United States show how the Church accepts, and to an extent, even celebrates this freedom, "all believers have found here the freedom to worship God in accordance with the dictates of their conscience".³⁰ As a result of these changes the Church and United States now have a common view on these issues.

Secondly, some have claimed a generally positive relationship exists between society and religion in the United States. Many scholars see the separation of religion and state as one of the reasons for this. Related to this, American society is thought to be more accepting of religious viewpoints influencing debate. As Pope Benedict said, "I am confident that the American people will find in their religious beliefs a precious source of insight and an inspiration to pursue reasoned, responsible and respectful dialogue in the effort to build a more humane and free society".³¹

Thirdly, scholars have noted links between the Bill of Rights and Church teaching. Courtney Murray viewed both as grounded in natural law, separating religion from the civil, "hence Catholics can unconditionally subscribe to these American convictions".³² Others have emphasised the similarities between Catholicism and the United States rather than the differences.³³

²⁸ 'Frequently Requested Church Statistics', Center for Applied Research in the Apostolate, <http://cara.georgetown.edu/frequently-requested-church-statistics/>.

²⁹ Human Rights, 'Issues: International Religious Freedom', [Http://humanrights.gov/dyn/issues/international-Religious-Freedom.html](http://humanrights.gov/dyn/issues/international-Religious-Freedom.html), 29 April 2013, <http://www.humanrights.gov/dyn/issues/international-religious-freedom.html>; Bureau of Public Affairs Department Of State. The Office of Website Management, 'Religious Freedom', 20 January 2009, <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/irf/>.

³⁰ Benedict XVI, "Welcoming Ceremony Address of His Holiness Benedict XVI" *Vatican*, http://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en/speeches/2008/april/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20080416_welcome-washington.html.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Michael Zöllner, *Washington and Rome: Catholicism in American Culture*, trans. Steven Rendall and Albert Wimmer (Notre Dame, Ind: University of Notre Dame Press, 1999), 169.

³³ George Nauman Shuster, *The Catholic Spirit in America* (New York: Arno Press, 1978).

Lastly, inter-religious dialogue is important for both actors. Before the 1960s the Church had little interest in it, seen in the Good Friday pre-Conciliar Mass where there was a prayer for the conversion of Jews.³⁴ During the Council, documents on the importance of inter-religious dialogue such as *Nostra aetate* (In our Time) were written. It also addresses the Church's relationship with non-Christian religions.³⁵

Inter-religious dialogue is an important issue in international relations for the United States in light of the problems it faces in the Middle East. Islam and Islamic theology has become a high profile topic that is debated more widely than before the height of secularisation theory.³⁶ The Holy See can play a vital role in assisting the United States to better understand, and perhaps even engage with, Islam.

This section has laid out that due to historical, philosophical and cultural reasons, the United States should be more amenable to the influence of religious actors. The Holy See, given its unique legal personality, should be better able to exert influence than other NGOs and religious groups given its diplomatic status. All of these are *milieu* goals and as will be argued have little influence when interacting with US possession goals during the wars.

Holy See (In)Ability to Influence

What factors limited the Holy See's ability to influence US foreign policy? Despite the similarities stated above, this thesis will examine the supposition that the Holy See had little soft power, a term coined by Joseph Nye, defined as the power of attraction. Nye claims an actor obtains what it wants by a wish to emulate, alternatively it "rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others"³⁷ to influence US foreign policy. Partly because of the scale of the task, ultimately *milieu* goals are weak when they interact with narrowly defined US possession goals. Reflecting this ultimate problem; its lack of relevance to the debate, political culture, divisions within the Church, the Holy See's failure to advocate for concrete policies, institutional factors, popular support for the wars as well as systemic factors, namely the Holy

³⁴ The 1955 text of the prayer was as follows: *Oremus et pro perfidis iudæis: ut Deus et Dominus noster auferat velamen de cordibus eorum; ut et ipsi agnoscant Iesum Christum, Dominum nostrum* (Let us pray also for the faithless Jews: that almighty God may remove the veil from their hearts; so that they too may acknowledge Jesus Christ our Lord).

³⁵ Paul VI, "Nostra aetate", http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decl_19651028_nostra-aetate_en.html.

³⁶ William McCants, 'Islamic Scripture Is Not the Problem: And Funding Muslim Reformers Is Not the Solution', *Foreign Affairs*, 94, no. 4 (July/August 2015); Ayaan Hirsi Ali 'A Problem From Heaven: Why the United States Should Back Islam's Reformation', *Foreign Affairs* 94 no. 4, (July/August 2015).

³⁷ Nye, *Soft Power*, 5.

See's legal status and foreign policy principles, reduced its ability to leverage its soft power to successfully challenge US possession goals.

Despite this, the use of soft power will give three insights into Holy See foreign policy. It will show the utility of hard power and the Holy See's complex relationship with force. Although supportive of the just war tradition, the Holy See rejected the possibility that either war could be moral. In both instances the Holy See rejected, even denied, power inequalities among states and sought dialogue to resolve the issues. As will be developed later, this thesis also gives insights into the limits of soft power with the dangers of transferring Cold War events into a post-Cold War context. Claims of Holy See soft power being central to, for example the 2014 revival of US-Cuba relations, should not be oversimplified. The final insight is that soft power links the domestic and international levels of analysis. In doing so it creates a more nuanced approach that other theories, such as structural realism, would omit. Using structural realism would also elide other important factors such as history and culture that help explain the Holy See's attempts to attract the United States.

Some scholars have read soft power as one state attempting to influence another. Haynes has extended it to religious actors.³⁸ This thesis aims to contribute to both areas due to the Holy See's special "actorness" of being both an international actor and through the Church, a religion. Ultimately, the Holy See's focus on *milieu* goals made the Holy See's soft power insufficiently attractive to alter US policies. Haynes, similar to Nye's formulation that will be discussed in the next chapter, argues that soft power includes "culture, values, ideas".³⁹ While these are shared at the most basic level the ideas are too vague and the culture too different for soft power's effectiveness to overcome the clearer US possession goals against Iraq in 1991 and 2003.

Crucially, influence and soft power are not equivalent. Influence can be gained through hard power or financial inducements. Correspondingly, "the exercise of soft power not only relies on persuasion or the capacity to convince people by argument, but also rests on the ability to *attract*" (emphasis in original).⁴⁰ Repeated Holy See attempts to attract the United States illustrate its lack of relevance. Yet, it was irrelevant because of its *milieu* goals which in turn were a result of its innate religious identity. Without this relevance, it could not hope to successfully use whatever soft power it is attributed with.

³⁸ Jeffrey Haynes, *Religious Transnational Actors and Soft Power*, New edition (Farnham, Surrey; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2012), 92.

³⁹ Ibid, 93.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

Holsti claims four points affect a state's ability to influence. The first is that a state's resources do not equate with influence.⁴¹ Essentially, Holy See soft power "resources" were not relevant to attracting the United States. Over these cases Holy See resources were non-existent. Its focus on *milieu* goals, shaping the international environment, made its soft power when confronted with US desires for security, impossible to operationalise. Holsti argues unless a resource is credible, it is useless. In this instance the Holy See had few resources to gain influence. Indeed, through its religious character and subsequent focus on altering the environment, with its focus on dialogue and international law and the UN, it was unable to address narrow US security concerns.

His second point is the extent to which one state needs another. He claims a relationship exists between a state that needs another and the level of influence. The United States did not "need" the Holy See, so its lack of support for the wars did not alter US possession goals to take this into account. However, US attempts to woo the Holy See may indicate it desired Holy See support for its own political and moral ends to advance its possession goals. Although seemingly not enough to implement the Holy See's desire for the US to work within a changed environment. As will be argued later, attempts to attract the Holy See to the US position fundamentally misunderstood Holy See diplomacy and its constraints. The distinctiveness of the Holy See's particular sovereignty will be explored later but this made wielding influence based on "need" especially difficult.

Holsti's third point on a state's ability to influence is based on technical expertise. Holy See diplomacy avoids specifics and concentrates on the broad environment in which others operate. Consequently, its wish to exercise soft power through *milieu* goals undermined any claim to technical expertise. The Holy See views itself as an "expert on humanity".⁴² However, such a view of itself did not convince the United States and only heightened the distance between the narrow possession goals, seeking security and the Holy See's wish for a changed environment. Concurrently it was constrained by its theology and neutrality. These constraints will be addressed more fully in subsequent chapters.

Finally, Holsti argues that actors' costs and commitments need to be recognised as "success in the wielding of influence seems to be related also to the extent to which the

⁴¹ K.J. Holsti, *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*, Sixth edition (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1992), 122-124.

⁴² Paul VI, 'Address of the Holy Father Paul VI to the United Nations Organisation' 4 October 1965 http://w2.vatican.va/content/paul-vi/en/speeches/1965/documents/hf_p-vi_spe_19651004_united-nations.html.

objectives of the states are compatible”.⁴³ This work demonstrates just how different the two actors are through culture and worldviews. Consequently, the lack of influence of one over the other is to be expected.

The Church in America could be viewed as more culturally “European” as it encompasses many different traditions and views, but generally could be seen as more accepting of the state’s role in society. The culture of the United States tends to be more individualistic.⁴⁴ This individualism is reflective of a cultural Protestantism that will be demonstrated in the militaristic, Jacksonian, spirit. This has a substantial effect on its influence when the Church attempts to advocate for certain policies. This individualism, it will be posited, weakens Church ties to individual Catholics and allows for a dominant Protestant culture to take precedence. This clashes with the “European” background of the US bishops.

For example, they have collectively praised universal health care.⁴⁵ Similarly, they have supported policies that raise the minimum wage⁴⁶ and support Social Security.⁴⁷ Many of these positions cannot be seen as exclusively “European”. Yet it may have been a factor in diminished attraction when contrasted with elements in US culture. Importantly, the bishops do not argue for the precise way to implement these policies. They simply suggest general priorities they view as important.

Chapters IV and VI will explore how the US has a profoundly different political culture to many European nations. Jacksonianism has an important role in shaping how the United States interacts with other states.⁴⁸ When combined with a more binary view of the world, from a Reformed Protestantism, it tends to reinforce the martial aspects and under certain conditions, makes war more likely to receive public support.

Underlining the ongoing significance of these issues, an article appeared in *La Civiltà Cattolica* written by two authors thought to be close to Pope Francis.⁴⁹ The magazine is

⁴³ Holsti, *International Politics*, 124.

⁴⁴ Stephanie M. Walls, *Individualism in the United States: A Transformation in American Political Thought* (New York: Continuum Publishing Corporation, 2015).

⁴⁵ Daniel DiNardo, William Murphy and John Wester, “Setting the record straight” USCCB, <http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/human-life-and-dignity/health-care/statement-by-cardinal-dinardo-bishops-murphy-wester-on-healthcare-2010-05-21.cfm>.

⁴⁶ USCCB, “Catholic Leaders Urge Senate to Promote Decent Work and Just Wages”, USCCB, <http://www.usccb.org/news/2014/14-003.cfm>

⁴⁷ USCCB, “2005 Social Security Background”, <http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/human-life-and-dignity/social-security/2005-background.cfm>

⁴⁸ Walter Russell Mead, *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World*, First edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2001).

⁴⁹ Antonio Spadaro and Marcelo Figueroa, ‘Evangelical Fundamentalism and Catholic Integralism: A Surprising Ecumenism’, *La Civiltà Cattolica*, 2017, <http://www.laciviltacattolica.it/articolo/evangelical-fundamentalism-and-catholic-integralism-in-the-usa-a-surprising-ecumenism/>.

reviewed by the Secretariat of State prior to publication. The article suggests a binary understanding unites certain Evangelical Protestants and Catholics. It openly names Steve Bannon, who at the time of its publication was serving in the Trump administration as a “supporter of apocalyptic geopolitics”. Allen points to the rarity of speaking so directly on the internal politics of another state. The complexity of the Holy See’s “actorness” is made clear with the Church’s “diplomatic entity” criticising a member of the presidential administration. The US bishops have criticised Bannon also, with White noting the rarity of the public intervention.⁵⁰ The article in *Civiltà Cattolica* is especially noteworthy because, as will be seen later, the Holy See goes to great lengths to maintain its neutrality. So the Holy See’s “actorness” is complicated by its international role with its neutrality taking precedence before a desire to maximise its soft power. Allen contends how each side criticised the pope for different reasons. Allen claims the ideological left chastise the pope for misunderstanding the role of the laity in the US, but Allen also argues the right now suggest the pope failed to appreciate the benefits of the US in the world. Allen concludes highlighting how others have noted the prevalence of binary ideas.⁵¹ These will feature prominently in this thesis as a factor in weakening Holy See soft power. Accordingly, these cultural issues are not merely historical but are of continuing relevance to comprehending US-Holy See relations.

Jacksonianism and exceptionalism view the existence and actions of the US as special. Two options exist, either as an active role shaping the world, or as an example to be followed.⁵² In recent times the active role has been the dominant interpretation. For example, George H.W. Bush argued for US engagement rather than isolation after the Cold War.

Related to this lack of specificity is partisanship. In the United States, Catholic Social Teaching (CST) can be evenly split between the Republican Party and the Democratic Party. The Church favours the social justice efforts that are commonly associated with the Democratic Party but simultaneously is viewed as socially conservative and thus closer to the Republican Party. From the point of lobbying, this could be seen as making the Church less effective.

A major reason for the Church not being more influential is its sheer size. With this size comes diversity and it could be argued that a numerically smaller Church may be more unified.

⁵⁰ Christopher White, ‘U.S. bishops fire back at Bannon’s comments on immigrants and DACA’ Crux, 7 September 2017, <https://cruxnow.com/church-in-the-usa/2017/09/07/bannon-says-daca-bishops-just-another-guy-opinion/>

⁵¹ John L. Allen, ‘Agree or Not, It’s Good to Know What Vatican Insiders Think of America’, Crux, 16 July 2017, <https://cruxnow.com/analysis/2017/07/16/agree-not-good-know-vatican-insiders-think-america/>.

⁵² Ernest Lee Tuveson, *Redeemer Nation: The Idea of America’s Millennial Role*, New edition (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 1980).

A connection may exist between the size and unity of an organisation and its corresponding influence. Accordingly, if there were fewer Catholics that were more unified it may be possible that they may be more cohesive. If this was the case, it may lead to greater influence in a democratic society.

Domestic Politics

Domestic factors in the US considerably weakened Holy See soft power. Political culture, in the form of Jacksonianism and exceptionalism, had a substantial role in shaping US *milieu* and possession goals. In turn this weakened the Holy See's soft power and the pursuit of its *milieu* goals. Divisions within the Church between the bishops, laity and media eroded whatever soft power the Holy See possessed. The role of US institutions also contributed to the dearth of Holy See soft power. Though divisions existed in Congress, instead of using its soft power to advocate for the Holy See's *milieu* goals, the presidency exerted its dominance. Enough in Congress ultimately accepted the presidency's definition of possession goals, and how they should be implemented, to approve both wars. Similarly, opinion polls broadly indicated support for both wars which undermined Holy See soft power. In doing so, Holy See *milieu* goals were weakened against the strength of US possession goals. Lastly, two historical incidents damaged the Holy See's soft power and its attempts to advocate for its *milieu* goals. The first was the end of the Cold War which gave "evidence" to those who believed in American exceptionalism. The weakening and eventual end of the Soviet Union was seen as confirmation of the superiority of the US economic and political system. This pride, undermined any actor who urged caution in using force. The second was the 2002 sex abuse crisis which received widespread public attention. Given the scale of the scandal and the subsequent response from the pope it shattered the Church's, and Holy See's, claims to moral authority.

Nye connects the domestic and international levels of analysis by linking how a state acts domestically to its level of soft power. He acknowledges material power but does not dismiss domestic factors to explain how a state acts. Soft power is useful as it helps introduce domestic aspects such as culture. National myths are a large part of political culture. These myths in turn reflect a nation's self-perception, such as in the United States where the notion that freedom and liberty are fundamental to the national consciousness. Chapter II will discuss how in spite of a lack of evidence, these myths are stronger than reality and weakened Holy See soft power and its ability to attract the United States to its *milieu* goals.

However, culture should not be used as a catch-all phrase to explain what cannot be otherwise justified, as obvious dangers exist in making generalisations. Although this point is generally valid, it does not apply to this thesis for three reasons. Exceptionalism is a form of nationalism, a well-studied idea. Jacksonianism is rooted in the events of Jackson's presidency, ideas of military force and US history, and ideas about the folk community, all of these are relevant to this work. Finally, this study engages with other theories of political culture as part of the argument. Both Jacksonianism and exceptionalism are often in tension with Holy See foreign policy.

Culture can be difficult to define. However, the differences in culture are most visible when contrasted with others. Although culture can change, this normally occurs slowly. Even significant shocks can reinforce national myths, one illustration being the 11th September attacks. The same language of the global role of the United States was used, with continuity emphasised and an expansive role promoted over other interpretations. Soft power can stress how culture can bolster in explaining how power is used and justified in seeking possession goals. In turn this can explain a dearth of Holy See soft power compared to its *milieu* goals.

The relationship between political culture and influence is complex. The contention that culture is the opposite of power has been claimed. Moreover, the lack of links between culture and international relations and thus ideas of identity and foreign policy have been noted.⁵³ On both these counts, this thesis hopes to contribute. However, some general points can be made.

Many nations share parts of their cultures with others. Thus, it has long been argued that the United Kingdom and United States have similar cultures.⁵⁴ Part of this may be due to a historical Protestantism that stressed the individual's relationship to God. Soft power will be used to explore how these cultural links made war more likely and how this individualism contrasted with the Holy See's more communitarian mind-set, which together weakened Holy See influence in advancing its *milieu* goals.

What is the consequence of a divided Church on exerting influence? Put another way, how important is a unified community in exerting soft power? This is one of the central questions of this thesis. Obviously the context of the question is important, whether it takes place in a democracy including the relationship between the Church and state but being unified is central to ultimate success.

⁵³ Valerie M. Hudson and Martin W. Sampson III, 'Culture Is More than a Static Residual: Introduction to the Special Section on Culture and Foreign Policy', *Political Psychology* 20, no. 4 (1 December 1999): 667–75.

⁵⁴ Russell Kirk, *America's British Culture* (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 1993).

Max Weber famously addressed three sources of authority: traditional, legal and charismatic. Religion could be said to be a mix of the first and last of these. This thesis concerns the nexus between the clash of the traditional and charismatic sources of authority against the legal. Normally these two sources of authority are not easily enforced and so are more suited to *milieu* goals over possession goals. As Anderson entitled his most famous work, all nations are *Imagined Communities*.⁵⁵ Thus, this thesis is also an exploration of the tensions between the American community and the Catholic community.

The Church has always had divisions. Saint Paul and Saint Peter disagreed over whether new converts to Christianity should observe Jewish dietary laws. That Catholics should be divided is not surprising. This study concerns the blending of culture, religion and identity. Debate has occurred as to how far religion should be intertwined with culture, or more detached from it. “Americanism” was exactly this, a late nineteenth century dispute between US bishops. One group wanted greater assimilation with American culture and society, while another sought to remain more aloof. The principal issues that surrounded the controversy were ethnic assimilation and education. The importance of the controversy was highlighted by Morris who writes, “Not for another century, in the theological disputes that followed the Second Vatican Council, would American Catholic churchmen have at one another so bitterly, or with such unrestrained vitriol”.⁵⁶

The divisions within the modern Church could be said to be more all-encompassing. Commenting on the divisions in the contemporary Church in the United States, one writer noted a 2016 speech of Pope Francis in which the pontiff asked his audience to, “‘Please, fight against divisions’ he [Francis] urged, ‘because it is one of the weapons that the devil has to destroy the local church and the universal church....The church is called to be able to put herself always above tribal-cultural connotations and the bishop, [as] visible principle of unity, has the task to build the particular church incessantly in the communion of all her members.’ By the pontiff’s standard, the chattering class of the Stateside Church must be Satan’s favorite playground”.⁵⁷

The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) was divided during both wars. Some factions were against and some “for” the wars. This weakened its domestic

⁵⁵ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 2006).

⁵⁶ Charles R. Morris, *American Catholic: The Saints and Sinners Who Built America’s Most Powerful Church* (New York: Times Books, 1997), 85.

⁵⁷ Rocco Palmo, ‘The Doctor Is In – In “Mercy” Doubleheader, Pope Visits NICU, Aims To Treat “Narcissism”’, *Whispers in the Loggia* (blog), 18 September 2016, <http://whispersintheloggia.blogspot.co.uk/2016/09/a-mercy-friday-doubleheader-pope-visits.html>.

lobbying strength and at the same time it impacted the Holy See's international ability to attract the US government to its *milieu* goals to resolve the crises without resorting to force.

Dolan writes that US Catholics "want to forge a religious identity that is faithful to the Catholic tradition and at the same time rooted in American culture".⁵⁸ This could be seen as a repetition of the Americanist debate. The desire to resolve tensions between being wholly Catholic and at the same time an active citizen have still not abated. This thesis suggests that although this tension is not "resolved", many Catholics see themselves as American first and Catholic second.

Catholics disagree over sexual morality, the extent of the role of the free market and importance of social justice. Church teaching and influence (what could be called domestic *milieu* goals) is weakened by some seeing particular issues as more significant than others. A poll indicated that less than 10% saw their religion as being the most important influence on issues such as immigration and the environment. This contrasts with 35% who said it was the primary influence on their views on gay marriage.⁵⁹ Of particular relevance is Shelledy's contention that religious organisations will only have influence when they have unity and secular resonance, "the ideas that a religious organization advances must be attractive to those who do not believe in the transcendent".⁶⁰

If Catholics in the United States were more united on Church teaching, in its entirety, they would form a powerful bloc.⁶¹ Domestically, the Church seems to have great difficulty overturning culture, history and profound philosophical differences with the United States. The Holy See cannot attract the US sufficiently to implement its *milieu* goals. Moreover, Catholics in America are more likely to act as *American Catholics*, contrary to Byrnes's argument.⁶² They were not attracted by the Holy See's *milieu* goals, so the Holy See's unique "actorness" made little difference in this instance. Put another way, their nationality takes precedence before their religion as President Kennedy argued in his 12 September 1960 address to Protestant ministers in Texas. Tensions between definitions of community, as will be explored, are central to enhancing divisions between the bishops, laity and media.

⁵⁸ Jay P. Dolan, *In Search of an American Catholicism: A History of Religion and Culture in Tension* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 197.

⁵⁹ 'Few Say Religion Shapes Immigration, Environment Views', *Pew Research Center's Religion & Public Life Project*, <http://www.pewforum.org/2010/09/17/few-say-religion-shapes-immigration-environment-views/>.

⁶⁰ Robert Shelledy, "Legions Not Always Visible on Parade: The Vatican's Influence in World Politics" (PhD diss, University of Madison-Wisconsin, 2003), 1.

⁶¹ Shelledy, 'Legions Not Always Visible on Parade', 10.

⁶² Timothy A. Byrnes, 'Sovereignty, Supranationalism, and Soft Power: The Holy See in International Relations', *The Review of Faith and International Affairs* 15 no. 4 (2017): 6-20.

Government institutions, as will be shown throughout, are a crucial part of this work. Only a reduced comprehension of a policy's implementation will be understood without an understanding of how decisions are made and the way structure acts. Differing powers between the branches of the US government should mean tensions. Yet presidential powers allowed the executive wide scope to shape the US response.

Polls show information at a moment in time. Although they should be treated with caution they are useful to provide a cross-section of what Americans, including some Catholics, think. Differences between individuals and most Christian denominational opposition to the war is illustrated. The sway of culture will be postulated as a contributory factor for their views.

Specific historical circumstances can substantially alter how events are perceived. For example, without the fall of the Soviet Union, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait would be seen differently. Chinese abstention in the UN Security Council resolution vote authorising war against Iraq, as will be argued, sought to avoid attention especially after the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. Before the 2003 war, the sex abuse crisis stripped the bishops and pope of their moral authority to oppose the war. These specific events lessened the Church's soft power, and weakened the sense of community between Rome and Catholics in the United States.

In essence, domestic factors had a substantial role in the success of the Holy See's pursuit of its soft power through its *milieu*, and possession, goals against the wars. Accordingly, what domestic factors weakened Holy See influence over the United States in the 1991 and 2003 Iraq Wars? It has been suggested that these are political culture, divisions, institutional factors, polling and the specific historical context. Each will be taken in turn to examine how they weakened Holy See influence on the United States.

International Politics

Principally this is a thesis of international relations but uses both domestic and international levels of analysis to answer the question as to why the Holy See lacked soft power. The Holy See's "actorness", the word to describe its unique mix of traditional state-like characteristics mixed with a global religion, made little difference to its soft power. As the next section will argue, at times this "actorness" weakened its capacity to relate to the United States and constrained its ability to act through its neutrality. This neutrality was both a policy and a strategy.⁶³ However, this neutrality undermined its efforts to attract the United States but served

⁶³ Ryall, 'How Many Divisions?'.

Holy See possession goals to separate all Christians, in the eyes of those living in the Middle East, from the US actions in both wars. It did this to protect the Catholics and non-Catholic Christians living in the region.

Related to this is its foreign policy principles which stem from the Church's interpretation of its theology. Later sections will discuss these principles. It will contend that these were flexible. Indeed, they are so flexible that they could oppose the wars for contradictory reasons. Central to the argument is the application of *milieu* and possession goals to both actors and the blurring of this distinction for both actors. These complications reflect the Holy See's unique "actorness".

As has been discussed above, domestic elements are important for answering the question. Indeed, soft power, does not abrogate other forms of power. At its most basic, this work is of a small "state" attempting to exert soft power on a large state. Normally, the answer of whether a small state can influence a large state is clear. Yet, this case does not easily follow such simple lines due to the Holy See's connections with the Church and the need to link the domestic and international levels of analysis.

Holy See "actorness"

To understand how the Catholic Church operates through the Holy See, it is necessary to develop how it interacts as a religious actor with its special legal personality. The section will examine the Holy See's "actorness"; through its moral leadership and its relationship to *milieu* goals, its traditional foreign ministry, the Holy See's exceptional legal personality and its differences to the Vatican City State and NGOs and its place within the UN, the theological sources of Holy See foreign policy, its diplomacy of *ad-hoc* coalitions and the annual papal speech to diplomats accredited to the Holy See. It will argue that this "actorness" made it harder to relate to, and attract, the United States. However, because it was harder to relate to, its voice was in the "wilderness". In turn it made it distinct from the US and so, easier to achieve its possession goals in the Middle East.

Troy has argued that the pope and UN Secretary-General have a special relationship in their "potential for moral leadership".⁶⁴ This "potential" is borne out not just because the pope is the sovereign of the Vatican City State but rather as Troy suggests because the pope represents something beyond the particular, and for the collective. This is a central dimension

⁶⁴ Troy, 'Two "Popes" to Speak for the World'.

of the Holy See's "actorness". As this thesis argues, this broader scope forms its *milieu* (and possession) goals. However, in doing so its soft power is weakened as its scope clashes with US possession goals. Thus, its "actorness" is both a strength in certain circumstances, but in relating to the US, a weakness. Therefore it is harder to relate to traditional states which assists in advancing its possession goals in the international "wilderness".

How the Holy See conducts its diplomacy is illustrative of its special status. The Secretariat of State, headed by the Secretary of State a sort of papal prime minister and chief diplomat, is sub-divided into two sections. The First Section run by an archbishop, the Substitute (*Sostituto*) for General Affairs, addresses internal Church matters. His deputy, the assessor for General Affairs, is an effective deputy chief of staff. The Second Section, the Holy See's foreign ministry, is also directed by an archbishop, the secretary for Relations with States, who is always a diplomat and graduate of the Holy See's diplomatic school, the Pontifical Ecclesiastical Academy (PEA). At the PEA priests are taught the practicalities of Holy See diplomacy such as how to run a nunciature, as well as language and history courses while concurrently obtaining a doctorate in theology or canon law at a Roman university.⁶⁵ The secretary's deputy, the under-secretary for Relations with States, is always a priest and PEA graduate.

The Holy See is the international legal personality (having legal rights and duties) of the Church. The Holy See allows the Church to act as an international actor analogous to, but *not*, a state. Thus, it can send and receive ambassadors, formally called apostolic nuncios, and can promulgate international treaties. It is the only religion with this ability, which is unmatched by even the largest non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The Vatican City State and the Holy See are comparable but not related. The former is a piece of territory in Rome, the latter the international legal personality of the Catholic Church. The Holy See still existed as a recognised international actor that sent and received diplomatic missions between 1870 and 1929, when the papacy did not control any territory during this period.⁶⁶ This is central to understanding its special "actorness" and how it, more or less, successfully relates to other states.

There are two ways to understand the Catholic Church as an international actor. The first of these is as the Holy See, the second is as an NGO. Some scholars have argued it is a

⁶⁵ Thomas J. Reese, *Inside the Vatican: The Politics and Organisation of the Catholic Church*, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1996), 149-151.

⁶⁶ "Bilateral Relations of the Holy See", Vatican, http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/secretariat_state/documents/rc_seg-st_20010123_holy-see-relations_en.html.

mix of these⁶⁷ Arajo and Lucal argue that “the Holy See is a unique entity *vis-à-vis* public international law”.⁶⁸ Consequently, its “actorness” means it can span both of these domains as both an NGO and “state” at the same time.

Abdullah has questioned the Holy See’s legal status and argues it should be treated like an NGO.⁶⁹ She concedes, “Even those scholars who maintain that the Holy See/Vatican City constitutes a state caution that it is a special case”.⁷⁰ The Holy See’s uniqueness differentiates it from NGOs who are not accorded the same status. Willetts notes the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is given specific mention in the Geneva Accords. Hence, it was given UN observer status.⁷¹ Like the ICRC, the Holy See has UN observer status. Yet, this does not empower the ICRC to act like a state. The Holy See has observer status by choice and could claim full membership at the UN due to its claims to non-geographic, spiritual, sovereignty.⁷² In response to criticisms from pro-abortion groups, angry at the Holy See’s role during the 1990s UN population conferences, the UN General Assembly affirmed the Holy See’s status and participation in a 2004 resolution.⁷³ Ryngaert posits that the Holy See is an observer state and not a non-state actor.⁷⁴ Differences therefore emerge between observer status and statehood, but ultimately underline its “actorness”.

In addition to these elements, its special “actorness” is represented in the sources of Holy See foreign policy which are fundamentally theological and make it unlike any other “state” but are implemented through a traditional foreign ministry. The principal elements of this theology consists of the unity of mankind, the common good and the primacy of international law to resolve disputes and ensure the “legal” equality of all states. How the Holy See reads its theology makes its foreign policy flexible. So, it saw both wars as distinct and opposed them for different reasons but it never explicitly set its arguments to each war within

⁶⁷ Lisa Ferrari, “The Vatican as a Transnational Actor” in Paul Christopher Manuel, Lawrence C. Reardon, and Clyde Wilcox, eds., *The Catholic Church and the Nation-State: Comparative Perspectives* (Washington, D.C: Georgetown University Press, 2006), 34.

⁶⁸ Robert John Araujo, *Papal Diplomacy and the Quest for Peace. The United Nations from Pius XII to Paul VI* (Philadelphia: Saint Joseph’s University Press, 2013), 2.

⁶⁹ Yasmin Abdullah, ‘The Holy See at United Nations Conferences: State or Church?’, *Columbia Law Review* 96, no. 7 (1 November 1996): 1835–75.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Peter Willetts, *Non-Governmental Organisation in World Politics: The Construction of Global Governance* (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2011), 67; ICRC Granted Observer Status, International Committee of the Red Cross <https://www.icrc.org/casebook/doc/case-study/united-nations-icrc-observer-case-study.htm>.

⁷² Robert A. Graham, *Vatican Diplomacy: A Study of the Church and State on the International Plane* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1959), 15.

⁷³ Ioana Cismas, *Religious Actors and International Law*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 216-217.

⁷⁴ Cedric Ryngaert, ‘The Legal Status of the Holy See’, *Goettingen Journal of International Law* 3, no. 3 (2011): 829-859.

the just war framework. As will be argued in subsequent chapters such flexibility allows it to oppose both wars for contradictory reasons. Its foundational principles are laid out in the *Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church* which was published by the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace in 2004.⁷⁵ In a single document, the nature and themes of the Church's interaction with social, political, economic, environmental and international questions are expounded. As these questions are non-dogmatic, the Church accepts differing points of view, although this is not stated in the document explicitly. A section on the "international community" lays out how themes of the "unity of the human family" and the community based on values and the need for co-operation should be the ordering principles of how states interact. In this way, the unique nature of Holy See "actorness" is made clearer in a world of states. The *Compendium* lays out the intersection of how its religious teachings informs its foreign policy principles and desires. Yet, unlike other religious actors such as the Dalai Lama or Shia religious leaders, the Holy See's widely recognised capacity to act on a par with states gives it a voice in official forums to advance its religiously informed *milieu* goals in light of its religious mission.

Stummvoll argues Holy See diplomacy "remains open to the option of engaging in *ad hoc* coalitions to promote its interests in specific issues".⁷⁶ So, Holy See pursuit of its possession goals are not bound by any formal or informal alliances, which in turn reflect its special "actorness". This is particularly true given that it is both unable and unwilling to form lasting alliances with other states due to its neutrality and theology.

Lastly, highlighting the Holy See's "actorness" in a particularly visible way is the papal speech to the diplomatic corps accredited to the Holy See at the start of each year. These speeches, sometimes informally called the "State of the World", allow the pope to examine the broad sweep of contemporary world events before the assembled diplomats while highlighting his concerns. John Paul II's speeches before the beginning of both wars are scrutinised below in detail. Symbolic of its "actorness" the speech is a *religious* actor speaking to diplomats accredited to it by virtue of its *religious* nature. Consequently, the complexity of its "actorness" is in many ways illustrated in this papal speech where the Holy See works within a system of states.

⁷⁵ Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, *Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church*, Vatican, 2004 http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/justpeace/documents/rc_pc_justpeace_doc_20060526_compendio-dott-soc_en.html.

⁷⁶ A. Alexander Stummvoll, *A Living Tradition: Catholic Social Doctrine and Holy See Diplomacy*, (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2018), 179.

This section has argued that the Holy See has a unique way of interacting with other states and religious actors. This “actorness” shapes the institutional, theoretical and public framing of Holy See diplomacy and how it pursues its *milieu* goals and relates to other actors.

Thus, the Holy See’s exceptional legal status allows it to interact with states, unlike NGOs but at the same time it has difficulty relating to states. Consequently it can seem like it exists in the “wilderness”. Due to the intimate relationship between the Holy See and the Catholic Church, the latter may be able to leverage Catholics in a resident country to support the Holy See’s foreign policy objectives and Church teaching. A question emerges, what role did the Holy See’s status play in its attempts to exert influence?

Holy See foreign policy principles stem from theology. These essentially comprise a belief in multilateralism, the importance of international institutions, the unity of mankind and the common good. Each of these can be interpreted according to circumstances. Consequently, the Holy See could oppose the 1991 war for not meeting just war criteria and oppose the 2003 war for not having international sanction. Obviously such notions clashed with the United States.

US-Holy See diplomatic relations

Now that a clear understanding of the Holy See’s special “actorness” has been developed a brief summary of US-Holy See diplomatic relations is needed. This is especially pertinent given that bilateral relations were formalised in 1984. Accordingly, this section will briefly outline the history of US-Holy See relations with particular reference to this “actorness”. It will posit that its “actorness” and anti-Catholicism were the principal obstacles to establishing formal diplomatic relations. Subsequently, a brief summary of US-Holy See diplomatic relations will be presented from the Holy See’s first contacts in the 1850s to the creation of the apostolic delegation in the 1890s. US ties to the Holy See will be examined from initial consular contacts in the 1790s to the various presidential “personal representatives” employed after the US mission was abandoned in the 1860s. Finally, the formal establishment of full diplomatic relations will be assessed in the personal, between Ronald Reagan and John Paul II, and historic context as well as the diminished national anti-Catholic sentiments.

The Holy See and the United States have had a complex historical relationship. US relations with the Holy See have been shaped by anti-Catholicism. Indeed, the Holy See’s special “actorness” was a significant part of US anti-Catholicism with many of the leading anti-

Catholic tropes revolving around the pope's international status.⁷⁷ This section will address both the Holy See and the United States. It will argue that the Holy See sought relations with the United States, while the United States took time to overcome the twin problems of anti-Catholicism and the Holy See's "actorness".

Archbishop Gaetano Bedini, visited the United States in 1853 "as a sort of political ambassador".⁷⁸ The visit was not successful and he was attacked and threatened on a number of occasions. It was not until 1886 that the Holy See again contacted the US government seeking relations.⁷⁹ Archbishop Francesco Satolli arrived in 1892 to the United States. Morris writes that the Holy See "longed for its own representative in America".⁸⁰ Satolli's appointment, as apostolic delegate in 1892, came about through the US government requesting maps for the 1892 Colombian exhibition. This marked 500 years since Columbus's voyage. An apostolic delegation was the pope's representative to the US bishops but not the US government, an apostolic nuncio. Satolli was sent with the maps and, after the US bishops thanked the pope he "would respond with the further beneficence of Satolli's permanent appointment".⁸¹ It was not until 1984 that the Holy See formally accredited a formal diplomat to the US government. This was the same year that the US sent a full ambassador to the Holy See. This illustrates the depth of the anti-Catholicism in the US that it took so long to mutually exchange ambassadors despite numerous attempts.

Although the Holy See never had full diplomatic relations with the US, it did send a number of lower diplomatic officials to Rome. The highest of these was the *charge d'affairs*, Rufus King, who left in 1868 shortly before the fall of the Papal States. Yet diplomatic ties were never formally broken, King left Rome. Anti-Catholicism was again a block to establishing full relations for the US. The nuncio in Paris wrote to the US ambassador to Paris, Benjamin Franklin asking if the pope could appoint a bishop for the US. The Continental Congress replied in 1784 that it had no jurisdiction in this affair.⁸² Consular (addressing concerns of US citizens only) relations were established in 1797. Establishing diplomatic relations would have meant the need for a Holy See ambassador in the US, which President

⁷⁷ Morris, *American Catholic*.

⁷⁸ Morris, *American Catholic*, 61.

⁷⁹ Gerald P Fogarty, *The Vatican and the American Hierarchy From 1870 to 1945*, (Wilmington, Delaware: Michael Glazier, 1985), 115.

⁸⁰ Morris, *American Catholic*, 103

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Graham, *Vatican Diplomacy*, 336.

Adams wished to avoid.⁸³ In 1848 relations were upgraded to “minister” level but despite advice, President Polk refused to establish full relations, with “significant anti-Catholic sentiments that existed”.⁸⁴ Graham writes that Franklin Roosevelt named Myron Taylor as his “personal representative” to the Holy See months after the outbreak of World War Two. By naming an official who was not a formal ambassador, it circumvented Senate hearings and the need for Congressional appropriations. At the same time as the announcement was made, Roosevelt’s sent letters to Jewish and Protestant leaders hoping for their cooperation “to advance the cause of peace throughout the world”.⁸⁵ Taylor was not an official ambassador but was granted complete diplomatic honours when meeting Pius XII in February 1940. Though not resident in Rome, Taylor remained “in office” until 1950. That Roosevelt had to write to Protestant and Jewish leaders illustrated his concern that anti-Catholicism was still strong enough to block establishing full diplomatic relations. Graham contends that far from the Holy See being offended as Roosevelt “only” sending a personal representative, “that the title of president’s personal representative only enhanced” Taylor’s standing.⁸⁶ In addition to Taylor’s appointment, that of a *charge d’affaires*, Harold Tittmann, was formally made shortly after Italy’s declaration of war on the United States in an effort to give Tittmann diplomatic protection.⁸⁷ Graham writes that the State Department had a choice, either give Tittmann official status or have Italy force him to leave. That it chose the former and ignored elements of popular opinion and readings of the constitution, Graham argues, illustrates the State Department’s priority.⁸⁸ Again, anti-Catholicism is a factor in limiting Taylor’s official mission but was overridden in Tittmann’s case during the war. Indeed, Graham argues that concerns over mixing Church and State were predominant instead of anti-Catholicism. In their article Essig and Moore note that this belief does not breach First Amendment concerns over establishing an official religion and negated the Holy See’s unique status which “protects its diplomatic status from constitutional attack”.⁸⁹ In essence, this is a problem of understanding the Holy See’s unique “actorness”. It is both an international diplomatic actor as well as part

⁸³ Andrew M. Essig and Jennifer L. Moore, ‘U.S.-Holy See Diplomacy: The Establishment of Formal Relations, 1984’, *The Catholic Historical Review* 95, no. 4 (2009): 741–64.

⁸⁴ Samuel W. Bettwy, ‘United States-Vatican Recognition: Background and Issues’, *The Catholic Lawyer* 29, no. 3 (1984): 225-265.

⁸⁵ Graham, *Vatican Diplomacy*, 326.

⁸⁶ *Ibid*, 329.

⁸⁷ *Ibid*, 332.

⁸⁸ *Ibid*, 333.

⁸⁹ Essig and Moore, ‘U.S.-Holy See Diplomacy’.

of the Church connected through the pope to states, bishops' conferences and dioceses to each Catholic.

After Taylor resigned, Truman nominated General Mark Clark to the post of full ambassador in 1951. However, objections to the appointment "flooded" the White House and Clark withdrew his name.⁹⁰ All subsequent presidents returned to the "personal representative" until, as Essig and Moore argue, a combination of personalities and timing meant Ronald Reagan nominated his then representative William Wilson as the first full ambassador in 1984.

Before Wilson's confirmation Jerry Falwell leader of the Protestant, Moral Majority group asked "I wonder what will happen when Mecca wants an ambassador. I told the White House that if they give one to the pope, I could ask for one myself".⁹¹ Aside from the credibility Falwell may have gained from this remark, and its latent anti-Catholicism, it either accidentally, or deliberately, misunderstands the Holy See's "actorness". Falwell conflates the Vatican City and Holy See. As was highlighted earlier, the Holy See has a non-territorial sovereignty and is not dependent on the existence of the Vatican City for its international presence and thus diplomatic recognition. At the same time he appears to warn of an "Islamic" ambassador from "Mecca" will be the next step.

This section has examined the history of US-Holy See diplomatic relations. It has suggested that the Holy See's special "actorness" and anti-Catholicism were the main blocks to the establishment of formal diplomatic relations. Before they were formally established in 1984 after weakened national anti-Catholic sentiments.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Massimo Franco, *Parallel Empires: The Vatican and the United States-Two Centuries of Alliance and Conflict*. Translated Ronald Flaminio, (New York: Doubleday Books, 2009). 96.

Research Questions

Given the previous sections the following questions arise. The aim of this thesis is to investigate **how it is we can better characterise the dilemmas raised by power and disunity which face the Holy See in its foreign policy?** Associated questions will be:

- What domestic and international elements shape Holy See soft power?
- What insights can be drawn from possession and *milieu* goals to analyse the place of Holy See foreign policy within the international system?

Related to the primary question is why there might have been an expectation that the Holy See would be influential. The degree to which the Holy See successfully influenced US foreign policy will be examined: each chapter will scrutinise how the Holy See attempted to alter US government policy, the reasons that contributed to its lack of success and whether anything could have been done differently for it to succeed.

The central hypothesis is to test how the Holy See attempted to use influence to persuade the United States to alter its policies in the case studies. It will be argued that the divided nature of US Catholics reduced the domestic pressure they may otherwise have exerted on the US government on behalf of the Holy See.

Thesis Structure

This study has introduced the theoretical framework of soft power in conjunction with *milieu* and possession goals. This was chosen due to its links to religion, identity and culture. Furthermore, soft power is able to link the domestic and international levels of analysis. The case studies were laid out and their importance stressed. The background outlined why the Holy See may have soft power but also reasons for its inability to influence. Domestic and international factors were examined with the research questions emerging from this.

The thesis will be divided into four parts. The first part will contain the Introduction and Theory chapters. Part Two will examine the 1991 Iraq War and Part Three will examine the 2003 Iraq War. Between Part Two and Three there is considerable similarity. Thus, Chapters III and V mirror each other, in that both lay out the actors' positions before the 1991 and 2003 wars respectively. Both give context and causes for the wars. The reasons for the Holy See's opposition, steps it took to avert war and the speed of its diplomacy will then be assessed. Following the Holy See stance and actions, both chapters examine the US position, and its reasons for going to war against Iraq on both occasions, before exploring what the US did with this decision and how it relates to allies and the UN.

The mirroring continues between Chapters IV and VI in Parts Two and Three. These chapters seek to answer the problems of power and disunity for the Holy See opposition to the wars. Together these two chapters are divided into domestic and systemic reasons reflecting soft power. Domestic elements begin both chapters with political culture (Jacksonianism and Exceptionalism) weakening the relevance of Holy See arguments. Each chapter examines divisions within Catholicism, within the bishops, laity and media. These divisions showed the Church was not united which correspondingly negated any attractive power it had. Subsequently, how the presidents' powers and Congress's abandonment their powers made each war more likely will be developed. Diverging from Chapter IV, Chapter VI argues that the 2002 Church sex abuse crisis damaged its moral credibility in opposing the 2003 Iraq War. The mirroring resumes with the systemic sections. Chapters IV and VI examine the Holy See's legal status and contend that in both wars it was largely irrelevant. The Holy See's foreign policy principles are scrutinised in both chapters, with the flexibility of Catholic Social Teaching stressed in both. This allowed the Holy See to find ways to oppose wars that otherwise met its criteria for a just war. Those same principles, in 2003, enable it to reintroduce themes that it minimised or ignored for the 1991 war.

Part Four will consist of Chapter VII, the conclusion, and will draw these threads together. It will argue that insights come from using soft power as a theoretical lens to analyse the Holy See. It will also maintain that rather than a clear distinction between traditional actors seeking to advance possession goals and non-traditional actors stressing *milieu* goals, this distinction becomes blurred. In effect, both actors had *milieu* and possession goals. The United States, as well as seeking security, sought to portray itself as acting for the broader international environment. Concurrently, the Holy See, used its vocal opposition to the Iraq wars to pursue its possession goals. After this the main findings will be discussed, followed by the contribution to the literature. It will conclude with avenues for future research.

Chapter II

Theory

This chapter lays out the theoretical lens of culture and soft power to analyse Holy See foreign policy. Culture will be examined and laid out. It is important as it helps frame a state's responses. It also reflects and shapes identity, so its inclusion is particularly pertinent to understand how Holy See soft power was weakened through power and disunity in seeking to advance its *milieu* goals.

Soft power is a useful lens as its usage demonstrates its limitations and how culture interacts with soft power to shape Holy See foreign policy. Joseph Nye's soft power was formulated in his 1990 work, *Bound to Lead*.¹ Nye expanded his theory in 2004 defining it as "the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments".² Nye argues that soft power rests on three factors, an actors' "culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority)".³ Each of these will be related to the Holy See's soft power and how these interact with Wolfers' possession and *milieu* goals in seeking to shape US foreign policy. Nye cites Wolfers possession and *milieu* goals but argues that actors must pursue both goals to be successful in foreign policy.⁴ Nye accepts the limitations of soft power in achieving national interests like "preventing attack" but suggests using soft power for *milieu* goals is "particularly relevant".⁵

Having taken culture, values and foreign policy in turn, methodology, methods and research design will be discussed. Critically, as Nye claims, "all power depends on context – who relates to whom under what circumstances – but soft power depends more than hard power upon the existence of willing interpreters and receivers".⁶ How soft power can be related to a historical case study method will be stressed as especially suitable for this study. It will be noted how this method returns to older IR epistemological conceptions. Flowing from this, it

¹ Joseph Nye Jr, *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (Basic Books: New York, 1990).

² Nye, *Soft Power*, x.

³ Ibid, 11.

⁴ Ibid, 17.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid, 16.

will be suggested that these older ideas shaped the choice of case studies, research question and design.

Culture

Political culture will be examined through the lens of Jacksonianism and exceptionalism and the historical legacy of Calvinism (formally, Reformed Protestantism). These aspects of culture are important as they shape both how the US interacts with other states, the Holy See interacts with it and how Catholics in the United States see the world. Despite some religious roots of these cultural elements, they are starkly different from the Holy See's vision, and efficacy of its soft power.

Traditionally, culture is made up of norms, conventions and beliefs but it also frames "the conditions for rational action, explain the workings of institutions and sustain social practices across time".⁷ The exact veracity of these are not relevant. These ideas' resonance and how they interact with other narratives is important. Hudson differentiates between elite and popular culture.⁸ Both elite and popular Americans appear to have been inculcated with the same national myths. Drawing a strict separation would be unwise as, in this case, both reinforce the other to weaken alternative cultural views. Moreover, aspects of culture may be especially strong during wartime. Although obvious divisions existed on the wars, this elite and popular cultural unity was strong enough to undermine the Holy See's *milieu* goals. Specifically, Part Two notes how even President Bush, writing to his children in private, viewed Saddam Hussein as evil. This illustrates how Bush could not be separated from popular culture, with policy decisions at least partly stemming from this cultural view.

As a result, "many social scientists would agree that myths are important factors in themselves and their role in social behaviour is independent of whether they are true or false".⁹ Naturally, these consequences are examined here but would not be possible under a positivist framework.

Before discussing foreign policy and culture, a more general outline is needed before understanding how nationality, culture and identity relate to Catholicism. Early studies were based on "national character", now dismissed as unsophisticated.¹⁰ The "behaviouralist revolution" followed originating from "universalist assumptions about human behaviour and

⁷ Michael Keating, "Culture and social science", in Donatella Della Porta and Michael Keating, eds., *Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences: A Pluralist Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 108-109.

⁸ Valerie M. Hudson, "Culture and Foreign Policy: Developing a Research Agenda", in Valerie M. Hudson, ed., *Culture and Foreign Policy* (Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997), 17.

⁹ Della Porta and Keating, "How many approaches in the sciences?", 22.

¹⁰ Michael Keating, "Culture and social science", 100.

action and the search for a science of politics and society that would be valid everywhere”.¹¹ The post-positivist aspect of this thesis will be discussed later but it is important given the study of culture. Its advantage is its collective explanation. Definitional problems and concerns about isolating its impact made it less studied. Keating maintains that “the appropriate unit of analysis must depend on the research question” in addition to examining where the culture interacts with different cultures.¹²

Thankfully, US culture is a well-studied area and parts can be applied to foreign policy. Nevertheless, these collective differences cannot be easily transposed onto states.¹³ For example the UK, was closest to the United States before both wars. Connected to this is individuals’ holding competing identities, which are “forged by socialization into a culture”.¹⁴

How American Catholics relate to their religion and nationality are fundamental to this study. On a societal level, religion needs to be interpreted through others’ understanding for it to be grounded in a culture and state.¹⁵ The same can be said for states. Each reflects cultural interpretation and thus behaviours with other states.

Lotz posits that “successful politicians wield symbols that represent the core beliefs of a society, thus shaping public opinion”.¹⁶ Both presidents success at this use of symbols may partly account for the weakness of Holy See attraction. It refused, or was unable to, wield myths and symbols to its advantage. Lotz contends that myths are “the community’s perception of its own role and its environment”.¹⁷ In 1991 the George H.W. Bush administration drew parallels between Saddam Hussein and Hitler. Bush drew on an image of the United States as liberator. Lotz refers to notions of the “city on a hill” and exceptionalism. He proposes two notions of exceptionalism one of isolation and one of leadership, “proponents of Leadership focus on America’s moral strength and political power to spread and protect the American way of life, including democracy, market economy, and individualism”.¹⁸ All of these feature prominently, as part of a flexible tradition of myths and symbols, in US justification for pursuing its possession (and *milieu*) goals.

¹¹ Ibid, 101.

¹² Ibid, 112–13.

¹³ Ibid, 104.

¹⁴ Ibid, 109.

¹⁵ Ibid, 110.

¹⁶ Hellmut Lotz, "Myth and NAFTA: The Use of Core Values in U.S. Politics", in Valerie M. Hudson, ed., *Culture and Foreign Policy* (Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997), 74.

¹⁷ Lotz, "Myth and NAFTA", 76.

¹⁸ Hudson, 82.

Wiarda claims that “culture implies permanence and the difficulty of changing things, whereas ‘politics’ means the use of institutions to alter how people behave or their culture”.¹⁹ Ignoring political culture, he argues, leads to an incomplete understanding. Citing European and US examples, he claims that the Cold War hid differences. After 1989, he posits the divergent belief in God and the role of religion in public life, emerged between Europe and the United States.²⁰ Consequently, Holy See ability to influence should have been enhanced. Yet, US culture has been influenced by an individualistic Protestantism.²¹

Religion’s role within the United States would make it more open to them. As Alexis de Tocqueville said, “America is still the country in the world where the Christian religion has retained the greatest real power over people's souls”.²² Given their numerical size, Catholics might be expected to play a part. Civil religion, a term coined by Rousseau, has been defined as the “public religious dimension [which] is expressed in a set of beliefs, symbols, and rituals”.²³ How this interacts with Catholicism will be examined throughout this thesis, yet its importance has been remarked on frequently.²⁴ How they identify, as either Catholics *in* America or *American* Catholics, is central.

Fox and Sandler discuss the role of religious legitimacy.²⁵ Its legitimacy, as a societally accepted influencer, or as some have called it, “secular resonance”²⁶ is essential to understanding the likelihood of success in what it proposes. So, religious legitimacy is not immutable and boundless but shaped by its *milieu* goals.

American exceptionalism

Gamble charts the roots and contemporary meaning of a piece of American exceptionalism, Winthrop’s *Model of Christian Charity*. He reminds his readers that the famous “city on a hill” metaphor comes from the Gospel of Matthew, not from Winthrop.²⁷ Winthrop used the address in a wholly Christian context to those arriving Christians. Gamble stresses that it was not meant

¹⁹ Howard J. Wiarda, *Culture and Foreign Policy: The Neglected Factor in International Relations* (Burlington, VT: Routledge, 2013), 8.

²⁰ Wiarda, 30.

²¹ Robert N. Bellah, ‘Religion and the shape of national culture’, *America* 181, no. 3 (1999):9.

²² Alexis Tocqueville, *Democracy in America: And Two Essays on America*, ed. Isaac Kramnick, trans. Gerald Bevan, New edition (London: Penguin Classics, 2003), 340.

²³ Robert N. Bellah, ‘Civil Religion in America’, *Daedalus* 134, no. 4, (Fall 2005): 40-55.

²⁴ Eric O. Hanson, *Religion and Politics in the International System Today* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 51.

²⁵ Fox and Sandler, *Bringing Religion into International Relations*, 4.

²⁶ Shelledy, ‘Legions Not Always Visible on Parade’.

²⁷ Richard M. Gamble, *In Search of the City on a Hill: The Making and Unmaking of an American Myth* (New York: Continuum, 2012), 52.

to be an exegesis for the theoretical basis of US foreign policy.²⁸ To underline this, the colony Winthrop founded was not viewed as the only “city on a hill”, a model community, but one among many.²⁹ Ronald Reagan’s speeches by the 1980s popularised Perry Miller’s decontextualisation of the phrase.³⁰ Originally Gamble noted how Winthrop warned of dangers if the United States did not live up to its promise. This conditional, almost transactional, aspect of Reformed theology is lost. This is evidenced when Reagan excised God’s condemnation of the United States if it did not act appropriately from his speeches.³¹ When taken together these weaken Holy See influence and strengthen the national community through shared myths. From this both *milieu* and possession goals can use exceptionalist themes to the benefit of those interpreting them. Guth suggests a foreign policy exceptionalism exists which he cites as meaning US leadership of the world.³² Though leadership’s definition is contested. Guth suggests, of the major denominations, Latter Day Saints (the Mormons) are the firmest believers in exceptionalism, while “white Catholics, unaffiliated believers, and mainline Protestants fall almost right of the sample average”.³³ Crucially, Guth argues that those with more traditional theological beliefs, such as the Latter Day Saints and Evangelical Protestants are more likely to believe in exceptionalism. Such divisions underline the central premise of this study, divisions within Catholics weakened its soft power.

A sense of mission to the community is embedded within exceptionalist narratives, but as Part Two argues, this can mean both the national community and the world community as the US sought to merge *milieu* and possession goals. Jacksonianism, on the other hand, has a much narrower view of community. Exceptionalist ideas of mission stemmed at least initially, from a Reformed sense of mission. Monten contends, “the conviction of religious mission and providential mandate, later secularized, provided a core tenet of U.S. national identity and sense of purpose”.³⁴ Gamble notes Winthrop’s *Christian* understanding of mission and how Miller later altered the emphasis.³⁵ A legacy of Miller could be viewed during the 1991 war where Coles suggests that Bush often linked how the “mission-by-example mode simultaneously

²⁸ Ibid, 32.

²⁹ Ibid, 61, 79-81.

³⁰ Ibid, 125-126.

³¹ Ibid, 144.

³² James L. Guth, “The Religious Roots of Foreign Policy Exceptionalism”, in Dennis R. Hoover, ed., *Religion and American Exceptionalism*, 1st edition (London: Routledge, 2013), 74.

³³ Ibid, 75.

³⁴ Jonathan Monten, ‘The Roots of the Bush Doctrine: Power, Nationalism, and Democracy Promotion in U.S. Strategy’, *International Security* 29, no. 4 (2005): 112–56.

³⁵ Gamble, *In Search of the City on a Hill*, 45.

interweaves mission-by-intervention motifs through objective actions”.³⁶ She suggests that Bush used this mission rhetoric “to limit the political fallout”.³⁷ By widening community involvement in the war, Bush was enabled to broaden the interests of the United States, and its potential support.

Given Coles’ argument, exceptionalism strengthened a narrow conception of American community, with US citizens and possession goals prioritised. Alongside this, it also framed US leadership acting for, and on behalf of, the rest of the world. US Protestant hegemony in effect reinforced secular post-Cold War hegemony. Holy See definitions of community were equally expansive in its *milieu* goals as those exceptionalist ideas that sought to serve the world. However, these were used in opposition to the 2003 conflict. When joined with exceptionalism, defined as serving US possession goals, coupled with Jacksonianism, Holy See *milieu* goals were weakened and war was made more likely.

American exceptionalism is a broad set of ideas pertaining to the United States and its self-image and role in the world. A 2010 survey reported that 58% of respondents felt God granted the United States a “special role in human history”, Gamble argues that irrespective of its interpretation, it endures.³⁸ Exceptionalist ideas are crucial in understanding why the Holy See’s soft power was insufficient at attracting the United States to its foreign policy views.

Conceptions of community lead to an understanding of the Holy See’s efforts to stop the wars. Radically different US-Holy See interpretations of community, and thus *milieu* goals, led to no agreement on how to resolve Iraq’s actions. For the United States, a world community under US leadership was paramount. Almost the exact reverse occurred for the Holy See. For the United States a greater belief in progress existed, coupled with cultural factors such as a binary worldview and the utility of force from Jacksonianism. These narrow ideas overwhelmed any idea of a singular “Catholic culture”.

Both actors share community, but their definitions contrasted starkly. For the United States, the most important community was national, which it viewed as also benefitting the world. Notions of exceptionalism heightened this strain of thought. Contrary to this, the Holy See’s understanding of community was challenged. In 1991 the UN Security Council approved the US coalition’s objectives to remove Iraq by force. In 2003 the reverse occurred, where the Holy See made appeals to international law, its *milieu* goals, and thus community. This

³⁶ Roberta L. Coles, ‘Manifest Destiny Adapted for 1990s’ War Discourse: Mission and Destiny Intertwined’, *Sociology of Religion* 63, no. 4 (2002): 403–26.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Gamble, *In Search of the City on a Hill*, 165.

comprehension of community side-lined Holy See attempts to define community that reflected its *milieu* goals. Although the Holy See is not mentioned, there are parallels between it and the UN's vision and thus definitions of community.³⁹

Achieving its possession goals after the Cold War was a large part of the US view of the 1991 war. While seeking order in a world without Saddam Hussein dominated in 2003. Exceptionalism buttressed these possession goals in 1991, when the UN supported the war. Accordingly, the Holy See had little room for opposition. For 2003, order and exceptionalism formed a framework to underpin US actions and undermined Holy See efforts.

Interaction between the domestic and international is particularly important with regard to exceptionalism. Catholics in the United States are no longer separated from US culture as they were before the 1960s. Modern Catholics had to choose between the exceptionalist view and the Holy See view. Ultimately, political culture and the identity it shapes takes precedence over religious affiliation. This would demonstrate both the deep cultural differences between the two actors and thus the difficult task confronting those wishing to stop the war.

US exceptionalist self-understanding, as a beacon for the world, directly contradicted the Holy See's appeals to engage with the UN before 2003. These differences emerge in part from the scope of the community. Vastly different visions of legitimacy underpinned these different views. It was therefore easier for the two presidential administrations to use exceptionalism to support the wars in pursuit of their *milieu* and possession goals. Previous historical examples suggested these themes influenced US westward expansion.⁴⁰ Exceptionalism's flexibility results in its durability.⁴¹ As has been noted, it sees itself as either a model to be followed, or force to change the world.⁴² Like many national myths, little empirical evidence exists to justify the claims made, as Hodgson argues.⁴³ Lipset argued its negative domestic implications include economics and race.⁴⁴ Exceptionalism's veracity is not relevant, rather it is the perception that is important.⁴⁵ Despite these inaccuracies, these myths

³⁹ Alan Chong and Jodok Troy, 'A Universal Sacred Mission and the Universal Secular Organization: The Holy See and the United Nations', *Politics, Religion & Ideology* 12, no. 3 (1 September 2011): 335–54.

⁴⁰ Scott Thomas, "Religion and International Conflict", in K. R. Dark, ed., *Religion and International Relations*, 2000 edition (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 3.

⁴¹ Fabian Hilfrich, *Debating American Exceptionalism: Empire and Democracy in the Wake of the Spanish-American War*, 2012 edition (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

⁴² Tuveson, *Redeemer Nation*.

⁴³ Godfrey Hodgson, *The Myth of American Exceptionalism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010).

⁴⁴ Seymour Martin Lipset, *American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword*, New edition (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997).

⁴⁵ Jeffrey M. Jones, 'Americans See U.S. as Exceptional; 37% Doubt Obama Does', Gallup.com, 22 December 2010, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/145358/Americans-Exceptional-Doubt-Obama.aspx>.

have a unifying effect on the national community. Tied into this, these interpretations of exceptionalism gives the United States a duty to lead in world affairs.⁴⁶ In turn this can lead to popular support for wars. Tensions between serving the narrow national community in pursuit of its possession goals at the service to the universal will be explored in Chapters IV and VI. Fundamentally, exceptionalism weakened Holy See efficacy against the war.

There are distinct resonances with a Puritan sense of mission within exceptionalism. Howe claims, “this sense of mission, originally Puritan, has helped infuse American patriotism with a loyalty to ideals transcending the nation-state itself”.⁴⁷ This echoes those aspects of exceptionalism that emphasise serving *milieu* goals. Scholars have questioned this interpretation, with exceptionalism’s fluid understanding throughout the centuries being stressed.⁴⁸ This sense of mission is prominent, with both wars being portrayed as the United States fulfilling a global mission on behalf of humanity.⁴⁹ This self-image, with the United States bearing burdens for the good of mankind, is central to comprehending how the United States went to war and its broader *milieu* goals. Ironically, it supports a vision of exceptionalism, and community, closer to the Holy See’s ideas and theology. This is due to the secularised idea of Winthrop’s covenant with God based on acting justly. Concurrently, it helps explain why the Holy See and the Church in the United States faced such a difficult task in attempting to halt the wars.

With the Soviet Union’s dissolution a triumphalist mood was prevalent. It would have been surprising if these events had *not* fed into a broader exceptionalist mood. Rome was more circumspect, just after the end of the war, in May 1991, John Paul II’s encyclical, *Centesimus Annus* both praised, and warned about, an excessive free market ideology. However, such nuance appeared to be lost by some conservative Catholics.⁵⁰

American exceptionalism made the Holy See’s arguments less plausible, and at the same time, made war more likely. The United States sought to protect its narrow national sense of community, and interests, but also see itself as leading the rest of the world. Combining these ideas made a more cautious view unlikely to attract. Exceptionalism, depending on its

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Daniel Walker Howe “The Impact of Puritanism on American Culture”, in Charles H. Lippy and Peter W. Williams, eds., *Encyclopaedia of the American Religious Experience*, vol. 1 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1987), 1069.

⁴⁸ Gamble, *In Search of the City on a Hill*.

⁴⁹ Adam Quinn, *US Foreign Policy in Context: National Ideology from the Founders to the Bush Doctrine* (London; New York: Routledge, 2011), 150.

⁵⁰ George Weigel, *A New Worldly Order: John Paul II and Human Freedom, A Centesimus Annus Reader* ed., (Lanham, MD: Ethics and Public Policy Centre, 1992).

interpretation⁵¹, may have made it easier for the United States to act when other nations would have been unwilling. This highlighted the differences between the two actors. Accordingly, when exceptionalism was applied to these issues it often strengthened them and as a result made war even more probable.

Jacksonianism

Jacksonianism, a term used by Walter Russell Mead, relates to a culture of militaristic ideas and the “folk community”. It profoundly affected US framing of Iraqi actions before the wars due to its emphasis on interests and military power. Much time can pass before those previously viewed as outside the folk community, such as Catholics, are brought into it. This distinction between those within and outside it is quite stark. This echoes predestination aspects of Calvinism, or Reformed theology. Ideas around the place of the United States, as the nation that will redeem the world. It will be contended that this distinction between those within, and outside, the folk community has been transferred to foreign policy.

Community for the Holy See meant all Catholics, if not the world. These ideas did little to assist it in maximising the attractiveness of its *milieu* goals. How the Holy See implements these ideas will be addressed in the systemic sections of Chapters IV and VI. For Jacksonianism, the definition of community is more restrictive comprising only those within the folk community. In contrast, exceptionalism can include either a narrow, US focused exceptionalism or an exceptionalism at the service of other nations. Sometimes these two strands can merge, as in 1991, where the United States was removing Iraq from Kuwait for its own possession goals. Therefore, parallels exist between Jacksonianism and exceptionalism. Subtle differences in their understandings of the boundaries of community emerge. This section will discuss Jacksonianism’s context, then note the themes of community and honour. After this, Jacksonianism’s connections with human nature, and the use of force will then be analysed. It will end by evaluating its integrationist strand, which can integrate different ethnic and religious groups, with Catholics the example given by Mead and studied here.

Mead argues that US foreign policy could be broken down into four broad schools of thought: Hamiltonian, Wilsonian, Jeffersonian and Jacksonian.⁵² Mead named these after Alexander Hamilton the first Treasury secretary who emphasised trade and a strong executive, President Woodrow Wilson who stressed international law and has been associated with

⁵¹ James W. Ceaser, ‘The Origins and Character of American Exceptionalism’, *American Political Thought* 1, no. 1 (2012): 3–28.

⁵² Mead, *Special Providence*.

idealism, Thomas Jefferson, the third president who Mead suggests argued for a reduced international role for the United States in favour of greater attention on the health of American democracy and people. Andrew Jackson, the seventh president, who Mead contends was a populist who often resorted to force. Thus, Jackson, represents the most martial tradition. Jacksonianism, is for the Holy See, the school of thought that represents the worst excesses of US foreign policy. Its war-like nature and lack of respect for international organisations lead to profound differences between the two actors. Essentially, Jacksonianism weakened Holy See influence on both Catholics and the two presidential administrations.

Jacksonianism's focus as Mead posits, is on the use of overwhelming military force to defeat the enemy. Consequently, war is more likely, partly because of Jacksonianism's view of war as more normal, as it might be seen within *realpolitik*. Honour is a key Jacksonian element within, and among, the folk community. For example, after the 1991 Iraqi invasion, President George H.W. Bush when asked about protecting Americans in the region replied, "This will not stand, this aggression against Kuwait".⁵³ Such a response seemed to encapsulate the exceptionalist *and* Jacksonian views on community. Although the reporter asked him about protecting Americans, his reply discussed undoing the invasion and the international support he received. He articulated the broader sense of community within exceptionalism and the role of the United States in leading the community by merging *milieu* and possession goals.

Bush's response used Jacksonian understandings of honour but also more obliquely, US possession goals. Not only had Kuwait been invaded, but Iraq had done so possibly believing it would be accepted. Exceptionalist elements may have been represented by US leadership, while Jacksonian aspects were motivated by honour and interests.

Mead enunciates an explicit substantial role for possession goals, what he calls interests, within Jacksonianism. He contends that it is the most realist of all the four schools.⁵⁴ Comparable to Wilsonian notions of community, the Holy See's *milieu* goals were vast. Obviously this tension was resolved, as polling will show, as most Catholics viewed themselves as broadly supporting the United States view of Iraq. Mead lays out how Jacksonians seek only their interests without regard to the consequences internationally.⁵⁵ Interests, possession goals, before the 2003 war were viewed as the interests not of a wider community but those of the Jacksonians who were included within the community. Indeed, Mead emphasises the

⁵³ See Chapters III and IV

⁵⁴ Walter Russell Mead, 'The Jacksonian Tradition: And American Foreign Policy', *The National Interest*, no. 58 (1999): 5–29.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

importance of the community within Jacksonianism, “Jacksonian realism is based on the very sharp distinction in popular feeling between the inside of the folk community and the dark world without”.⁵⁶ Jacksonian stress on the community in this instance is closer to Catholic theology with those inside and outside the community where divergences lie.

Jacksonianism seeks to force its enemies into submission.⁵⁷ Thus, both wars could be viewed as Jacksonian. Together they sought to change the behaviour of Iraq through coercion as defending the interests of the (national) community. Community was only significant for Jacksonianism in how it related to those within. Holy See *milieu* goals attempting to dilute this would have been all but impossible. Wilsonianism and Jeffersonianism have conceptions of the community that are closer to the Holy See’s but neither had significant relevance as they did not match the desire for securing possession goals through force.

No president wholly conforms to one school. Each is a composite of two or three, and sometimes all four schools during his presidency. A more accurate categorisation would be analysing specific instances. The 1991 war, “was a popular war in Jacksonian circles because the defense of the nation’s oil supply struck a chord with Jacksonian opinion”.⁵⁸ Obvious tension can be seen between definitions of the community and Jacksonian possession goals, and who those interests should be dictated by. US individuals and their interests appeared to take precedence over the Holy See’s theology of wider notions of community. On one hand the 1991 war was Jacksonian, in its strategy and execution with the use of overwhelming military force. Alternatively, this impulse was diluted by administration efforts to work within the UN framework.

Exceptionalism bolstered Jacksonian sentiment, thus making the wars all but inevitable. Any soft power the Holy See had was unable to withstand this combination of factors because it was divided and lacked “secular resonance”.⁵⁹ Catholics’ identity as Americans took precedence over their religious community. They imbibed many of the sentiments that separated them from the Holy See.

From the Holy See viewpoint, Jacksonianism embodies many of the most feared traits in US foreign policy, notably its lack of respect for international institutions and its willingness to use force.⁶⁰ Yet, once a group are inside the folk community they are protected and treated

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Shelledy, ‘Legions Not Always Visible on Parade’.

⁶⁰ John L. Allen, *All the Pope’s Men: The Inside Story of How the Vatican Really Thinks* New edition (New York: Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, 2004), 377-378.

equally. Mead gives the example of how Catholics were gradually integrated into the folk community.

Catholicism actively seeks to integrate into a local culture while maintaining the Church's teachings. Inculturation, "is intended conceptually both to safeguard the integrity of the Gospel and to encourage sensitivity to various cultural contexts".⁶¹ A danger exists that the local culture will overwhelm the Church's attempt to integrate its teachings into society. In the US case, blending the Gospel and US culture are hard to detach one from the other.⁶² Herberg contends that "by every realistic criterion the American Way of Life is the operative faith of the American people".⁶³ He defines this as democracy and individualism.⁶⁴ Despite its age, Herberg's work still addresses the interplay of religious and national identity. From the outset, no commonalities existed on the definition of order so the Holy See's attractive power was negligible. The American Way of Life tended to support, and be supported by, other individualistic Protestant cultural elements, such as Jacksonianism. This Protestant view was in tension with Catholicism's.

Consequently, the Holy See's ability was weakened by Jacksonian notions of the folk community, "American Catholics, once among the world's most orthodox, remained Catholic in religious allegiance but were increasingly individualistic in terms of psychology and behaviour".⁶⁵ Catholics became a more accepted part of the community. Economic advancement from the mid-twentieth century meant that Catholics moved from the inner cities to the suburbs, this broke down the "Catholic ghetto" that had aided doctrinal orthodoxy.⁶⁶ The Jacksonian definition of community, and thus possession goals, was the narrowest of all the aspects of political culture. It directly contradicted that of the Holy See. Due to this greater assimilation it was harder for the bishops and the Holy See to unite and exert influence.

⁶¹ Dennis M. Doyle, 'The Concept of Inculturation in Roman Catholicism: A Theological Consideration', *U.S. Catholic Historian* 30, no. 1 (21 June 2012): 1–13.

⁶² Dolan, *In Search of an American Catholicism*.

⁶³ Will Herberg, *Protestant-Catholic-Jew: An Essay in American Religious Sociology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 75.

⁶⁴ *Ibid*, 78–79.

⁶⁵ Mead, 'The Jacksonian Tradition'.

⁶⁶ Morris, *American Catholic*.

Calvinism

Religion and political culture are broad terms, sometimes difficult to define. Some have questioned whether culture is a subset of religion or vice versa.⁶⁷ This thesis suggests that religion is a subset of (national) culture. Catholicism's flexibility to adapt to local circumstances supports this view. This section will explore the legacy of Reformed Protestantism (sometimes called Calvinism) and how it may have bolstered the US through a binary world view. A short section will stress Calvinism's importance in weakening Holy See soft power and address issues around how it can be used cautiously. A brief history and definition will follow with a subsequent discussion on how Calvinism might have aided US possession goals. Though these are difficult to directly relate to Calvinism, they were significant enough to reduce Holy See attractiveness.

Attempting to apply a whole theology to politics is difficult as it risks oversimplifying both. Theology is, like politics, not always clear but carries multiple interpretations, making any application problematic. An emphasis will be placed on order and how Calvinism may have strengthened a US desire for order.

Alexis de Tocqueville wrote, "I think I can see the whole destiny of America contained in the first Puritan who landed on these shores". Holy See ideas against the wars carried less weight both generally and among US Catholics. These ideas will be a prominent explanation of why the Holy See was not sufficiently attractive. Jacksonian elements in Calvinism, and vice versa, bolstered each other through views on human nature. This weakened Holy See cultural influence, making war more likely. Each of the cultural elements added tension between the two actors.

Puritans followed Reformed theology (differing from Lutheranism), who disagreed with the religious policies of Charles I and faced persecution under him, left England.⁶⁸ Reformed theology influenced many denominations, Puritans in New England, "Dutch Reformed in New York, and Huguenot in Charleston".⁶⁹ It has been suggested that 75% of the colonists during the Revolution were in the Reformed tradition.⁷⁰ Herberg points out, "the American Way of Life was shaped by the contours of American Protestantism; it may, indeed,

⁶⁷ Mark Hulsether, "Religion and Culture", in John Hinnells, ed., *Routledge Companion to the Study of Religion* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 500.

⁶⁸ J. T. McNeill, *The History and Character of Calvinism*, 1st Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 337.

⁶⁹ Mark Valeri, "Calvin and the Social Order in Early America: Moral Ideas and Transatlantic Empire", in Thomas J. Davis, ed., *John Calvin's American Legacy* (New York: Oxford University Press, U.S.A., 2010), 22.

⁷⁰ Thomas S. Engeman, "Introduction", in Thomas S. Engeman and Michael P. Zuckert, eds., *Protestantism and the American Founding* (Notre Dame, Ind: University of Notre Dame Press, 2004), 1.

best be understood as a kind of secularized Puritanism, a Puritanism without transcendence, without sense of sin or judgement”.⁷¹ Some evidence for this can be seen when Reagan removed Winthrop’s warnings of God’s judgement for Americans who fail to live up to his famous text.⁷² So, far from the United States being solely “modern”, “rational” and “enlightened” some of its opposition to the Holy See was rooted in deeply held religious ideas.

Reading political topics into Reformed theology is complex. Instead great flexibility was shown in finding solutions to problems.⁷³ In some ways this may have assisted the Holy See, yet this minor factor was insufficient to help its case against the war.

No clear understanding of community appears to exist. Valeri notes how Calvin urged his followers to do business that would support social life, but claims “whatever served the community of the faithful, for Calvin, served the cause of godliness”.⁷⁴ Theologically there was more clarity. Calvinists, like the rest of the Reformed movement, adhered to predestination. Claims that predestination could be considered helpful, “in giving assurance of salvation to believers” has been argued.⁷⁵ Questions were then raised as to what signs showed God’s favour on the elect, those destined for Heaven. Elements of Jacksonianism could be seen here with divisions between those inside and outside the folk community merging with these ideas.⁷⁶

It is difficult to directly transpose such concepts onto religion. Nonetheless, Calvin during his time in Geneva was involved in the execution of Michael Sevrus, who disavowed the Trinity.⁷⁷ An argument may be made for this incident as part of a wider concern for possession goals. Naturally, it would be unwise to presume this episode was part of broader pattern or can be easily applied to IR.

Valeri points out that Calvin did not see any overarching ideas or themes that would form an ideology, “scripture stood over and sometimes against the political or economic philosophies that hold sway at any moment”.⁷⁸ Bellah contends that concentration in America on the individual and his relationship with Christ, almost to the exclusion of all, else results in “the doctrine of the God-Man easily slips into the doctrine of the Man-God”.⁷⁹ Consequently,

⁷¹ Herberg, *Protestant--Catholic--Jew*, 81.

⁷² Gamble, *In Search of the City on a Hill*, 144.

⁷³ Valeri, “Calvin and the Social Order”, 22.

⁷⁴ *Ibid*, 24.

⁷⁵ Davis, 158.

⁷⁶ Mead, ‘The Jacksonian Tradition’; Allen, *All the Pope’s Men*, 316.

⁷⁷ Davis, 5.

⁷⁸ Valeri, “Calvin and the Social Order”, 22.

⁷⁹ Robert N. Bellah, ‘Religion and the Shape of National Culture’, *America* 181, no. 3 (31 July 1999): 9–14.

it could be postulated that the binary nature and emphasis on predestination became part of US political culture *despite* Calvin.

Dialogue was foundational to the Holy See's opposition to the war but it never stated when the *last* resort had been reached. No indication was given when its interests would have been sufficiently threatened to use force. As Duffey posits, just war teaching is summarised by, all citizens are answerable for a nation's decision and conduct of war but "citizens may conclude that they cannot cooperation in the nation's war-making".⁸⁰ Previously, a legal understanding of sin took precedence. Cardinal Ratzinger noted a "morality of conscience and a morality of authority as two opposing models".⁸¹ Others have claimed that this was "very individualistic to the serious neglect of the social dimension of sin".⁸²

This binary view of the world will play a prominent part in this study. President George W. Bush, speaking in 2003, appeared to acknowledge this dualistic worldview.⁸³ Needless to say, it would be unwise to view the Puritans as nascent Americans.⁸⁴ Theological divisions occurred within the Puritans who were not always united.⁸⁵ Howe argues the Puritan legacy was particularly felt in advancing democracy, through theological convictions of the equality of believers.⁸⁶ Early Puritans were influenced by an orthodox Calvinist who adhered to predestination and the elect.⁸⁷ The contention that popular support was rallied because of the elect and damned. Notions of predestination were not uniquely Calvinist however, Zwingli, Bullinger and Bucer all ascribed to the idea.⁸⁸ This may have aided its cultural prevalence and longevity.

Through the legacy of the Puritans and their ideas about predestination, a binary sense of the world divided into good and evil notions of order can be discerned. Though some caution should be taken when applying this to IR. Overall, this weakened the ability of the Holy See to exert influence through its ideas and values.

⁸⁰ Michael K. Duffey, 'The Just War Teaching: From Tonkin Gulf to Persian Gulf', *America* 164, no. 4 (2 February 1991): 83–89.

⁸¹ Joseph Ratzinger, "Conscience and Truth", Workshop for the Bishops, February 1991, <http://www.ewtn.com/library/curia/ratzcons.htm>.

⁸² Bill Cosgrave, 'Understanding Sin Today', *The Furrow* 50, no. 10 (1999): 538–47.

⁸³ George W. Bush, 'Remarks at Whitehall Palace in London', American Presidency Project, 19 November 2003, www.presidency.uscb.edu/ws/?pid=812.

⁸⁴ Gamble, *In Search of the City on a Hill*, 14–16.

⁸⁵ Deborah L. Madsen, *American Exceptionalism* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998), 21.

⁸⁶ Howe, "The Impact of Puritanism on American Culture", 1061.

⁸⁷ McNeill, *Calvinism*, 335.

⁸⁸ Thomas J. Davis, "Introduction" in Davis, *John Calvin's American Legacy*, 6.

Soft power and culture

The Holy See, Vatican and Church have all been ascribed with soft power by Nye. Following on from the previous section, this section will explore the need for an attractive culture in maximising soft power. It will make four points and suggest that culture is not based solely on national boundaries but similarities are shared between countries. After this the problems of connecting this national culture to the Holy See and Vatican City will be examined. From this, the idea of a “Catholic culture” will be explored. It will be contended that although this allowed the Church to adapt in different settings, it does little to define a distinct culture. Consequently, given “Catholic culture’s” flexibility, even vagueness, it will be argued that “national” culture dominates as Catholics *in* the United States are in reality *American* Catholics. The last paragraph will lay out the relationships between the Holy See’s use of soft power, US culture in Jacksonianism and exceptionalism and how these elements interact with possession and *milieu* goals. Together these elements weakened the ability of the Holy See to attract Catholics to its *milieu* goals.

Nye’s formulation of culture is based on states but due to the Holy See’s unique “actorness” and nature it cannot be easily compared to a state. Obviously, culture is not just nationally based and characteristics of one are the same as, or similar to, another. Thus, defining, “Holy See culture” or “Vatican City culture” is at best difficult and perhaps impossible. Especially because of the non-geographic nature of Holy See sovereignty does not lend itself to a “coherent” outline. Moreover, it is not clear how a Vatican culture would be dramatically distinct from Italian culture.

Outlining a “Catholic culture” appears to be somewhat easier, but significant problems emerge. The Church has sought to adapt itself to the local cultural environment, which in many ways has been partly the reason for its global spread, known as inculturation. Doyle defines it as “intended conceptually both to safeguard the integrity of the Gospel and to encourage sensitivity to various cultural contexts”.⁸⁹ One obvious example is the previously mentioned nineteenth century Americanist crisis. A previously aloof Catholic culture, or cultures, became integrated into a “national” US culture. Therefore, this raises the question as to where the local culture ends and where the Catholic culture begins. As will be illustrated, Jacksonianism and exceptionalism are steeped in Protestant themes and theology. Accordingly, the cultural

⁸⁹ Doyle, ‘The Concept of Inculturation’.

element of this thesis examines the extent to which a US Catholic culture existed or whether it was US Catholics who have absorbed, and followed, US culture. Given the varying interpretations of Church theology and teaching Catholics choose to remain Catholic but are culturally American, that is to say Protestant.

It will posit that the relationship between soft power, the Holy See and Jacksonian and exceptionalist elements of US culture accords with Nye's framework of soft power's weakness when confronted with possession goals and hard power. Holy See attempts to shape the environment were of negligible importance to Jacksonianism. Its concentration on the overwhelming use of force, coupled with a binary, Reformed Protestant, distinction between good and evil resulted in the Holy See's soft power *milieu* goals being unable to overcome cultural Jacksonianism. The Holy See's relationship to exceptionalism was equally complicated. During both wars exceptionalism was used by the United States to inject its possession goals with a sense of *milieu* goals. This was particularly the case in 2003, when before the UN General Assembly, President Bush spoke of the perceived danger Iraq posed. He spoke of how the United States understood the threat and that the UN should join with the US in support of its mission it protecting the international environment from Iraq.

How these complex and even competing cultures shape, and are shaped by, Holy See soft power and its attempt to exercise and attract the US to its *milieu* goals is complex. The empirical chapters will outline that the division between *milieu* goals and possession goals is not as strict as would be imagined. During the 1991 Iraq War, the US pursued its possession goals but it also sought to shape the environment within which states operated in the post-Cold War world. Equally for the Holy See its central focus over both wars was using its soft power to achieve its *milieu* goals by seeking to alter the environment in which the United States operated. By stressing the need for dialogue the Holy See desired to shape the environment. Concurrently it had possession goals which although were weaker in its ability to achieve them, namely protecting Catholics and Christians in the Middle East, it used its *milieu* goals in aid of its possession goals through its vocal opposition to the wars.

Soft power and values

Nye's second element of soft power is how those who "live up to their values" maximise their soft power. This section will in four points discuss how, like culture, the Church's "values" can be interpreted in several different, sometimes conflicting, ways. Subsequently, the 2002 sex abuse crisis will be viewed as an example of these conflicting interpretations and suggest how it illustrates problems in the Holy See maximising its soft power. After this a section on how Holy See soft power was weakened during the crisis because it did not live up to its values will be explored before how Holy See soft power and the interaction between war and its values will be discussed. This will be then related to how this undermined its image as a moral actor.

Chong writes how the Holy See used soft power to enlarge its presence.⁹⁰ He cites John Paul II in Poland using soft power to challenge Polish authorities.⁹¹ In both of these cases the Holy See's use of its soft power was exceptionally specific. Its effectiveness was bound up with the Polish pope acting in Poland. Enacting its values maximised its soft power but this example cannot be widely transposed into claiming wide ranging Holy See soft power.

Similar to soft power and culture, the Holy See's "values", or Church's teachings, are not easily categorised. It is not clear which values would maximise Holy See soft power. Central to this thesis is not just the size and potential influence of Catholics in the United States but the natural political divisions that exist in such a large group. Those on the left are attracted to the Church, and Holy See, because of its stance of social justice, poverty, climate change and economics. Conservative Catholics are attracted to it for its stances on sexual morality. So by choosing to emphasise one interpretation of its theology over another, the Holy See consciously or not will alienate either liberal or conservative Catholics. This is predicated on there being one "official voice". While this is clearly the papacy, in opposing both wars John Paul II distanced himself from conservative Catholics, but his other comments about social justice and poverty made separately from the wars were not enough for liberal Catholics to see the Holy See as "living up to its values".

Emblematic of this is the 2002 sex abuse crisis which will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter VI. However, it does reveal the problems faced by the Holy See in maximising its soft power and advocating for *milieu* goals when two sides have vastly different explanations for the causes of the crisis. For liberals it was a problem of authority, teaching and bishops. On

⁹⁰ Alan Chong, 'Small State Soft Power Strategies: Virtual Enlargement in the Cases of the Vatican City State and Singapore', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 23, no. 3 (1 September 2010): 383–405.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*

the other hand, conservatives saw the problem with those who lacked respect for authority and its teachings. Moreover, some saw the problem as relating to homosexuality rather than being distinct.

Holy See exercise of soft power in this context was fundamentally weakened, the Holy See was not living up to its values. Crucially, it is not just living up to its values that is important. Equally the reasons why it does not do this matter, with divisions between liberals and conservatives the causes of this lapse. Combined, this damaged its image as a moral actor and weakened the soft power it had in pursuing its *milieu* goals.

Similarly, problems exist of maximising Holy See soft power in opposing the wars. Which teachings, or “values” heighten its soft power are heavily context dependent. As will be suggested in the empirical chapters, for the 1991 Iraq War, Holy See opposition was based on an explicit desire for “dialogue”. Furthermore, there was an implicit rejection that the war did not meet all the just war criteria. However, Holy See opposition should not have been surprising given its essentially religious nature. This may reveal more about the lenses through which “values”, or teachings, are interpreted. That conservative Catholics sought, even expected John Paul II to support both wars illustrates the starkly contrasting values between conservative US Catholics and the pope. As will be scrutinised more fully below liberal Catholics who had opposed the Church’s stance on sexual morality supported papal opposition to the wars. At the same time, conservatives who would otherwise support Church teaching found themselves on the opposite side of the “official” Church policy. Lastly, what will become clear is that the Holy See’s position was not relevant for most Catholics. So it is not just the attractiveness of values, or teachings that is needed to maximise soft power, but the message as well as those delivering the message.

Soft power and foreign policy

Nye's final element of maximising soft power is a state's foreign policies when they are viewed as legitimate and having "moral authority". Similar to the other sections *caveats* apply because of the Holy See's special "actorness". This section will cover the broad issue of a lack of knowledge. It will be divided into three parts with the first of these covering the distinction between the Holy See and the Vatican. The second will address the issue of ignorance more specifically and the last will discuss the Holy See's neutrality. Overall, it will maintain that Holy See foreign policy does not map easily onto the international system leading to confusion and a weakening of soft power. Thereby making it more difficult to achieve its broader *milieu* goals. It will also posit that a tension exists between Holy See foreign policy and soft power. The Holy See's image as an actor in the "wilderness" benefits its possession goals though damages its capacity for soft power.

What has been made clear is the distinction between the Holy See and the Vatican City especially as they relate to how the Holy See operates internationally. Though this distinction is quite "technical", it is indicative of a broader dearth of knowledge around the Holy See's unique "actorness". Conflating the Holy See and "the Vatican" negates the Holy See's special "actorness", its international status with its non-geographic sovereignty and treats it as another territorially based state actor with the implication that it should and does behave the same way as other states. Thus, when it comes to its foreign policy being seen as legitimate, and moral, it immediately suffers. Instead it should be treated as a specific category acting similar to other religions and NGOs but with a special status that allows it to operate in a system of states.

Aside from conflating the Holy See and Vatican, issues of ignorance exist, or may be even exacerbated maliciously. Chapter V will note how then US National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, said she was unable to understand Holy See opposition to the 2003 Iraq War, "I don't see how it could be immoral to prevent the deaths of tens of thousands, maybe hundreds of thousands, maybe millions of people by acting against a brutal regime". Whether this quote was disingenuous or not is some ways irrelevant. That Rice said it, places the Holy See on the same footing as other states and implicitly expects it to behave as any other state, rather than as a religion which is inherently sceptical of violence. When viewed in these terms Holy See ability to shape the international environment was obviously weakened. It stresses the contradictions between soft power and its broader *milieu* goals. This ignorance from such a senior official that then explicitly questions the morality, even moral authority, of the Holy

See over its hostility to the war demonstrates a lack of understanding of the complexities of Holy See foreign policy. Consequently, actors do not operate in a vacuum but seek to attract each other. However, when one so obviously undercuts the moral authority, even legitimacy, of the other then that actor's success will obviously be reduced. Naturally, this is before the scale of the task and weakness of *milieu* goals over possession goals is considered. However, a contradiction exists in that the Holy See seeks to attract the United States but at the same time, it benefits from its image of an actor in the international wilderness seeking to create a distinction between "Western" and Middle East Christians.

Connected to this Rice seemed to be unaware of, or disinterested in, Holy See neutrality and its sources. As will be explored below in greater depth CST has a profound role in shaping Holy See theology and thus foreign policy. It is sufficient for now to argue that the Holy See's freedom on manoeuvre is severely restricted in what are political questions and the legal and international obligations to be neutral. Accordingly, Holy See "policies" that are seen as legitimate and possessing moral authority are almost inevitably bound to be few. Moreover, there are few instances where legitimacy and moral authority come together internationally. One instance could be the 1991 Iraq War, where after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait the United States assembled a coalition, with UN support, that restored Kuwait. The Holy See could have been expected to "support" or at least accept the war but was opposed. It also opposed the 2003 Iraq War because it *did not* have UN approval. In both instances its neutrality took precedence over its desire to heighten the attractiveness of its *milieu* goals and thus exercise of soft power against the US possession goals.

Methodology, Methods and Research Design

This section seeks to connect this work to broader methodological, methods and research design issues, debates and history and how these shape and are reflected in the thesis. It is situated within a historical case study approach. Yet the discussion on methodology does contextualise this in more contemporary philosophy of science developments. This thesis will understand soft power in a post-positivist way as enabling analysis of culture also. From this epistemology, there are strong links to constructivism which form identities, norms and values that shape interests and thus how foreign policy is formulated and conducted. Older historical case study approach will be outlined before this is related to epistemology, in general and this work in particular will be analysed. Following this a discussion of positivist and post-positivist epistemologies will be outlined. The section will conclude with a discussion of methodological points around historical case studies, how they relate to these chosen case studies and finally this thesis's case study selection.

With the "Second Debate" the historical case study approach became less dominant. The desire for a "scientific" approach to IR became popular. With this a positivist epistemology became widespread. Scholars such as Morton Kaplan and Thomas Schelling were among those espousing a positivist epistemology and a desire for quantifying IR through observable laws. From this, history's connections to IR became less visible until "the methods and aspirations of the two disciplines grew ever further apart".⁹² After the Cold War's end, Classical Realism and Constructivism returned. Lebow claimed that positivism is not merely irrelevant to the social world but, how other scholars have contended how the positivists have failed "after 50 years of well-funded efforts to develop propositions with predictive value, let alone law-like statements that cannot readily be falsified, if they can be tested at all".⁹³

How and when (hard and soft) power is effective is a central aspect of this thesis. Moreover, the roots and sources of power cannot be easily quantified. IR learning from history brings methodological issues for both. Schroeder claims differences between IR and history amount to how the former aims to establish predictive laws while "history seeks to 'explain' events and developments not by assigning specific causes for them, but by thinking one's way

⁹² David Armitage, 'The Fifty Years' Rift: Intellectual History and International Relations', *Modern Intellectual History* 1, no. 1 (2004): 97-109.

⁹³ Richard Ned Lebow, 'Philosophy and International Relations', *International Affairs* 87, no.5 (2011):1219-1228.

into them and seeing them from inside”.⁹⁴ This description may have been true of earlier IR scholarship, with Waltz’s 1979 *Theory of International Politics* an example. Waltz’s work was part of a positivist era that attempted to build a unified model of behaviour. By assuming a positivist natural science approach can be applied to international relations, Waltz collapses the distinctions between the two worlds into one. It contrasts both earlier and later scholarship that views these worlds as separate.

However, this thesis seeks not to “find” positivistic predictive laws. Rather it reverts to an older IR scholarship where history works in conjunction with IR. Using qualitative historical case studies while accepting complex causality would make positivism wholly unsuitable here. As Schroeder argues, the revival of constructivist and classical realist methodologies “present no fundamental challenge to the assumptions and goals of historical explanation, and therefore offer no obstacle in principle to cooperation between two disciplines”.⁹⁵ Schroeder suggests the differences between history and IR generally comprise; what is being explained, how the event is understood and the method of explanation.⁹⁶ History, as Schroeder contends seeks to understand change through human agency. Both case studies see war as change, this thesis desires to comprehend not just human agency, but identity through the Holy See’s (lack of) soft power.

Given, the primary research question, how can we better characterise the dilemmas raised by power and disunity which face the Holy See in its foreign policy? This leads to how the US and Holy See are studied, through the use of historical case studies. Waltz’s positivism would not only not suffice, but would be fundamentally unsuitable in answering a question about ideas, religious actors and culture. From this a qualitative research design based on empirical case studies was chosen.

A deductive approach was taken. Indeed, this is suited to the kind of work and the factors used to analyse, the Holy See’s dearth of soft power in these case studies. Soft power addresses a number of causes for this lack of soft power through domestic explanations such as US political culture, divisions, institutional factors, unique historical events and polling all were causes. While structural causes comprise the Holy See’s legal status and its foreign policy principles which help explain its lack of soft power. To “isolate” the most important of these factors, given the epistemological framework used, would be impossible. It would also

⁹⁴ Paul W. Schroeder, ‘History and International Relations Theory: Not Use or Abuse, but Fit or Misfit’, *International Security* 22, no.1 (Summer 1997): 64-74.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

undermine the complexity of causality. In this way, soft power theory is honed and improved. From the outset of the project, case studies were chosen, to best understand how the elements of culture, ideas, religious belief, identity and (soft) power fit together.

Case studies have sometimes received criticism from positivists, those only accepting “objective” facts. Flyvbjerg has attempted to refute the most serious arguments against them. He maintains that because case studies are grounded in reality, they provide a subtle view of human behaviour, without an exclusive focus on theory.⁹⁷ Melding case study and theory gives a fuller account of not just how the United States acts and why, but the frame of soft power helps explain how these decisions are made.

On the point that case studies fail to build theory he suggests that “atypical or extreme cases often reveal more information because they activate more actors and more basic mechanisms in the situation studied”.⁹⁸ War could be classified as an “extreme” example. Using such case studies provides light onto when the Holy See does not have soft power. Consequently, it may help answer when and under what conditions it does have attractive power. Particularly important for this thesis, the level of divisions at these times is heightened. Divisions always exist but during war these can become especially acute.

George and Bennet suggest case studies have four advantages: conceptual validity, ability to foster new hypotheses, examine causal mechanisms and the capability to address causal complexity.⁹⁹ Some refer to more positivist epistemology. They argue that conceptual value helps identify concepts the researcher intends to measure. This is especially suited here as it cannot quantify culture. Case studies assist in finding new hypotheses. For this thesis, the Holy See’s soft power and association solely with *milieu* goals is questioned. George and Bennett suggest case studies explore causal mechanisms. Here causality is not direct but more complex. No single “variable” causes a lack of Holy See soft power but an array of factors.

Flyvbjerg rejects arguments that case studies possess a tendency to confirm the researcher’s bias. He contends “the case study has its own rigor, different to be sure, but no less strict than the rigor of quantitative methods. The advantage of the case study is that it can ‘close in’ on real situations and test views directly in relation to phenomena as they unfold in practice”.¹⁰⁰ Problems of cross-comparison are evident here. Positivists obviously base their

⁹⁷ Bent Flyvbjerg, “Case study” in Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln (eds.) *The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research*, Fourth edition (London: Sage, 2011), 303.

⁹⁸ Ibid, 306.

⁹⁹ Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2005), 19-22.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid, 309.

criticisms on epistemological grounds but by doing so, this illustrates the differences between the two fields and the complications of comparison.

Due to this study's relatively recent nature, primary sources are not widely available. Most of the Holy See studies have been historical and the more contemporary are largely diplomatic memoirs.¹⁰¹ Where primary sources have been available, every effort has been made to use them to improve the analysis. Nonetheless, primary sources are less widely available, so secondary sources have been used to fill gaps. These secondary sources assist integrating a wider variety of causes, which helps support each individual cause and thus explain a richer overall causality.

An account of the case study choice will be addressed below but a fundamental reason for choosing these case studies rests on the contradiction between the 1991 and 2003 Iraq Wars. The Holy See opposed both but for entirely different reasons. For 1991, it implied the just war theory's presumption against war, fears of a "clash of civilisations" and concerns that it did not meet the just war criteria. In 2003, its hostility to the war was "simpler", it did not have UN endorsement. This was in spite of the 1991 war having received UN sanction. Yet it did not see these as contradictory. It did not apply all the just war criteria to the 1991 conflict, but also claimed the 1991 conflict did not meet the just war measures.¹⁰² Yet this contradiction questioned its seemingly inherent moral status through its rejection of the moral use of force.

For the 1991 war, a reading of the Holy See's own foreign policy principles lead it to offer (tacit) support, with the common good, the unity of the human family and the importance of multilateralism lending credence to its justification as a "good" war. Nevertheless, the Holy See *still* refused to see it as just. Despite drawing these differences, without stating them explicitly, it contradicted itself and used a lack of UN support as a justification for opposing the 2003 war to protect its possession goals.

Case studies provide a means to analyse specific but in-depth events through a series of broader questions. Generally, "confronted with the case, the challenge is to acknowledge and uncover its specific meaning, while extracting generalizable knowledge actually or potentially related to other cases".¹⁰³

¹⁰¹ Negroponte and Rooney, *The Global Vatican*; Jim Nicholson, *The United States and the Holy See the Long Road* (C. S. C. Grafica, 2004).

¹⁰² Ronald Patrick Stake, 'The Holy See and the Middle East: The Public Diplomacy of Pope John Paul II' (M.A., Naval Postgraduate School, 2006), 64.

¹⁰³ Pascal Vennesson, "Case studies and process tracing: theories and practices" in Della Porta and Keating, 226.

Selecting these case studies allows for some sense of “continuity” in that both wars involved Iraq. Moreover, as Flyvbjerg suggests, testing something at the “extremes” is important.

In addition to this contradiction, two further reasons merit their selection. Firstly, this is a post-Cold War study. Consequently, narratives around progress and man’s capacity to change are important in what was seen as a “new” era. Secondly, both wars reveal a consistent Holy See policy of protecting its possession goals at the expense of attempts to maximise its soft power. A lack of US Catholic support for Holy See “policies” gave it little room for manoeuvre. As Flyvbjerg argues this helps provide a more in-depth look at events. Furthermore, choosing case studies allows for a greater sense of the complexity of the Holy See-US relationship in the post-Cold War era that positivist epistemology could not provide. However, this methodology still allows for theory development through the application of theory to previously unexamined empirical events.

Had other case studies been chosen these would not have given a clearer explanation of the US-Holy See relationship. Studies on the US intervention to protect Bosnian Muslims or the lack of US intervention in Rwanda would highlight the differing view of humanitarian intervention. Instead the two wars show the profound differences between the two actors and their attempts to pursue their soft power, possession and *milieu* goals.

Conclusion

This chapter has laid out the theory of culture and soft power. It has been maintained that culture frames a state's responses by reflecting and shaping identity. Linked to this, soft power has been used to show its sources, through culture, values and foreign policy but also its limitations.

Nye's soft power was examined as the principal lens using Wolfers's *milieu* and possession goals to analyse their actions. In this way, Holy See attempts to shape the international environment met with US possession goals. Sections on culture will be outlined, the conclusions and their significance for the next chapters before the importance soft power will be laid out.

The benefits and usage of culture has been discussed in shaping foreign policy. Its advantages uncovers the framing used by the actors to the wars. It also reveals the underlying differences between the European responses to both wars. Without culture, much would be lost in the analysis of the Holy See's lack of soft power. Using culture helps draw the distinction between not just the Holy See and the United States but, "the European" position which tends to reflect the Holy See preference for international law and multilateralism. As will be demonstrated later the Holy See's desire for these *milieu* goals were not strong enough against US possession goals. This chapter has illustrated, how exceptionalism, Jacksonianism and Calvinism interact with each other to shape a response to the wars. Such were the differences between this and the Holy See that any attractive power it possessed was greatly diminished. The following chapters will show how culture's flexibility allowed the United States, in two differing contexts, to undercut the Holy See's moral credibility in seeing itself as serving more than just its own possession goals evincing the weakness of the Holy See's *milieu* goals and soft power.

Nye's formulation of soft power was examined and its benefits were highlighted as an appropriate lens through which to examine the Holy See and its goals. The soft power and culture section posed problems of defining a uniquely "Catholic culture". It was suggested that because it is more narrowly defined, national culture tends to overwhelm and envelop it rather than create a distinct identity. Historical examples, namely the nineteenth century Americanist crisis, were offered as illustrative of a "distinct" and previously aloof Catholic culture became integrated into a "national" culture. Such an example undermined theology that saw all Catholics united as one, irrespective of nationality. Accordingly, it was harder for the Holy See

to attract Catholics to its *milieu* goals against the strength of the narrower US culture and possession goals.

The soft power and values, or “teachings” section contended that those actors that “live up to their values” lay the foundations for soft power. The section argued that the Church’s values, or teachings, can be interpreted in several different, sometimes contradictory, ways. The result can heighten divisions between, in the US case, liberal and conservative Catholics who viewed the 2002 sex abuse crisis and its ultimate causes through starkly contrasting lenses. Consequently, these teachings make it difficult to engender unity to utilise the Holy See’s soft power. In turn this undermined the Holy See’s soft power and the success at attracting others to its *milieu* goals and at the same time damaged its image as a moral actor.

Lastly, how foreign policy is built to create soft power was examined. The importance of legitimate and moral foreign policies was emphasised. Crucially a lack of knowledge, even ignorance, dulls Holy See capacity to advocate for its *milieu* goals against the war, making it more likely to occur. In addition to this, the relationship between legitimacy, moral authority and the Holy See’s neutrality was examined. It was suggested that there are few instances where all three occur simultaneously. While Holy See *milieu* goals were weak against US possession goals, its desire to protect its possession goals illustrates the tensions within Holy See foreign policy and soft power during the case studies. Thus, its image as an actor in the international “wilderness” benefits its possession goals by setting itself against the United States and its allies.

Part Two – 1991 Iraq War

Chapter III The Good War

This chapter will contend that the Holy See was immediately at a disadvantage in attempting to influence the United States through *milieu* goals. The Holy See's opposition to the 2003 Iraq War was based on a lack of a UN Security Council resolution. Yet, the 1991 Iraq War had a UN resolution and it *still* opposed the war. A contradiction exists in the Holy See's opposition to the war and the wider world's view as to its justness and the possibility of the moral use of force. The previous chapter maintained how the Holy See claimed neither of the two Iraq wars met the just war criteria for distinct reasons. The UN's support for the 1991 war was crucial for both scholars and the Bush administration viewing it as just. Consequently, the Holy See's opposition to the war and its *milieu* goals were so broad as to be ineffective against combined US possession and *milieu* goals. Ultimately, UN support undermined the Holy See's soft power and its anti-war message.

While campaigning for the US presidency in 2008, Barack Obama described the War in Afghanistan as the “good war”.¹ Obama contrasted this “good war” to the 2003 Iraq War, which he saw as the “dumb war”.² and the 1991 war's view by many as just (or good), an expectation of Holy See support may have existed because of the Holy See-US “triumph” in the Cold War. This should have made the Holy See influential. In addition to the broader reasons for its influence discussed in Chapter I.

The first section will lay out the post-Cold War “end of history” narrative, and how the US and the Holy See's engagement with this reflected different ideas of history and progress. These ideas set the tone for some of the George H.W. Bush administration's rhetorical justification for the war. These contrasting narratives reflected ideas around, and progress, highlighting the distinct worldviews of both actors. The Holy See's lack of soft power because of its pursuit of *milieu* goals is also made clearer. The second section will briefly examine the

¹ Don Gonyea, 'Is Obama In An “Afghan Box”?', NPR.org, <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=113316234>.

² Barack Obama, 'Transcript: Obama's Speech Against The Iraq War', NPR.org, 2 October 2002, <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=99591469>.

1991 war's immediate causes, based on the post-Cold War order, debt and oil, this will emphasise US power in the post-Cold War era which Iraq clearly miscalculated and how this set the scene for US possession goals.

After this, the Holy See's positions on the war will be laid out over three stages: first, why the Holy See opposed the war, and how seeking to alter US *milieu* goals weakened its soft power. Second, the Holy See's efforts to persuade the United States not to go to war through letters and speeches. The UK, French and German support for the war, negating Holy See hostility, will also be examined. Lastly, the slow speed of the Holy See's response will be examined. It will be posited that this was because it was understaffed as well as it being a tactic to retain its neutrality.

In both of these sections US political culture played a role in shaping the positions of both actors and had a significant role in undermining the Holy See's soft power. For the Holy See, ideas of Jacksonianism, American exceptionalism and Calvinism in the context of the 1991 war, all made the Holy See's opposition less relevant. While for the United States these same factors, in the same context strengthened its resolve against Iraq.

Echoing this structure, the United States will be examined. The first section will explore why the United States went to war. This was due to a mix of possession and *milieu* goals to protect its interests, security and international order as the Soviet Union crumbled as well as domestic factors. The second section will explore what practical steps it took leading to war, uniting most of the major states and other actors to remove Iraq from Kuwait. Overall the UK, France and Germany supported the US stance against Iraq, despite Germany's position, which was closer to the Holy See's. Although this similarity did not last which weakened the Holy See's attractive ability. A brief conclusion will then end the chapter, before Chapter IV answers what domestic and systemic factors weakened the Holy See's soft power through its focus on *milieu* goals.

Chapter Rationale: Whither the Just War?

This section argues the 1991 war is included for three reasons: the prominence of the just war theory in Catholic thought, the lack of public support for the Holy See's interpretation and the date of the war at the end of the Cold War. The section will then briefly examine the sharply contrasting differences between the US and the Holy See on the war's justness. It will be contended that some in the Church had a mathematical view of the just war theory which it is argued, reduced its soft power and advocacy of its *milieu* (and possession) goals. Lastly, Bush's view of the war will be discussed in light of the alternative sanctions proposed on Iraq.

The just war doctrine has been of long standing importance to the Church. This was stressed when it was included in the Catechism, the Church's beliefs.³ In spite of this inclusion and its importance, the Holy See saw the war not meeting the just war criteria and opposed the war. Every war, irrespective of circumstances, could be justified or rejected by the Holy See. Furthermore, Holy See moral authority on the war, on just war terms, was limited as many saw the war as just. Complicating matters, they could not openly reject the just war theory as it was placed within a summary of Catholic teaching, the Catechism. Although the Holy See strenuously opposed the war, it also sought not to be portrayed as pacifist. Moreover, to reject the just war teaching would be to imply a "functional pacifism" which they had been accused of by some.⁴

Another justification for this case study is public support for the war and the inability of the Holy See to attract enough supporters to its interpretation of the just war theory to advance its *milieu* goals. Notably, the reasons that the Holy See opposed the 2003 Iraq War are the very reasons why it should have supported the 1991 Iraq War, namely that it was supported by the UN Security Council.⁵

Additionally, the war's date is important. The conflict was the first major crisis in the post-Cold War era. Accordingly, the role of US soft power is significant with goodwill towards the US at its height, especially in Europe. Thus, support for US objectives and the war's

³ Catechism of the Catholic Church, no 2309,
http://www.vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/archive/catechism/p3s2c2a5.htm.

⁴ James Turner Johnson and George Weigel, *Just War and the Gulf War* (Washington, D.C.; Lanham, MD: Ethics & Public Policy Center Inc., U.S., 1991), 64.

⁵ 'Vatican Says No Strike on Iraq without UN Approval', The Irish Times,
<http://www.irishtimes.com/news/vatican-says-no-strike-on-iraq-without-un-approval-1.436303>.

justness strengthened the US pursuit of its possession and *milieu* goals and weakened Holy See soft power.

Many observers saw the 1991 war as just, yet the Holy See remained opposed. Certain bishops, and even the pope, seemed to view the just war theory as a precise mathematical formula to be followed. Rather than an imperfect series of issues and questions to be debated and evaluated in context. Acknowledgement of the nuances and imperfections of the just war theory and need for debate would have threatened both the Holy See's neutrality and possession goals by forcing it to take a position on the war. To counter this, it was safer to treat it as a clear set of questions. Indeed, as Chapter IV elaborates, some bishops saw the use of force be directed by "clear moral criteria". This demand for clarity clashed with how it operationalised soft power and made its *milieu* goals, for greater dialogue to avoid war, not only weak but irrelevant to the combination of US possession and *milieu* goals. Given this danger to Holy See neutrality, John Paul II never publicly stated his apparent mathematical view of the just war theory. This had a direct impact on the Holy See's pursuit of advocating for its *milieu* goals and thus its attractiveness to the US. Flowing from this, the Holy See's seemingly impossibly high standard for the use of force led some to question its supposed moral status which benefited the United States' *milieu* goals at the start of the post-Cold War era.

The United States was able to use the war's perception as a just war to attain its possession and *milieu* goals. President George H. W. Bush saw the war as just. He claimed just cause, legitimate authority, right reason and last resort.⁶ The United States and its coalition attempted to pressure Iraq to withdraw through sanctions but these had little effect. As will be discussed later, some who opposed the war advocated sanctions. Yet questions could be asked over the long term justness of this approach on Iraqi civilians. Two issues emerge, the first is that sanctions were seen as a way to avoid war while hoping for an Iraqi withdrawal. A choice was posed between "peaceful" sanctions or a violent war to alter Iraq's behaviour. This choice implied states either imposing the immediate suffering of war, or the longer, and perhaps less effective, suffering of sanctions. Other aspects of proportionality (sometimes called macro-proportionality, the good in waging war must be balanced by the damage caused) should be borne in mind such as war outweighing the problems it would cause. This, coupled with the argument that they did not do significant damage to civilian infrastructure may have

⁶ George Bush, 'Remarks at the Annual Convention of the National Religious Broadcasters', 28 January 1991 American Presidency Project <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=19250>.

demonstrated this element.⁷ Part of the just war theory is grounded in the possibility of success and war as the last resort.⁸ Before the war, Iraq refused to compromise on its demands. The United States was in a difficult position between not rushing to war and its broader *milieu* goals of not allowing Iraq's invasion to be legitimised in the post-Cold War era.

This section has posited that the 1991 war was included for the relevance of the just war theory in Catholic thought, the absence of support for the Holy See's opposition to the war and the war's date, coming at the end of the Cold War. The contrasting differences between the US and the Holy See on the war's justness were explored. It was argued that the pope's mathematical view of the just war theory reduced his soft power. Lastly, Bush's view of the war as just was discussed.

⁷ Michael Walzer, 'The Triumph of Just War Theory (and the Dangers of Success)', *Social Research* 69, no. 4 (2002): 925–44.

⁸ Johnson and Weigel, *Just War and the Gulf War*.

Context and Causes of the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait

There are three primary, and interlinked, causes of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait: a drop in Iraqi oil revenue due to overproduction, debt and Iraq's renewed claims to Kuwait. Each of these will be addressed. Other reasons are, Iraq was invited into Kuwait by those wanting to overthrow the al-Sabah monarchy and Iraq equating its invasion to the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories.⁹

Freedman and Karsh argued that high oil production worsened Iraqi debts from the Iran-Iraq War and were a significant factor in the Iraqi invasion. The scale of Iraq's problem was made clear when they note, "Iraq's oil revenues of \$13 billion per annum barely covered the military budget".¹⁰ Iraq needed either a debt restructuring or an increase in the price of oil. However, the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was unable to enforce quotas on its members. Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) were responsible for 75% of the excess production at the beginning of 1990.¹¹ This led to a fall in the oil price and thus, Iraqi revenues.

The second related factor was debt. Iraq demanded Kuwait repay \$10 billion.¹² In addition, Iraq claimed that Kuwait had been drilling in Iraqi oil fields and thus needed to reimburse it a further \$2.4 billion.¹³ Tensions were heightened when Iraq defined Kuwaiti actions as nearing "military aggression".¹⁴ Consequently little room was left for either Kuwait, or Iraq, to compromise. These tensions were occurring at the same time as the Iraqi military build-up began on 15 July 1990.¹⁵

Lastly, Iraq had a long history of claiming Kuwait as a province.¹⁶ Iraqi claims on Kuwait, while longstanding, seemed to alter based on political expediency. Iraq recognised Kuwait in 1963 but was said to have done so due to Kuwaiti payment.¹⁷ The Iraqi government then *seemed to reverse* this position after the Ba'ath Party returned to power through a coup d'état in 1968.

⁹ Ken Matthews, *The Gulf Conflict and International Relations* (London; New York: Routledge, 1993), 144.

¹⁰ Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, *The Gulf Conflict: 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order*, New edition (London: Faber and Faber, 1994), 39.

¹¹ *Ibid*, 41.

¹² *Ibid*.

¹³ *Ibid*, 48.

¹⁴ *Ibid*.

¹⁵ *Ibid*, 47.

¹⁶ *Ibid*, 42-43.

¹⁷ *Ibid*, 44.

Before the outbreak of the war both Iraq and Kuwait met in Jeddah on 31 July but the hosts, the Saudi government, did not attend to mediate.¹⁸ Accounts posited two alternate views of what was offered. The talks collapsed but were due to resume in Baghdad on 4 August. Iraqi sincerity was in doubt when “even before the collapse of the Jeddah talks, the three Iraqi armoured divisions facing Kuwait had uncoiled and moved forward to within three miles of the border”.¹⁹

It has been contended that Iraq wished to invade Kuwait, not only to make up for a loss of revenue but to increase the Iraqi stake in the oil market and possess greater prestige.²⁰ The Jeddah talks, Freedman and Karsh argue, were “a smoke-screen aimed at gaining international legitimization for the impending military action”.²¹ Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990.

The Iraqi regime seems not to have taken sufficient account of what US unipolarity in the new post-Cold War world meant for the Middle East, and international relations more generally. The United States was unencumbered from systemic consequences. This new unipolarity did not necessarily mean the United States would act against Iraq, since some commentators advocated for retrenchment. Fears of US isolation were not as substantial after the end of the Cold War. Polling suggested a stable majority remained in favour of engagement.²² Domestic factors in the US played a large role. Yet as this thesis argues, the scale of the task, stopping a war, in addition to other elements limited any influence the Holy See may have had.

¹⁸Ibid, 59.

¹⁹ Ibid, 60.

²⁰ Freedman and Karsh, 62.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Charles W. Kegley Jr, Eugene R. Wittkopf, and Christopher Jones, *American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process*, 7th Revised edition (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co Inc, 2005), 255; Steven Kull et al., *Misreading the Public: The Myth of a New Isolationism* (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 1999).

Holy See Position

Reasons for Holy See opposition

The Holy See's opposition, because of its unique "actorness", rested on both theological and (geo-) political reasons. Each of these will be examined in turn.

Shelledy posited that Holy See opposition to the war rested on three main points. First, is the importance of international law, with Iraqi invasion a violation of this. Second, the Holy See's reading of the just war theory (which gained theological prominence after the 1960s²³) presupposes a presumption against war. This presumption raises the qualification bar for a just war. Lastly, fears the war may have engendered a clash of civilisations strengthened Holy See hostility over concerns for negative repercussions for Christians throughout the Middle East. Lastly, Holy See opposition was based on concerns over US hegemony in the region.²⁴ Thus, Holy See opposition was based on a mix of *milieu* and possession goals between the presumption against war and the possession goal for the need to protect Christians.

International law for the Holy See was an important framework to resolve disputes, with its opposition to the war predicated on an insufficient attempt at dialogue. This belief clashed with Jacksonian ideas of the efficacy of force, which were re-enforced by Calvinist ideas. Holy See stress on international law reflected its ideas of the theological unity of mankind. However, in supporting military force, the UN, disagreed with the Holy See. When the Holy See disagreed with the UN, it ignored the Security Council's decision. The Holy See's high standard for the use of force led some to question its supposed moral status, which benefited the United States' *milieu* and possession goals against Iraq. Rather the Holy See sought to advance its possession and *milieu* goals outside a UN framework.

Holy See understanding of community is important but shifts over these case studies. It does so only under circumstances that do not jeopardise its neutrality or damage its possession goals. The UN is not the sole representation of the world's states but that its most powerful members agreed to use force to correct Iraq's actions says much. Concurrently, ideas of the unity of mankind, transposed from Catholic theology had little to say, in the Holy See's interpretation, about Kuwait as a supposedly equal member of this international "community". Supporters of the war could claim their view of community was more in accord with Church

²³ Drew Christiansen, "Holy See Policy Towards Iraq", in Gerhard Beestermöller and David Little (eds), *Iraq: Threat and Response* (Hamburg: LIT Verlag Münster, 2003), 88.

²⁴ Shelledy, 'Legions Not Always Visible on Parade', 164–165.

theology. This happened to accord with US possession goals making the US case for war more attractive to Catholics in the United States.

A geopolitical reason for its opposition was neutrality, which preceded all else, as it neither supported war nor accepted Iraqi actions. Yet it also desired a peaceful resolution to the Iraqi invasion. However, this desire was unable to circumvent US culture, especially Jacksonian tendency's and a binary Calvinist belief in good and evil. Preferring a negotiated Iraqi withdrawal may suggest that Holy See goals were not equivalent to its wishes. Maintaining neutrality, as Ryall contends, is a structural feature of the Holy See.²⁵ That international law did not support its anti-war stance on Iraq forced it to choose its possession goals over the UN.

Holy See reading of just war theory had a presumption against war, though this was never stated explicitly. This *milieu* goal could not overcome US possession goals that had UN support. It seemingly took the presumption against war to mean *all* wars, at *all* times, in *all* circumstances. Therefore, Holy See possession goals would be guarded through its vocal opposition. Its stance protected its religious character and neutrality. However, US possession goals were so narrow, removing Iraq from Kuwait, it meant Holy See desire to shape the international environment to have others follow its pacifism was impossible.

Stummvoll claims that the Holy See presents itself as a moral actor and its depoliticised nature allows it to present itself as “detached from geopolitical realities, ideological blocs, or party politics”.²⁶ In this instance, its soft power was non-existent as its *milieu* goals were too broad and too ambitious to be realised. Indeed, Shelledy argues, “although the Vatican recognizes the moral ambiguity of neutrality, it appears to be more concerned with the dangers of a moral sanction of war than criticisms of neutrality”.²⁷ The empirical chapters will stress how the Holy See continually placed its neutral status above seeking “moral influence”. Thus, it appeared to realise the weaknesses of pursuing its soft power through *milieu* goals. However, it connected these *milieu* goals to its possession goals of protecting Christians in the region, a strategy they were to repeat in opposing the 2003 war.

The Holy See's suggestion of dialogue, because it was a *milieu* goal, was vague. It did not account for the negative understanding of human self-interest in Calvinism and Jacksonianism. The extent to which the Holy See presumed all wars were unjust, made the use of force not just impossible but immoral. Furthermore, because it was a *milieu* goal it failed to

²⁵ Ryall, 'How Many Divisions?'.

²⁶ Stummvoll, 'A Living Tradition', 38.

²⁷ Shelledy, 'Legions Not Always Visible on Parade', 163

produce alternatives to restoring Kuwait but allowed the Holy See's opposition which reflected its geopolitical possession goals.

Flowing from this, its concerns of a clash of civilisations contributed to its hostility to the war. Like its positions on international law and the presumption against war, its fear of a clash of civilisations reflected its preference for *milieu* goals but also how these advanced its possession goals of protecting Christians against a backlash. Adding to this, only the most superficial reading would lend credence to a clash of civilisations. On the one side was the "West" embodied in the United States and much of Western Europe, against Iraq in the Middle East. Yet, Japan²⁸, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Egypt²⁹ all supported the war. Naturally, this assumes the idea of clearly defined "civilisations".

Holy See objectives against the war affected their view on the clash of civilisations. This argument only strengthens Holy See opposition based on protecting Christians as "traditional" possession goals. Clearly, the Holy See is not a "normal" state so its goals can be both less traditional and more diffuse, reflecting its "actorness". Christians were spread throughout the Middle East and senior prelates stated their desire to maintain a Christian presence in the region.³⁰ A similar concern was expressed in the 2003 Iraq War.³¹ Anxiety over a clash of civilisations, may have been used to express these possession goals, rather than a genuine fear of "civilisational" violence.

In essence, the Holy See belief may have derived from its global vision, a worldwide view of events, rather than a state-focused one. Thus, its *milieu* goals were a natural extension of this. These in turn meant whatever soft power the Holy See possessed was insufficient to overcome these competing goals. Ironically, the Bush administration portrayed itself as holding a similarly global view through exceptionalism. When this was mixed with Jacksonianism, Holy See soft power was significantly reduced in pursuit of its *milieu* goals.

Previously mentioned reasons for the Holy See's opposition to the war was to Stake's contention that the war did not meet the just war criteria.³² However, they are never clearly enunciated but have been surmised. Christiansen's analysis did not state reasons for its opposition but only notes John Paul II's opposition.³³

²⁸ Freedman and Karsh, *The Gulf Conflict*, 121.

²⁹ Ibid, 96–97.

³⁰ John L. Allen, 'Preventing a "spiritual Disneyland" in the Holy Land', *National Catholic Reporter*, 21 July 2011, <https://www.ncronline.org/blogs/all-things-catholic/preventing-spiritual-disneyland-holy-land>.

³¹ Allen, *All the Pope's Men*, 46.

³² Stake, 'The Holy See and the Middle East', 64.

³³ Christiansen, "Holy See Policy Towards Iraq", 89-91.

Traditionally, the just war criteria for *jus ad bellum* (rules for going to war) are: just cause, comparative justice, competent authority, last resort, probability of success, right intention and proportionality of doing good over evil.³⁴ Dodaro elaborated on the Holy See position during the war.³⁵ Dodaro contends that the Holy See linked the Iraqi invasion to other conflicts in the region. He writes, “a just resolution of the crisis required of the allies that the complex interrelation of economic and political issues which led to the invasion be respected”.³⁶ He maintained that the Holy See saw Iraqi demands for withdrawal as part of a bargaining position.³⁷ If this were to be implemented it could create a moral hazard. Iraq could then blackmail others. Dodaro claimed the Holy See was aware of this problem but saw the crisis in a much larger context. The risks of not holding discussions seemed to outweigh any consequences. Consequently, its broad worldview and advocacy for *milieu* goals to shape the international environment supported each other. Dependency theory may have influenced the Holy See, which views poor states as exploited by rich, usually Western, states. Dodaro posited the Holy See position drew similarities “between the Gulf Crisis and other Middle Eastern and Third World crises stemming from economic injustice”.³⁸ This overlooks the economic mismanagement of the Iraqi economy, the wars begun by Iraq and its OPEC membership. Iraq is viewed as a victim rather than being, at least partly, to blame for its own actions.

A shift³⁹ in the reading of just war theory may partly have been a consequence of the Second Vatican Council, which praised non-violence and conscientious objection.⁴⁰ An illustration of this is the 1965 document *Gaudium et spes*, with a section entitled “Avoidance of War”. It states, “governments cannot be denied the right to legitimate defense once every means of peaceful settlement has been exhausted”.⁴¹ The text did not elaborate on when the last resort has passed and when war is thus permissible. No mention was made of states being unable to defend themselves.

The Holy See seeks relations with all states. It opposed the war for theological and geopolitical reasons. Although referring to the 2003 Iraq War, in protecting its interests, some

³⁴ Johnson and Weigel, *Just War and the Gulf War*.

³⁵ Robert Dodaro, ‘The Gulf War and the Just-War Theory: View from the Vatican’, *New Blackfriars* 73, no. 859 (April 1992): 200–209.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Michael K. Duffey, ‘The Just War Teaching’.

⁴⁰ John Dear, *The God of Peace: Toward A Theology of Nonviolence* (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2005), 115.

⁴¹ Paul VI, *Gaudium et spes: Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World*, 7 December 1965, http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_const_19651207_gaudium-et-spes_en.html.

have claimed that it is capable of “realpolitik”.⁴² Yet the pope’s *milieu* goals were unable to overcome the combination of US possession and *milieu* goals. The pope’s position was not able to attract sufficient support, either in the administration, or from Catholics in the United States. The Holy See’s *milieu* goals dominated and its possession goals, protecting Christians in the region, was not explicit. This would have made Holy See opposition more understandable to many Catholics given its possession goals.

When the Security Council supported the war, the Holy See’s traditional theology of the unity of mankind was abandoned. Accordingly, they had to find an alternative way to oppose the war. To do this the Holy See needed to rely on its own reading of just war theory. It sidestepped the significance it placed on international law, consensus and the unity of mankind. Instead, it merely implied that the Iraq war did not meet just war requirements. Chapter VI will demonstrate how, for the 2003 war, Holy See emphasis shifted back to the UN’s authority. It downplayed ideas of community in its theology. In advocating for *milieu* goals, it opted for an “absolutist” position where it was protected under the umbrella of Holy See opposition. Naturally, such a stance made any soft power it possessed largely ineffective when opposing the war.

Holy See hostility to the war was never made explicit but rested on not viewing the war as meeting just war criteria. Yet, its religious nature and presumption against war would lead some to question its supposed moral status. This benefited the United States’ *milieu* and possession goals at the dawn of the unipolar age

Despite its opposition to Iraqi actions, it feared negative repercussions for Christians in the Middle East and concerns over US regional hegemony. Lastly, its reading of just war theory had an assumed presumption against war meaning its starting position was to oppose all wars. What this presumption does not answer is under what circumstances the Holy See would view a war as just. This forms the basis of Weigel’s charge of pacifism.

Holy See Diplomacy to Stop the War: Choosing Neutrality over Peace

How did the Holy See try to influence US foreign policy in the Middle East? It used personal and public diplomacy, leveraging its perceived moral status to attract the United States to its *milieu* goals. Principally this consisted of the pope’s letters and speeches. John Paul II’s speeches advocated negotiation to end the tension and bring about an Iraqi withdrawal. Preserving its neutrality was considered more important than maximising its soft power to

⁴² Allen, *All the Pope’s Men*, 46.

avoid war. In doing so, it bolstered its possession goals and benefited from its position in the international wilderness. Even when possibilities existed to remain neutral but do more to avoid war, the Holy See chose not to. This section will conclude with how French and German positions were similar to the Holy See's, but were not similar enough to its *milieu* goals to attract the United States successfully.

The Holy See was from the outset limited in what it could, and could not, do because of its own neutrality. It attempted to balance opposition to the war while calling for its resolution. Contemporary news reports noted that pacifists and former members of the Italian Communist Party also supported the Holy See's anti-war stance.⁴³ Hence, it has been contended, the Holy See's stance "was cautious in the extreme".⁴⁴

Holy See public diplomacy in opposing the war was based primarily on speeches and letters. Initial reaction condemned Iraqi actions, the editorial in *L'Osservatore Romano* of 9 August asked what had happened to "the dignity and sovereignty of an independent State".⁴⁵ The first such public statement from the pope was issued on 26 August 1990. During his Sunday Angelus, the pontiff noted the "grave violation of international law" and asked the crowd assembled to pray that "equitable solutions" to problems may be found.⁴⁶

John Paul II mentioned the Persian Gulf but did not explicitly refer to either Iraq or Kuwait. Questions could have been asked as the extent of the moral pressure it was willing to use. Contemporary reports indicated a meeting between John Paul II and the apostolic pro-nuncio⁴⁷ to Iraq, but that no proactive steps were offered to resolve the crisis.⁴⁸

On Christmas Day 1990 the pope used his traditional *Urbi et Orbi* blessing (To the City and the World) to appeal for peace. He hoped that "respect for the inalienable rights of people and nations, it is possible to identify and travel the paths of understanding and peace".⁴⁹ A view of a united humanity is shown here, but this view did not extend to the Security Council

⁴³ Clyde Haberman, 'War in the Gulf: The Vatican; The Pope's Divisions Attract Strange Recruits Over Gulf', *The New York Times*, 21 February 1991, <http://www.nytimes.com/1991/02/21/world/war-gulf-vatican-pope-s-divisions-attract-strange-recruits-over-gulf.html>.

⁴⁴ Christiansen, "Holy See Policy Towards Iraq", 89.

⁴⁵ Shelledy, 'Legions Not Always Visible on Parade', 167.

⁴⁶ John Paul II, Angelus, 26 August 1990, Vatican, http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/it/angelus/1990/documents/hf_jp-ii_ang_19900826.html.

⁴⁷ Apostolic Pro-Nuncios were appointed by the Holy See to those nations where the nuncio was not concurrently dean of the diplomatic corps. The title is no longer in use with apostolic nuncio being the title predominantly used.

⁴⁸ 'Pope breaks silence on Gulf crisis', *The Tablet*, <http://archive.thetablet.co.uk/article/1st-september-1990/22/the-church-in-the-world>.

⁴⁹ Clyde Haberman, 'Pope, in Christmas Message, Warns on a Gulf War', *The New York Times*, 26 December 1990, <http://www.nytimes.com/1990/12/26/world/pope-in-christmas-message-warns-on-a-gulf-war.html>.

sanctioning war. Leaving this aside, there was no further elaboration on these principles to peace, or what was to occur if dialogue was unsuccessful. Fundamentally these *milieu* goals were insufficiently attractive to maximise Holy See attractiveness but worked in tandem with its possession goals.

In his 1991 New Year address to diplomats accredited to the Holy See, the pope spoke of two interrelated themes. The first was that Iraq broke international law, but was not mentioned by name. The second theme was the equality of nations with the weak not being dominated by the strong. Such ideas of equality underpin Holy See diplomacy, as will be highlighted in Chapters IV and VI. Its stress on equality made the Holy See's world-view dramatically different to the United States in general but on this occasion, through exceptionalist and Jacksonian lenses the United States could enforce state equality. In turn, this widened the gulf between the actors and damaged the Holy See's soft power. There were no diplomatic mechanisms to guarantee all nations are treated equally, absent such a method, negotiation is one of the few tools left. Security Council endorsement of force to remove Iraq and the Holy See's view of humanity did not adapt to this. Thus, the Holy See's high standard for the use of force made it harder to advance its *milieu* goals. An alternative reading of the strong not dominating the weak could refer to the United States, with Iraq seen as the weak state. This might be plausible given the Holy See's view of economic injustice toward Iraq, not justifying its invasion, but the need for a more equitable economic order.⁵⁰ Such views minimise Iraq's actions and could be seen as indicative of dependency theory. The other is the pope's public diplomacy favouring talks: "now more than ever is the time for dialogue, for negotiation, and for affirming the primacy of international law".⁵¹ These themes, respect for international law and the need for a diplomatic solution, would be consistently repeated throughout the conflict, and were emphasised again before the 2003 Iraq War. They underline the Holy See's broader view of the conflict and the need for a changed international environment to resolve the Iraqi invasion.

John Paul II, in a January 1991 letter to European foreign ministers gathered in Luxembourg, urged talks to resolve the issue and warned of the dangers of conflict.⁵² This was followed days later by a letter to the UN Secretary-General, supporting his visit to Iraq to avoid

⁵⁰ Dodaro, 'The Gulf War'.

⁵¹ John Paul II, "Address of His Holiness John Paul II to the Diplomatic Corps accredited to the Holy See", Vatican, http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/speeches/1991/january/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_19910112_corpo-diplomatico.html.

⁵² George Weigel, *Witness to Hope: The Biography of Pope John Paul II 1920 - 2005* (HarperCollins, 1999), 620.

war.⁵³ Despite the developing situation, the Holy See's position remained unchanged. This focus on the international environment, and its implicit possession goals, while understandable given its constraints contributed to its lack of attractiveness to the Bush administration.

In keeping with Holy See public diplomacy, letters were published from the pope on 15 January, hours before the deadline for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, to the presidents of United States and Iraq.⁵⁴ These letters were published too late to make any difference to the actors involved. Nevertheless, it remained consistent with Holy See diplomatic theory, as laid out in the previous chapter. Thus, the possibility of meaningful talks between the parties was minimal. Holy See diplomacy seemed not to take this into account but its consistent opposition in favour of its possession goals may have assisted Christians in the region.

However, after the conflict began, Holy See concerns against accusations of pacifism were such that John Paul II said "we are not pacifists, we do not want peace at any price".⁵⁵ That this was said at all could be seen as indicative of the Holy See's anxiety for its image. The Holy See was unable to leverage its *milieu* goals over the mixture of US *milieu* and possession goals and its perceived moral authority against the war. In the United States in 1991, 59% said they had "a great deal/quite a lot" of confidence in the Church.⁵⁶ Yet translating this confidence into action proved difficult. Holy See desire to shape the environment in which states operate was not attractive enough for most Catholics.

Having interviewed Archbishop Jean-Louis Tauran, the secretary for Relations with States; George Weigel, a conservative US Catholic, noted that on the first day of hostilities John Paul rang President Bush saying he still hoped for a peaceful solution but sought a coalition victory. Weigel contended the pope, "seemed to be making a plea for restraint in the conduct of the war, while underlining that the Holy See recognized that a gross violation of justice and international law had taken place".⁵⁷ Weigel argues that "there was some concern that this point was getting lost in the Pope's insistent appeals for a negotiated settlement".⁵⁸

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ John Paul II, "Messages of John Paul II to His Excellency Saddam Hussein, President of Iraq, and to His Excellency George Bush, President of the United States of America", *Vatican*, http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/speeches/1991/january/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_19910115_saddam-hussein-bush.html.

⁵⁵ Clare Pedrick, 'Pope Rejects Pacifism, Calls for "Just Peace" in Persian Gulf', *The Washington Post*, 19 February 1991, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1991/02/19/pope-rejects-pacifism-calls-for-just-peace-in-persian-gulf/53e31e70-b71d-45eb-b2ff-e2bd9c54e4fb/>.

⁵⁶ Lydia Saad, 'Confidence in Religion at New Low, but Not Among Catholics', Gallup.com, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/183674/confidence-religion-new-low-not-among-catholics.aspx>.

⁵⁷ Weigel, *Witness to Hope*, 620–21.

⁵⁸ Ibid, 621.

That this call occurred privately bolsters the argument for the Holy See's *milieu* goals worked together with possession goals to protect Middle East Christians. This call represented the pope's "actorness" and desire to exert moral authority through personal diplomacy. The seeming assumption of inherent moral authority, on the part of the pope, may not have been taken seriously. Overall, Holy See strategy was passive.

Finally, the major European powers, the UK, France and Germany, held complex views on the war but a combination of events, and recent history meant any opposition to the war was negated. UK support for the US, as will be discussed in the next section, was based on cultural links and a desire for influence. Yet British policymakers feared the cost of this influence would be largescale military deployments. This nexus between a potentially negative public reaction and Holy See anti-war aims were perhaps one of the only means it had of advocating for dialogue. Nonetheless, British concerns for public opinion were not strong enough to give the Holy See sufficient moral credibility to attract it to its *milieu* goals

France's desire for a separate foreign policy from the United States could have increased Holy See attractiveness to France. Indeed, the French wish for independence from the United States aligned with the Holy See. The possibility of increased Holy See influence might have improved as any conflict damaged French relations with Arab nations. This was despite the French naval presence in the Gulf to encourage diplomacy.⁵⁹ French fear of not damaging relations, was also held by the Holy See in pursuit of its possession goals of protecting Christians in the region. Franco-Holy See mutual anxieties and desire for independence may have made Holy See's policies more appealing perhaps increasing its relevance and moral authority. Despite these commonalities, the French position moved away from the Holy See's. Iraqi forces surrounded the French embassy in Kuwait and captured four French citizens. Subsequently, the French position moved closer to the United States.⁶⁰ Iraqi actions coupled with French naval manoeuvres, ended whatever French and Holy See commonalities existed, reducing calls for dialogue and weakening Holy See relevance of its *milieu* goals to both France and the United States.

History shaped Germany's position. The conflict came at the worst possible time with German unification in October 1990 and the first national elections in December. Germany was constrained by its constitution, a strict reading of which, coupled with opposition pressure, made German military involvement all but impossible.⁶¹ Whatever German support did come

⁵⁹ Matthews, *The Gulf Conflict and International Relations*, 115-116.

⁶⁰ Ibid, 117.

⁶¹ Ibid, 118-120.

was in the form of transport equipment and financial aid to Jordan, Egypt and Turkey. The military support given was in spite of substantial public disagreement to the war.⁶² Germany's stance was closely aligned to the Holy See with German reticence to use force was shared by the Holy See. Notwithstanding the similarities, German desire to show its support for the United States reduced Holy See effectiveness in engaging the German government.

Holy See Diplomacy: Tactically Slow

If the Holy See wished to exert sway, questions could be raised as to the timing of its interventions. These reflected the complexity of its "actorness". Its responses were consistently slow especially given the seriousness with which it claimed to view events.

One example of this is UN Security Council Resolution 660, passed on 2 August, which called for Iraqi withdrawal and negotiation. The resolution allowed states time to decide what to do next.⁶³ At this moment, the Holy See could have been its most influential. There have been several incidents where Holy See arbitration has proved successful such as in 1885⁶⁴ or the 1980s talks between Chile and Argentina⁶⁵ and the 2014 restoration of US-Cuba relations.⁶⁶ Had it intervened, it may have been able to influence events and maintain its neutrality while protecting its possession goals.

It failed to engage and thus missed the moment when both its neutrality, *milieu* and possession goals and desire for peace were potentially most aligned. John Paul II's first message on 26 August appealed for peace in the region. These comments have been described as "framework-setting".⁶⁷ This response, more than three weeks after the invasion, was late. By this time, troops had already arrived in the Middle East under Operation Desert Shield. Additionally, on 26 August the UN Security Council had already condemned the invasion (Resolution 660), passed economic sanctions (Resolution 661), declared the invasion illegal (Resolution 662), demanded that civilian and diplomatic personnel be allowed access out of Kuwait (Resolution 664) and passed a measure allowing for a naval blockade (Resolution 665).

⁶² 'Germany Strongly Resists Being Drawn into Gulf War', *tribunedigital-baltimoresun*, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1991-01-22/news/1991022106_1_turkey-gulf-war-nato.

⁶³ Matthews, *The Gulf Conflict and International Relations*, 74.

⁶⁴ Robert John Araujo SJ and Robert Lucal SJ, *Papal Diplomacy and the Quest for Peace: The Vatican and International Organizations from the Early Years to the League of Nations* (Ann Arbor, MI: The Catholic University of America Press, 2004), 66–68.

⁶⁵ James L. Garrett, 'The Beagle Channel Dispute: Confrontation and Negotiation in the Southern Cone', *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 27, no. 3 (1985): 81–109.

⁶⁶ John Hooper, 'Renewed US-Cuba relations biggest success in Vatican diplomacy for decades', *The Guardian*, 17 December 2014 <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/17/pope-us-cuba-vatican-diplomacy>.

⁶⁷ Weigel, *Witness to Hope*, 619.

After these resolutions, John Paul II's comments seemed irrelevant. The mixture of US possession and *milieu* goals meant protecting Saudi Arabia and ensuring its broader role in the post-Cold War world.

There may be two possible explanations, for the Holy See's actions. It may have been a deliberate policy or was due to being understaffed. The former, that it was a deliberate action by the Holy See, demonstrated its complex "actorness", to see how events unfolded in an effort not to alienate any one party. Organisationally the Second Section of the Secretariat of State (the Holy See foreign ministry) was viewed as being understaffed. Allen has claimed that it is either efficient or understaffed.⁶⁸ If it was either, or perhaps both, it may have undermined the Holy See's ability to attract the United States but may not have damaged Holy See desires to protect its possession goals.

The Holy See's neutral image was bolstered when it sent letters to George Bush and Saddam Hussein. Little influence was achieved as the letters were published too late. At the moment the letters were made public (15 January), the UN deadline for Iraq to withdraw was only hours away. If the letters were published before the military build-up, and before positions on both sides had hardened, there may have been a greater possibility of Holy See influence to avoid the conflict. If the letters had been delivered before tensions led to the invasion, or perhaps immediately after, it may have been possible to avert the conflict. That they were delivered just before the start of the war may suggest the Holy See prioritising its possession goals.

Sharply conflicting priorities of preserving Holy See neutrality and attempting to halt the war reduced the attractiveness of its *milieu* goals over the US possession goals. Despite this, the Holy See bolstered its neutral status, it sought to avoid war but also sought to attract other to its *milieu* goals to facilitate an Iraqi withdrawal. Yet, its wish to influence required clarity in its demands, acting in a timely fashion and having similarities with those it seeks to influence. Lastly, there was a need for those being influenced to be willing to be persuaded.⁶⁹ As has been argued elsewhere, though in a different context, "policies based on an abstract 'international community' that promotes universal norms of conduct cannot achieve coherence, let alone order".⁷⁰

⁶⁸ Allen, *All the Pope's Men*, 30.

⁶⁹ Nye, *Soft Power*, 16.

⁷⁰ David Martin Jones and M. L. R. Smith, 'Return to Reason: Reviving Political Realism in Western Foreign Policy', *International Affairs* 91, no. 5 (1 September 2015): 933–52.

It may be argued that the Holy See preferred to be seen as neutral rather than maximise its soft power and seek to alter events. As Shelledy argues, “although the Vatican recognizes the moral ambiguity of neutrality, it appears to be more concerned with the dangers of a moral sanction of war than criticisms of neutrality”.⁷¹

Even when it could maintain its neutrality Holy See strategy seemed to be fundamentally passive, seeking only to influence the international environment in which states operate. Matthews has argued that the pre-crisis phase lasted until 7 August when US troops arrived in Saudi Arabia. It was this defensive measure in addition to the joint US-Soviet statement calling for Iraqi withdrawal “that really determined the eventual Iraqi defeat”.⁷² The period from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, to the arrival of US troops on 7 August, that the Holy See could have used its moral authority to resolve the crisis. During these days positions had not hardened. However, the Holy See would have taken an active role. Pope John Paul II’s first mention of the crisis was too late by which time the naval blockade of Iraq had already begun.

Holy See delays could be attributed to a “diplomacy of silence”. This somewhat oxymoronic term could describe Holy See diplomacy. It may have thought the safest strategy, for its neutrality and for Catholics in Iraq, possibly to avoid alienating any one party.⁷³ Yet, diplomacy is based on communicating, especially when attempting to exert influence on another state. Avoiding communication to not be offensive seems to be an inherently risk averse strategy. Holy See’s attempts to influence the United States in going to war, it could have said to be a failure from the outset. Alternatively, the Holy See was aware that it did not have the ability to stop the war on its own. It may have simply seen its opposition as a way of both protesting and protecting Catholics in Iraq and the wider Middle East.⁷⁴

⁷¹ Shelledy, ‘Legions Not Always Visible on Parade’, 163.

⁷² Matthews, *The Gulf Conflict and International Relations*, 103.

⁷³ Drew Christiansen, “Holy See”, *Iraq*, 89.

⁷⁴ Allen, *All the Pope’s Men*, 46.

United States Position

US Diplomacy: Combining *Milieu* and Possession Goals

The section scrutinises the role of the United States at the end of the Cold War. It supported action against Iraq for domestic and geopolitical reasons, both of which relate to its *milieu* and possession goals. Perhaps more than any other reason, fear of setting a precedent by not responding to the Iraqi invasion was paramount. Other areas examined will be its ability to build a coalition, how the end of the Cold War shaped its response, the rest of the world's weakness and Bush's domestic concerns in shaping the US response. Ultimately, US *milieu* and possession goals merged with UN resolutions to support removing Iraq. Holy See *milieu* goals were considerably weaker in that it sought to remain neutral but at the same time have Iraq leave Kuwait.

Concerns existed for the US about the precedent that would be set if the Iraqi invasion was not undone. This was both a *milieu* and possession goal as it was in US interests not to allow the invasion to be accepted. At the same time the US sought to shape the international environment, so the war against Iraq was also a possession goal, in that it wished to influence the international system at the end of the Cold War. Thus, the US had an interest in restoring the Kuwaiti government. Soft power is not simply about the international sphere but links the domestic and international. Consequently, US actions were also predicated on domestic concerns, anxieties over oil supplies⁷⁵, the dangers of higher prices domestically and potential Iraqi blackmail.⁷⁶

The United States acted as the lead player in diplomatic, economic and military activity. In this period the nature of the relationship between the UN and the United States was symbiotic. It successfully leveraged its soft power at the end of the Cold War to shape its, and its allies and thus the UN, response.

The administration took great care in leading, and building a coalition. These efforts were seen after the passage of Resolution 661 imposing sanction on Iraq on 6 August 1990, just four days after its invasion of Kuwait. The US and British governments desired an enforcement mechanism in the resolution, but “judged that there was no chance of this being agreed”.⁷⁷ Both were flexible enough to allow for consensus to emerge. This flexibility

⁷⁵ Freedman and Karsh, *The Gulf Conflict*, 5.

⁷⁶ Ibid, 180.

⁷⁷ Ibid, 84.

ultimately strengthened US soft power as it meant its allies were not pushed into accepting the, still evolving, US position.

Narrowly, the Iraqi invasion did not *directly* threaten the United States. Nevertheless, in the context of the fall of the Berlin Wall and with exceptionalist narratives prevalent, US action was made more likely. The end of the Cold War assisted the US to implement both its wider *milieu* and possession goals. As Matthews argues, “perhaps the main determinant of US response was the implication of not responding”.⁷⁸ The Holy See also sought a restoration of Kuwait. Yet, limitations both self-imposed and placed on it, coupled with Holy See methods, were too broad to be sufficiently attractive for the United States. It failed to be attracted to the Holy See’s suggestion for dialogue to resolve the Iraqi invasion with its definition for a just war being high. Bush administration officials were motivated by *milieu* goals, the same could be said for the Holy See. Yet, the latter’s outlook was *so* broad as to make any action a potential danger to its worldwide view but at the same time such a view enabled it to see the dangers for Catholics, and Christians, in the Middle East from being associated with the US-led coalition. Furthermore, cultural ideas also made US action more plausible, with Jacksonianism, Calvinism and exceptionalism all framing the ultimate US response to Iraq.

If America did not wish to act, uncertainty existed that sufficient pressure could be brought to bear from the rest of the world that would precipitate an Iraqi withdrawal.⁷⁹ Thus, the US role was central, which in turn illustrates the scale of its soft power in eventually uniting the coalition around itself. Bush met Margaret Thatcher on 2 August in Aspen, she is thought to have warned him that if an Iraqi withdrawal was not imminent then other options would have to be considered. This was especially true given the links between the United Kingdom and Kuwait.⁸⁰ It has been conjectured that the US response was shaped to maintain order and “a future world security order based upon the *pax americana* would require a clear demonstration in the first post-Cold War crisis”.⁸¹ Thus, US *milieu* goals were equally important to understanding its actions against Iraq, as its narrower possession goals formed part of its response to the invasion.

Domestic concerns were also a part of the Bush administration’s response. Hiro contended that before the invasion, Iraq was seen as “moderate” being neither Communist nor Islamist. In order to circumvent this, the Bush administration explained US involvement

⁷⁸ Matthews, *The Gulf Conflict and International Relations*, 98.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Dilip Hiro, *Desert Shield to Desert Storm: The Second Gulf War*, First edition (London: Paladin, 1992), 108.

⁸¹ Matthews, *The Gulf Conflict and International Relations*, 99.

against Iraq by halting belligerence, with additional economic reasons, oil supplies and prices.⁸² It has been estimated that if the United States did not act, Iraqi control of Kuwait meant it controlled 20% of world oil reserves.⁸³ Immediately after the invasion concerns existed over the threat to oil and the fear of Iraqi blackmail and aggression.⁸⁴ The Holy See's *milieu* goals had no response to these narrow possession goals, which were enhanced through a Jacksonian lens. Some scholars warn against reducing coalition action to oil's importance, and the potential to gain "military and political power".⁸⁵ Both sides sought to use oil as a weapon. Iraq hoped a shock would weaken the US coalition's resistance, while at the same time it hoped sanctions would change Iraqi behaviour and withdraw.⁸⁶ Obviously the Holy See, because of its special "actorness", was not affected by these calculations. Though they may have grasped the importance of oil prices, their moral opposition and seeking to alter behaviour through *milieu* goals, clashed with the coalition's possession goals. Iraq's hope of using oil as a weapon backfired. Saudi Arabia in mid-August 1990 increased production by over a third with other OPEC members, filling the lost Kuwaiti production.⁸⁷ The upcoming 1992 presidential election was also a factor in deciding the administration's response. Equally, to avoid being seeing as rushing to war, Iraq and the United States met in Geneva in January 1991, giving Iraq enough time to withdraw, but the "talks" had strict conditions on Iraq to withdraw.⁸⁸ Bush was cognisant of appearing to rush to war and damaging the soft power it had accumulated through its actions up to this point.

US Diplomacy: Uniting Community to Enforce Order

The United States used its international position to increase pressure on Iraq through sanctions, meetings, demands for withdrawals and ultimately military action. Supporting this, the Bush administration seemed to rely on the UN, rather than Congress, for its legitimacy. Accordingly, this bolstered its soft power with its allies and the US public and weakened that of the Holy See. This soft power was eventually used by the US assembled coalition to remove Iraq from Kuwait by force. USSR and Chinese stances assisted the US aims due to their respective

⁸² Hiro, *Desert Shield to Desert Storm*, 246-247.

⁸³ Ibid, 108.

⁸⁴ Freedman and Karsh, *The Gulf Conflict*, 75-76; Hiro, *Desert Shield to Desert Storm*, 296.

⁸⁵ Matthews, *The Gulf Conflict and International Relations*, 202-204.

⁸⁶ Freedman and Karsh, *The Gulf Conflict*, 180.

⁸⁷ Ibid, 182-83.

⁸⁸ Ibid, 249.

domestic and international problems, they did not oppose US to implement Resolution 678 and remove Iraq by force. Cuba and Yemeni anti-war positions will be examined and their isolation vis-à-vis the rest of the UN Security Council will be studied. Nonetheless, the Holy See's special international status and its desire to advance *milieu* goals was not sufficient to attract the US to its anti-war position. US attempts to attract Cuba and Yemen to its view will be analysed and despite this failure, US overall success will be stressed. The end of this piece will discuss how major European nations (UK, France and Germany) were generally supportive of the United States, due to cultural and historic affinity, and Iraqi actions. These nations' support bolstered US claims to both represent, and work for, order. In turn this reinforced its soft power.

The US was serving its possession goals but "the solidarity of the United Nations and the global community was a testimony to the fact that in doing so it was also serving at least some of the interests of that community".⁸⁹ The war was a test, for the United States and the UN. Both needed to show that they had a purpose after the Cold War. As Iraq was the aggressor, war to undo the aggression was more likely.⁹⁰ Like the US and the Holy See, the US and the UN diverged on many issues. Only through historical circumstance they happened to align, this divergence will be analysed in Part Three. Having misjudged Iraqi intentions before, intelligence agencies feared an Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia. With the protection of the Saudi monarchy accomplished, through Operation Desert Shield, the mistake had been rectified. An early study on the war's costs suggested that 300,000 troops would be needed for a four month campaign with 10,000 American deaths likely.⁹¹ Carvin and Williams argued that science is used to achieve overwhelming military victories as a sign of a humane approach to war, rooted in Enlightenment values.⁹² They maintain the 1991 war was an exemplar of a liberal war, with an overpowering use of force coupled with general observance of the laws of war.⁹³ The Bush administration, while focusing on its possession goals, managed the relationship with the Security Council members especially China and the Soviet Union. Concurrently, Bush also had to ensure the support of the Arab, as well as the European, nations.⁹⁴ By managing these relationships, the US was able to maximise its soft power to implement both its possession and

⁸⁹ Matthews, *The Gulf Conflict and International Relations*, 58.

⁹⁰ Ibid, 118.

⁹¹ Hiro, *Desert Shield to Desert Storm*, 245.

⁹² Stephanie Carvin and Michael John Williams, *Law, Science, Liberalism and the American Way of Warfare: The Quest for Humanity in Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 1.

⁹³ Ibid, 17.

⁹⁴ Matthews, *The Gulf Conflict and International Relations*, 60.

milieu goals. The US coalition showed the differences between the US' soft power and the Holy See's lack of it in advancing its *milieu* goals.

Some have claimed that "Bush made no effort to dissuade the pope from his position".⁹⁵ Although some attempts seem to have been made.⁹⁶ From the Holy See's position, the administration's failure to consult it, "had a considerable impact on Vatican perceptions of American intentions and policies".⁹⁷ Subsequently, this weakened US soft power in the Holy See's eyes. The Holy See failed to act quickly, failed to adapt to the changing situation and failed to clearly express its reasons for opposing the war. It only stating its opposition to both the Iraqi invasion and US actions. If it did so it would have undermined its neutrality and threatened its ability to protect its possession goals.

A danger to coalition unity may have arisen when Arab members thought the problem should be dealt with by them. Yet Baghdad's actions minimised this fear for the administration.⁹⁸ Consequently, the Iraqi regime damaged its ability to divide the coalition and heightened US soft power.

When Iraq invaded Kuwait, coincidentally the Soviet and American foreign ministers were meeting. This may have contributed to a greater degree of co-operation.⁹⁹ Soviet criticism of the invasion became less forthright as time passed.¹⁰⁰ Its desire for sanctions, and UN approval of any military action¹⁰¹ benefited the Bush administration's soft power and thus its implementation of its possession and *milieu* goals. In turn this strengthened exceptionalist narratives as the Soviet Union was weakening. Matthews argued that such was the indefensibility of Iraqi actions that sanctions would be complied with.¹⁰² Sanctions helped pressure Iraq, but not enough to force withdrawal.

In September 1990, a month after the Iraqi invasion, Bush met Gorbachev in Helsinki to discuss the Iraqi invasion. During which Bush agreed to allow a non-military solution to be attempted.¹⁰³ In agreeing to this Bush may have attempted to maintain USSR support and

⁹⁵ Lawrence J. McAndrews, *What They Wished For: American Catholics and American Presidents, 1960-2004* (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 2014), 251.

⁹⁶ Thomas Patrick Melady, "George Bush: Influence of the Family on His Values", *A Noble Calling: Character and the George H. W. Bush Presidency* (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2004), 7.

⁹⁷ George Weigel, *Witness to Hope: The Biography of Pope John Paul II 1920 - 2005* (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 1999), 622.

⁹⁸ Matthews, *The Gulf Conflict and International Relations*, 63.

⁹⁹ Ibid, 79-80.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid, 80.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Ibid, 145.

¹⁰³ Hiro, *Desert Shield to Desert Storm*, 225.

maintain, or even enhance, US soft power. Talks between Moscow and Baghdad in October resulted in the Iraqi regime accepting a face-saving withdrawal. This was not accepted by the Security Council members.¹⁰⁴ Despite the USSR-United States differences both saw it as in their interests to maintain international order and stability.

At this moment, the Holy See could have made a significant intervention. Its reticence to involve itself was detrimental to dialogue ending the Iraqi invasion. Soviet efforts seemed to produce Iraqi concessions (no longer seeing Kuwait as part of Iraq) and the suggestion of an Arab peace conference. The Bush administration viewed this as insufficient, fearing Iraqi non-compliance of UN resolutions.¹⁰⁵ Bush seemed to calculate that this would not alienate the coalition he was assembling and undermine US soft power in pursuit of possession and *milieu* goals. Moreover, Bush's speech on 31 October comparing Hussein to Hitler may have been an attempt to strengthen domestic opinion for war.¹⁰⁶ Soviet concessions from Iraq were not enough for Bush, and the USSR's weakness did little to help its case.

Foreign hostages may have been one element of how the USSR and Iraq could avoid war. Iraq said the remaining hostages could leave between December 1990 and March 1991, "by choosing the three-month period after Christmas the Iraqi leader was attempting to spike Washington's military option".¹⁰⁷ Yet, once Gorbachev agreed to the use of force on 27 November, Iraq's hopes of halting war were negated.¹⁰⁸ Gorbachev's acceptance of force illustrated not just Iraq's weak position but also his own *vis-a-vis* the United States. With troops in the Gulf, Congressional *and* UN resolutions supporting US actions, the Holy See had few options to attract the US to its *milieu* goals. Had it engaged earlier, war may have been avoided. However, its desire for neutrality appeared to take precedence. The Holy See had opportunities to become more engaged, by acting sooner or doing more, but appeared to shun these. Even accepting its neutrality, John Paul II could have spoken sooner and more directly on the Iraqi invasion, before positions had become entrenched in pursuit of its *milieu* goals. Naturally, this reticence to speak reduced its soft power.

Matthews argues that USSR internal events weakened its influence. He claims that it "required a radical departure in Soviet foreign policy and effectively a withdrawal from its Cold War competition".¹⁰⁹ Yet, the USSR was also aware of US (soft) power after the Cold

¹⁰⁴ Ibid, 226.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid, 230.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid, 230.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid, 243.

¹⁰⁸ Matthews, *The Gulf Conflict and International Relations*, 105.

¹⁰⁹ Hiro, *Desert Shield to Desert Storm*, 51.

War. Economics, the need for aid, reinforced the USSR's trend toward co-operation with the United States and its allies.¹¹⁰ At a meeting in Paris in November 1990 between Bush and Gorbachev, Bush promised not to admit the Baltic states to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe if one last meeting between Iraq and the United States would take place. Such a meeting took place in Geneva in January 1991.¹¹¹ Consequently, the USSR voted for Resolution 678, making war certain but without wider systemic consequences such as the possible of viewing the conflict through great power, or Cold War, lenses.

China's position was, in some ways, more complicated. The Tiananmen Square massacre took place in 1989. The Chinese foreign minister visited Iraq in November. Speculation existed that the visit was Iraq attempting to have China veto the resolution authorising war.¹¹² When Resolution 678 was debated, authorising the use of force, China was the only permanent member to abstain.¹¹³ Some have argued that a Chinese veto would have brought unwanted attention.¹¹⁴ China was isolated and appeared to have altered its behaviour in order to minimise this isolation.

Of the non-permanent UN Security Council members, only Cuba and Yemen voted against the resolution. Cuban opposition appeared to have stemmed from the principle of non-intervention. Others have argued that its policy was motivated by anti-Americanism.¹¹⁵ Yemen's position seemed to have been due to ideological links between the Yemeni and Iraqi regimes and the aid given to Yemen from Iraq.¹¹⁶ Despite being offered aid by the US, it still refused to accept or abstain on the resolution.¹¹⁷

At the beginning of the 1990s, an almost unique moment favoured military action against Iraq. The significance of the Cold War's end cannot be overstated, "if the decline of Soviet power was the key to Iraq's invasion, it was also the key to the construction of its defeat".¹¹⁸ China was weakened by the 1989 Tiananmen massacre. Attempts by Iraq to divide China from the rest of the Security Council members were unsuccessful, making Iraq more isolated, and war more probable.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 53.

¹¹¹ Hiro, *Desert Shield to Desert Storm*, 259.

¹¹² Ibid, 242.

¹¹³ Matthews, *The Gulf Conflict and International Relations*, 77.

¹¹⁴ Ibid, 83.

¹¹⁵ Ibid, 55.

¹¹⁶ Hiro, *Desert Shield to Desert Storm*, 197.

¹¹⁷ Steven Hurst, *The United States and Iraq since 1979: Hegemony, Oil and War* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), 97.

¹¹⁸ Matthews, *The Gulf Conflict and International Relations*, 53.

European nations had a role in supporting US-led defence of the international order, but their support also illustrated their shared ideas on the use of force and contrasts to Germany's position, which was closer to the Holy See's *milieu* goals. Overall, the United Kingdom stance was closest to the United States. A shared sense of community existed through mutual cultural links.¹¹⁹ After the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the focus on German unification, Thatcher, may have seen the conflict as a chance to reassert the UK's importance.¹²⁰ British desire to have greater involvement in policy formation was complicated by a political cost to a greater UK military involvement.¹²¹ Ironically, UK military support was not needed "but the absence of British collaboration would have made the political task immeasurably more difficult".¹²² A lack of British support would have reduced US soft power in its relations with other European, and non-European, states.

France's role in the conflict, was in part shaped by the unpaid Iraqi debts owed to French weapons suppliers. French support for its own foreign policy was demonstrated when the French posture was driven "by its general attempt to develop special relations with the Arabs and its eagerness to demonstrate a distinctive national approach and, in particular, independence from the United States."¹²³ In spite of this desire it had to accommodate itself to unipolarity.

For Bush, the UN's approval was crucial but "the United Nations has only been able to take action when the circumstances allow".¹²⁴ In many ways this is similar to the Holy See, who sought to end the First World War but was ignored by the European powers.¹²⁵ Similarly, the Secretary-General's role is diminished when the interests of several major powers are at stake. Thus he is "unlikely to be able to find an independent role unless it is in the interests of those powers for him to do so".¹²⁶ The US had the soft power and means to enforce international order with the support of the community under its leadership.

¹¹⁹ Walter Russell Mead, *God and Gold: Britain, America and the Making of the Modern World* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007).

¹²⁰ Freedman and Karsh, *The Gulf Conflict*, 110.

¹²¹ Ibid, 113.

¹²² Matthews, *The Gulf Conflict and International Relations*, 61.

¹²³ Freedman and Karsh, *The Gulf Conflict*, 115.

¹²⁴ Matthews, *The Gulf Conflict and International Relations*, 73.

¹²⁵ John Pollard, *Benedict XV: The Unknown Pope and the Pursuit of Peace: The Pope of Peace*, New edition (London; New York: Burns & Oates, 2005).

¹²⁶ Matthews, *The Gulf Conflict and International Relations*, 73.

Conclusion

This chapter has argued that the US and Holy See positions on the war were profoundly different. It has maintained that with the US at the height of its hard and soft power, the US and Holy See were unable to agree on a common resolution to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, their *milieu* and possession goals were too distinct. Contrasting views of what constituted a just war was at the core of this disagreement. This could not be overcome and fundamentally damaged the Holy See's ability to attract the United States. The Holy See was not able to attract sufficient US support especially given the strength of US soft power, both nationally and globally, after the end of the Cold War.

Many viewed the war as just and yet the Holy See remained opposed despite UN Security Council's support. Chapter IV will demonstrate how this led many to contest the morality of the Holy See's anti-war stance. The Holy See's aims at shaping the international environment through its *milieu* goals could not overcome US possession and *milieu* goals. Such a position undermined the Holy See and weakened any hope of attracting the United States.

Concomitantly, the Holy See sought to advance its possession goals through its vocal opposition to the war. It did this by attempting to distinguish the United States, and its broad coalition, from Christians in the Middle East. In this it gained from its position in the international wilderness having a unique "actorness" so intimately bound to the Church.

Attention was drawn to cultural factors in framing lack of Holy See soft power in pursuit of its *milieu* goals. This lack of success aided its possession goals to protect Christians in Iraq and the wider region. At the same time the exceptionalism, Jacksonianism and Calvinism framed position on, and US response to, Iraq. Consequently, this made the US stance harder to change and made war more likely.

Of particular relevance to understanding the Holy See's position is the 2003 war that did not gain UN approval. This was the primary reason for Holy See opposition in 2003, yet having achieved UN approval to remove Iraq from Kuwait the Holy See still remained opposed to the war. It consistently sought negotiation to resolve the Iraqi invasion but this was not treated as practicable by the UN or US. Its seemingly impossible high standard for the use of force undermined its supposed moral status. This contradiction will be scrutinised in greater depth in Chapter VI.

This chapter has examined the positions of the Holy See and the United States. The Holy See could not realistically alter its foreign policy fundamentals because they were based

on Catholic theology but its interpretation was central to Holy See hostility to the war. At the same time it elided notions of international law, the community and the unity of man that would prove central in 2003. Obvious disagreements exist between the Holy See and the UK's policy. The French posture seemed closest to the Holy See. If one nation desired to build an anti-war "coalition", its similar position to France seemed an obvious starting point to leverage the Holy See's presumed moral status through shaping the international environment. Yet its decision to prioritise neutrality over soft power as well as its desire to advance its possession goals through its vocal opposition weakened its ability to act in a transcendent manner. Equally promising was German concern not to commit its own forces. Iraqi targeting of the French embassy, coupled with the wish of the German government to give some support to the US led coalition isolated the Holy See. Moreover, its neutrality restrained any possibility to build an anti-war coalition.

This chapter has scrutinised how the actors implemented their positions, to varying degrees of success. The next chapter will analyse why the Holy See failed in its mission to halt the war, and will argue that it was a mixture of domestic and systemic factors combined that led to this.

Chapter IV

“It is the whole world versus Saddam Hussein”¹ Why the Holy See was unsuccessful

This chapter explains why the Holy See failed at influencing the United States from going to war against Iraq. The answer will be broken down into two sections, domestic and systemic. The domestic element will explore political culture comprising Jacksonianism and American exceptionalism. Within each of these rests the legacy of Reformed theology, Calvinism, in weakening Holy See soft power and its pursuit of its *milieu* and possession goals. Fundamentally, these made Holy See soft power ineffective given the context for the US with “end of history” narratives dominant and the dissolution of the Soviet Union then imminent. These cultural aspects framed the US response to Iraq leading up to, and including, the war. After political culture, the various divisions between the bishops, within the laity and then within major Catholic media sources will be examined. These weakened the Holy See’s soft power, through its advocacy of *milieu* goals, to attract both Catholics, and the United States government to its anti-war position. Institutional elements also hindered the Holy See’s attempts, namely, the executive branch’s foreign policy powers and the weakness of Congressional opposition to war. The domestic section will end with an analysis of polling data that showed fluctuating, though overall support, for the war.

The second section will scrutinise the systemic, or international, aspects that weakened Holy See soft power. These will be its special legal status and how its foreign policy principles shaped its hostility to the war. Fundamentally, its unique status failed to be of significant advantage. What the Holy See was proposing, talks to resolve the Iraqi invasion, was similar to what some Protestant denominations were advocating. Therefore, it was not clear what added benefit the Holy See’s status had in this instance compared to other denominations. Its

¹ George Bush, ‘The President’s News Conference’, American Presidency Project, 21 September 1990, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=18847>.

perceived moral status, and soft power, were not sufficient to overcome this relevance deficit making any soft power it possessed minimal.

The chapter will apply Wolfers' categories of possession and *milieu* goals to the Holy See and US. In doing so it will seek to refine theory. It has been postulated that both actors had possession and *milieu* goals. Consequently, it will be contended that the distinctions blur.

The chapter title originates from a press conference, it evokes the binary mentality that made war more likely and weakened the attractiveness of the Holy See's position. At the same time Bush's sweeping rhetoric ignored the Holy See's opposition to US actions, if not the ultimate aims of restoring the Kuwaiti government.

Domestic factors that weakened Holy See soft power

Incorporating soft power's two levels of analysis this section will address the domestic factors that reduced the Holy See's soft power on the United States and US Catholics. Principally these are US political culture, consisting of Jacksonianism and exceptionalism; divisions within the bishops, laity and media; political institutions, namely the president's foreign policy strength and Congressional weakness and polling that ultimately supported the war.

US Political Culture

Political culture weakened Holy See influence. Jacksonianism and exceptionalism will be examined. Within each of these, Calvinism's legacy supports a binary vision of the world through its theology. Together, all of these damaged Holy See ability to attract sufficient domestic support to change the administration's analysis in going to war against the combined US possession and *milieu* goals. Holy See proposals to undo the Iraqi invasion through dialogue could not be reconciled with the dominant cultural factors in the United States.

Jacksonianism: Strong (National) Community

Jacksonianism, named after President Andrew Jackson, refers to a martial spirit. By definition it clashed with Holy See principles and contributed the Holy See weak soft power and *milieu* goals. This section will outline a more detailed definition, before addressing its relationship to the war and finally Jacksonianism's integrative nature. Using soft power to connect the domestic and international allows for the emergence of a more nuanced picture to develop. Especially as it includes both the Holy See's international status and the USCCB in domestic politics.

As Chapter II outlined, Mead sees Jacksonianism as one of the four schools that comprise the wider US foreign policy tradition. Jacksonianism privileges a "populist and popular culture of honor, independence, courage, and military pride".² Mead postulates that Jacksonianism is the most attuned to political realism. Links can be drawn between US possession goals and Jacksonianism's methods of achieving them.

² Mead, *Special Providence*, 88.

Jacksonians “separate the issues of morality and war more clearly than do many members of the foreign policy establishment. The Gulf War was a popular war in Jacksonian circles because the defense of the nation’s oil supply struck a chord with Jacksonian opinion”.³ Interests form a clear part of Jacksonian thought and join with US possession goals to create a self-reinforcing link between culture and US actions. Mead underlines how Jacksonianism aligns with *realpolitik*, emphasising force’s efficacy. Such connections challenge Holy See attempts at attracting the US government, and Catholics, through its desire to alter *milieu* goals.

Using force against enemies is intrinsic to Jacksonianism.⁴ Moreover, interpretations of US culture allowed the Bush administration to narrow their options after Iraq failed to withdraw. The Jacksonian school is “the least likely to support Wilsonian initiatives for a better world, to understand Jeffersonian calls for patient diplomacy”.⁵ Use of force is bolstered by Calvinism’s, emphasis on predestination. As noted elsewhere a binary view is created between those who are saved and damned.⁶ Tendencies to moral absolutism jarred with the Holy See’s seeking to advance *milieu* goals and cautious approach which were each reflected in its unique “actorness” as it desired to advance its possession goals through its opposition.

Of particular relevance is the Americanising, or integrationist, strand in Jacksonian thought which eventually accepts and integrates new members into the folk community. There has been a history of Catholic separateness, even proud isolation, from the rest of the Protestant United States.⁷ As time passed, Catholics “remained Catholic in religious allegiance but were increasingly individualistic in terms of psychology and behavior”.⁸ One prominent example is William Buckley, speaking on Pope John XXIII’s encyclical *Mater et Magistra* (Mother and Teacher). Wills famously suggested Buckley’s position could be encapsulated by, “Mater si, Magistra no”.⁹ This illustrates the increasing cohesion of Catholics to American society. Historically Catholics had been outside of the national community. Over time they became culturally American.¹⁰ Affinity with the state was thus stronger than loyalty to what some of their bishops, and the pope, said regarding the war. As Catholics integrated they became

³ Ibid, 246.

⁴ Mead, ‘The Jacksonian Tradition’.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Allen, *All the Pope’s Men*, 315–16; Eric Luis Uhlmann and Jeffrey Sanchez-Burks, ‘The Implicit Legacy of American Protestantism’, *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 45, no. 6 (1 July 2014): 992–1006.

⁷ Morris, *American Catholic*.

⁸ Mead, ‘The Jacksonian Tradition’.

⁹ Garry Wills, *Why I Am a Catholic*, 1st Mariner edition (Boston: Clarion Books, 2004), 47.

¹⁰ Herberg, *Protestant-Catholic-Jew*.

resistant to Holy See language of advancing and altering *milieu* goals. Clearly, this loyalty was more complex than simple obedience.

Calvinism's individualistic legacy fundamentally undermined the Holy See's ability to attract Catholics to its position which illustrates its complicated "actorness". Ultimately, the Holy See, was unable to overcome Protestantism's cultural legacy. The emphasis on the individual and the stark division between the elect and damned meant the Holy See's proposals had little or no effect on US culture. This sharp distinction clashed with Holy See's effort to alter the (international) environment in which the US, and other states, operated.

It would be simplistic to equate the Bush administration actions with Jacksonianism. Mead emphasises the repugnance of Jacksonians to Wilsonian ideas, how for them "the world community Wilsonians want to build is not merely a moral impossibility but a monstrosity". These Jacksonian principles were contradicted during Bush's "New World Order" speech. Mead argues the speech "had a distinctly Orwellian connotation to the Jacksonian ear".¹¹ Bush's Wilsonian idea of community and the "New World Order" had some similarities to Holy See theology. Yet, the next section on exceptionalism will argue that Bush used these ideas in exceptionalist rhetoric to support the case for war rather than move towards Holy See's attempts to advance wider *milieu* goals for how states should interact.

The United States has a sense of individualism and a weaker state.¹² This weaker state reinforced individualist, Calvinist, and Jacksonian tendencies. When Jacksonianism is added to a strong executive, and a weak Congress, a tendency towards war can emerge.

Therefore, two main factors weakened the Holy See. Firstly, the prominent Jacksonian element and concurrently, Bush's Wilsonian desire for a "New World Order". Secondly, UN support for the war reduced the Holy See's effectiveness as the UN was a body also focused on advocating for *milieu* goals. As they diverged on the war, the Holy See did not engage with the UN's support for war.

This pattern appeared to be repeated in the 2003 Iraq War. The Holy See was similarly opposed to the war, although for different reasons. Thus, the two Iraq Wars are examples of the Jacksonian school.¹³ This helps explain why the Holy See was unsuccessful at leveraging

¹¹ Mead, 'The Jacksonian Tradition'.

¹² Seymour Martin Lipset and Gary Marks, *It Didn't Happen Here: Why Socialism Failed in the United States*, New edition (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001); Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America*, 2nd Harvest edition (San Diego: Thomson Learning, 1962).

¹³ Mead, 'The Jacksonian Tradition'; Nick Ritchie and Paul Rogers, *The Political Road to War with Iraq: Bush, 9/11 and the Drive to Overthrow Saddam*, First edition (London; New York: Routledge, 2007), 148–49.

its perceived moral status and attracting the US to its *milieu* goals. It may also indicate the strength of Jacksonian thought in US culture.

Exceptionalism: Bearing Burdens and Buttreassing *Milieu* Goals

Exceptionalism allowed for a wider interpretation of interests and undermined Holy See soft power which was based on the equality of states. Consequently, the United States represented itself as advancing *milieu* goals by serving humanity while establishing the post-Cold War order but also implementing its possession goals at the same time. This contrasted with Holy See calls for caution. Moreover, it was unable to challenge the wider US exceptionalist narrative which argued it was bearing burdens of global leadership for peace and order against its own *milieu* goals.

This section will examine the context of exceptionalism at the end of the Cold War. Signifying this new mood, Francis Fukuyama's *End of History* and Bush's New World Order speech will be given as examples of this environment. American exceptionalism was seen as "proven" correct after the collapse of the Soviet Union which lessened the Holy See's relevance. Finally, the Church's views on history will be explored, where overall it had a more cautious approach which clashed with the United States.

A brief overview of the context within which the Iraq War took place is needed. Ideas of the "end of history" coupled with the (secular) messianic reading of American exceptionalism reduced the Holy See's effectiveness in attracting the US. Francis Fukuyama's *The End of History and the Last Man* and President Bush's 1991 State of the Union, or "New World Order" speech are emblematic of the US mood of triumph at this time will each be examined in turn.

Fukuyama's *The End of History and the Last Man* argued that democracy will become more prevalent.¹⁴ Related to this was the State of the Union speech given by Bush in January 1991.¹⁵ Bush stressed the new era in US-Soviet relations after the fall of the Berlin Wall. He idealistically desired a new era, where states work "to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind -- peace and security, freedom, and the rule of law".¹⁶ Though these ideas were similar to Holy See *milieu* goals, US implementation of them differed as in the 1991 war they merged with possession goals. Consequently Holy See soft power was weakened.

¹⁴ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (London: Penguin, 1992).

¹⁵ George Bush, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union", American Presidency Project, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=19253>.

¹⁶ Ibid.

Bush's speech evoked Thomas Paine's famous quote, "we have it in our power to begin the world over again". Bush presented the United States as having the strength to carry the world's burdens.¹⁷ Aspects of Wilsonianism were evident in Bush's speech, but also apparent is how both presidents compared Saddam Hussein and Adolf Hitler.¹⁸ Judgements such as these are absent in Holy See language. When they do occur they are not directed at a specified group.¹⁹ This further delineates the two actors and emphasises their differing views. One informed by interpreting theology, the other by using its soft power while pursuing its possession goals which were shaped by a utilitarian and individualistic Protestantism.

The exceptionalist theme in this post-Cold War context is noteworthy. Some have maintained that the end of the Cold War and American exceptionalism can be connected.²⁰ Restad contends "the end of the cold war reaffirmed American exceptionalism. The disintegration of the Soviet Union was seen as proof that the American model was indeed superior".²¹ These ideas, when coupled with a nascent unipolarity, may have strengthened the Bush administration's policies. Although not mentioned explicitly in Bush's speech, exceptionalist themes featured prominently. An example being when he argued, "American leadership is indispensable. Americans know that leadership brings burdens and sacrifices. But we also know why the hopes of humanity turn to us".²² Bush painted the United States as the saviour of the world, despite its narrow possession goals. Taken together, the "New World Order" speech and Fukuyama's work signified a mood of triumph.

The Holy See, after the Cold War, was more cautious about the "end of history" than the United States. John Paul II's 1991 encyclical, *Centesimus Annus* exemplified this caution. In perhaps the most emphatic support for a market economy he claimed, "The free market is the most efficient instrument for utilizing resources and effectively responding to needs".²³

¹⁷ George Bush, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union", American Presidency Project, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=19253>.

¹⁸ George Bush, 'Address to the Nation Announcing the Deployment of United States Armed Forces to Saudi Arabia', American Presidency Project, 8 August 1990, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=18750>.

¹⁹ BBC, "Syria war: Those bombing Aleppo 'must answer to God' – Pope" 28 September 2016 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-37494519>.

²⁰ Uri Friedman, "'American Exceptionalism': A Short History", *Foreign Policy*, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/06/18/american-exceptionalism-a-short-history>.

²¹ Hilde Eliassen Restad, *American Exceptionalism: An Idea That Made a Nation and Remade the World* (London: Routledge, 2014), 197.

²² George Bush, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union", American Presidency Project, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=19253>.

²³ John Paul II, "Centesimus Annus: On the Hundredth Anniversary of Rerum Novarum", 1 May 1991, http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_01051991_centesimus-annus.html.

Nevertheless, at the same time he also warned that the free market needs to serve people and be grounded in morality.

Belief in a specific type of exceptionalism, rose after the end of the Cold War. Thus, the idea had a stronger resonance during the war. A greater confidence may have existed at this time. However, this may be offset by research that shows negligible mention of the phrase “American exceptionalism” in the early 1990s. Prominence of the topic rose in the 1990s.²⁴

By referring to the idea of American exceptionalism, Bush, encouraged a belief in the spreading of these ideas in American society. He merged US possession goals in Iraq with wider *milieu* goals which the Holy See was unable to counter, despite doubt being cast on exceptionalism’s veracity.²⁵ As Hudson writes, “nations may choose actions more in line with their heroic history that with more dispassionate norms of strategy”.²⁶ Notwithstanding questions over its authenticity, exceptionalism can be a strongly held belief.²⁷ Belief in exceptionalism weakened the attractiveness of Holy See *milieu* goals against the war.

This section has addressed the context within which exceptionalism took place. Fukuyama’s *End of History* and Bush’s New World Order speech were taken as emblematic of this context. Some scholars have suggested that the end of the Cold War gave evidence to American exceptionalism and may have contributed to reduced Holy See soft power. At the same time, these views on the “end of history” were examined against the Church’s that had a more cautious approach to change after the end of the Cold War.

²⁴ Philip S. Gorski and William McMillan, ‘Barack Obama and American Exceptionalisms’, *The Review of Faith & International Affairs* 10, no. 2 (1 June 2012): 41–50.

²⁵ Hodgson, *The Myth of American Exceptionalism*.

²⁶ Valerie M. Hudson, *Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006), 105.

²⁷ Gallup Jones, ‘Americans See U.S. as Exceptional; 37% Doubt Obama Does’, Gallup.com, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/145358/Americans-Exceptional-Doubt-Obama.aspx>.

Catholic Divisions and American Society

This section will explore divisions within bishops, laity and media. The lack of unity among these groups fundamentally undermined the Holy See's ability to attract and then leverage them to its stance. Therefore, attempts to exert its broader soft power and advance Holy See *milieu* goals were of limited success.

Episcopal Divisions: *Cum Petro et sub Petro*?

Bishops collectively form a College of Bishops, the highest body in the Church. Together, as the Latin phrase holds they are, with Peter and under Peter. Yet, in this instance neither of these ideals were realised. The Holy See's "actorness" complicated matters and proved of little use. For example, divisions within, and between, the bishops and the Holy See on the justness of the war weakened their ability to influence the Bush administration. Lacking unity, in addition to a lack of secular resonance their soft power was reduced and were less attractive to Catholics.²⁸ Three positions will be examined, those "supporting" the war, those opposing it and those "moderates" who supported that main US bishops position. Bishops' efforts to persuade with senior Bush administration officials will be examined. After this, how they exerted influence will be discussed in relation to their *milieu* and possession goals. Furthermore, their contention that there were "clear moral criteria" will be examined and it will be posited that such a statement is antithetical to the just war theory. How bishops and priests saw the war will be discussed in particular in relation to their changing views on the war's justness. Finally, the bishops' divisions will be placed within the *milieu* and possession goals framework and the idea of the bishops being *cum Petro et sub Petro* will be seen as an ideal that was not reached.

Before the outbreak of the war the bishops were divided into three camps. The first was the most "pro-war". This group appeared to support US possession goals against Iraq and was composed of bishops like Cardinal Law of Boston.²⁹ Law rejected the Holy See's stance and *milieu* goals and saw the use of force as just(ified). Shelledy noted the pope's opposition did

²⁸ Shelledy, 'Legions Not Always Visible on Parade'.

²⁹ Peter Steinfels, 'War in the Gulf: Religious Leaders; Cardinal Says Iraqi's Acts Prove Bush Right', *The New York Times*, 26 January 1991, <http://www.nytimes.com/1991/01/26/us/war-in-the-gulf-religious-leaders-cardinal-says-iraqi-s-acts-prove-bush-right.html>.

not receive significant media attention but “even those that did not support the war did not cite the pope in support of their arguments”.³⁰

Those bishops most supportive of war had to chart a difficult path. Cardinal Law argued that the war was probably just though he did leave some doubt in his statements.³¹ Hostilities were occurring as Cardinal Law wrote the column. Crucially, Law did not wait until after the war was over, like others, to view it as just. He hoped for peace but, “we realize that such a prayer is not fulfilled at the price of granting tyrants and aggressors an open field to achieve unjust ends”.³² Such sentiments directly contradicted Holy See efforts to remain neutral and its efforts to resolve the war through *milieu* goals. A division emerged between the Holy See and these US bishops. Moreover, Cardinal Law’s words also represented Jacksonian thinking which shows how widespread political culture can become in society.

Among those who opposed the war were Archbishop Raymond Hunthausen and Bishop Thomas Gumbleton. Gumbleton encouraged conscientious objection among military personnel.³³ Gumbleton and Hunthausen, along with 13 other Catholic bishops and priests, signed the National Council of Churches (NCC) statement calling for US withdrawal.³⁴ Differences between this and Cardinal Law’s stance are almost jarring.

The final camp was led by the president of what is now called the USCCB, Archbishop Daniel Pilarczyk. The USCCB attempted to chart a middle way between these positions, broadly reflecting the Holy See *milieu* goals. On behalf of his fellow bishops, he wrote to President Bush in November 1990, after the Iraqi invasion but before the war. Pilarczyk argued that there is a need to seek both justice and peace.³⁵ He acknowledged divisions within the episcopal conference but said there was unity around some main points: the condemnation of Iraqi actions, the need to consider war’s consequences and the belief of the bishops that peaceful action against Iraq should continue.³⁶ James Francis Stafford, then-archbishop of Denver, wrote to President Bush in September 1990, commending UN sanctions but cautioned against the use force.³⁷ At their meeting in November, the bishops endorsed a letter, sent by Roger Mahony, archbishop of Los Angeles to James Baker, secretary of State warning war

³⁰ Shelledy, ‘Legions Not Always Visible on Parade’, 173.

³¹ Steinfels, ‘War in the Gulf’, 26 January 1991.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ McAndrews, *What They Wished For*, 252.

³⁵ Johnson and Weigel, *Just War and the Gulf War*, 114.

³⁶ Ibid, 115.

³⁷ McAndrews, *What They Wished For*, 251.

might threaten the just war doctrine.³⁸ Such were the divisions among the bishops that by their final January resolution, the coalition troops had already been deployed. The bishops may have simply decided they had failed to persuade and the war would take place irrespective.

On exerting influence, several factors should be noted. On the bishops' call for President Bush to review the moral costs of the war. Partly informed by the *milieu* goals framework they sought to balance all concerns. Pilarczyk's letter urged halting aggression while protecting civilians. Unusually, it also stressed that any force be guided by "clear moral criteria".³⁹ However, just war theory scholars have agreed it relies on case by case judgements.⁴⁰ To claim that the just war criteria is "clear" is misleading. Pilarczyk's claim fits with Holy See attempts at advocating for an altered international environment by downplaying the just war's ambiguity. Furthermore, tensions between the just war criteria's imperfect nature and the bishops, and Holy See, opposition to the war meant they may have shifted the just war theory's emphasis to making it clearer than it should otherwise have been. Finally, Pilarczyk hoped that peaceful pressure could be used against Iraq.⁴¹ He fails to address how this helped reverse the Iraqi invasion or cite any instances where this worked previously. This is indicative of the Holy See's, "actorness", and its and the bishops', joint focus on *milieu* goals and why it could not counter narrow US possession goals.

Several examples of how the focus on *milieu* goals, by altering the just war theory's emphasis, can be seen in some of those who opposed the war. Before the war's outbreak, Archbishop Mahony opposed it, noting how quickly nations wage war rather than attempt peace.⁴² Archbishop Quinn of San Francisco argued that modern weapons made the possibility of a just war less likely, but did not explicitly see the war as unjust. Father Bryan Hehir, who assisted in the drafting of Cold War document *The Challenge of Peace*, said the war was not just based on the last resort principle.⁴³

Importantly, some who opposed the war later went on to consider it just, notably Archbishop Mahony. Cardinal Bernardin of Chicago repeated his opposition to the war but decided it was just. Perhaps most significantly Hehir also decided later the war was just.⁴⁴ Significantly all these statements came *after* the war. McAndrew's suggested that Pilarczyk

³⁸ Ibid, 251.

³⁹ Johnson and Weigel, *Just War and the Gulf War*, 114.

⁴⁰ Dennis P. Hollinger, *Choosing the Good: Christian Ethics in a Complex World* (Baker Academic, 2002), 176.

⁴¹ Johnson and Weigel, *Just War and the Gulf War*, 115.

⁴² McAndrews, *What They Wished For*, 254.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ McAndrews, *What They Wished For*, 255.

“would not own up to his own revisionism”.⁴⁵ Questions could be raised as to what degree their *post hoc* “support” for the war was contingent on its military success.

These divisions were the result of opposing *milieu* and possession goals. Bishops like Cardinal Law, who “supported” the war, openly rejected Holy See *milieu* goals to resolve the invasion. Law agreed with the Bush administration’s view and dismissed Holy See concerns concerning the conflict’s justness. Vastly differing notions of community were on display. These were at variance with the theological idea of a College of Bishops, supposedly united *cum Petro et sub Petro*. In practice, these ideas carried little significance. The community of bishops, in this instance, was merely an ideal. The national, Jacksonian folk community, was a more persuasive idea than that of a worldwide Catholic community.

In the case of the Iraq War, there was not a distinctly American Catholic viewpoint. The bishops were divided. As the war was not a matter of sexual morality, it was at least officially, not seen in absolutist terms.⁴⁶ Thus, they should have been more accepting of disagreement. This corroborates the point about Church teaching being clearer on sexual morality than political matters.

For the bishops, but also the Holy See, there was little confusion in the administration that could be used to their advantage to shape policy. No large organisation is entirely coherent in its views. For the bishops to exploit this, to attempt to stop the war harmed their moral authority.⁴⁷ Thus any soft power they had was reduced by these divisions.⁴⁸ The three main camps, supporting, opposing and agreeing with the Holy See were examined. Their attempts at exerting influence was discussed and how these related to *milieu* and possession goals was examined. Some bishops seemed to view the just war theory as supposedly bringing “clear moral criteria” to the debate. The changing views of some were analysed in light of the US victory in the war. It was suggested that their opposition to the war may have been predicated on military success and not the morality of the war itself. Finally, the idea of the bishops being *cum Petro et sub Petro* was seen as an ideal rather than as how bishops and the pope interacted in this instance.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ A. Alexander Stummvoll, ‘A Living Tradition: The Holy See, Catholic Social Doctrine, and Global Politics, 1965-2000’ (PhD diss, European University Institute, 2012), 41.

⁴⁷ Anna Grzymala-Busse, *Nations under God: How Churches Use Moral Authority to Influence Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 254.

⁴⁸ Shelledy, ‘Legions Not Always Visible on Parade’, 1.

Lay Divisions: More Individualistic, More Partisan, Less Informed

Divisions weakened the Holy See's soft power and its advocacy for its *milieu* goals. In essence, a politicised and ideologically divided laity made Holy See efforts to alter the debate against the war all but impossible. Reflecting the Holy See's complicated "actorness", individualism weakened the Holy See's ability to leverage Catholics when relating to their own political beliefs and identity. This individualism made it easier for Catholics to be part of the Church but not adhere to all its statements. As the Church is based on being catholic, that is universal, it is less united. Some US prelates have suggested a smaller and more committed Church would be preferable.⁴⁹ This section will analyse unity in theology, how political beliefs and religious affiliation interact and the prominence of the individual, a lack of lay knowledge, cultural differences between the United States and Rome followed by an assessment of how Catholics are divided. It will conclude with the consequences of this for the Holy See's desire to influence US foreign policy.

Church theology calls for unity among all Christians, *ut unum sint*. A document issued by then-Cardinal Ratzinger stresses taking Church teaching as a whole.⁵⁰ Obviously, not all Catholics unified around the Holy See's message on the war. Associated to this, political decisions are considered secondary to matters of sexual morality. The former being vague, flexible and accepting of disagreement, while for the latter the Church's teaching is inflexible.⁵¹ Compounding this, some Catholics view the Church's voice as more relevant on sexual morality.⁵² When opposing the war, by being more closely associated with equal marriage and abortion, the Church's relevance for the individual was weakened. Consequently, this complicated and reduced their ability to maximising its soft power and attracting Catholics to its *milieu* goals.

Greeley and Hout maintain that few conversions occur from Conservative Protestantism to Mainline Protestantism or Catholicism. They posit, this "suggests that few

⁴⁹ David Gibson, 'Archbishop Chaput Welcomes "smaller Church" of Holier Catholics', National Catholic Reporter, 21 October 2016, <https://www.ncronline.org/news/people/philadelphia-archbishop-chaput-welcomes-smaller-church-holier-catholics>.

⁵⁰ Joseph Ratzinger, 'Doctrinal Note on Some Questions Regarding the Participation of Catholics in Political Life', 24 November 2002, http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20021124_politica_en.html.

⁵¹ Stummvoll, 'A Living Tradition', 41.

⁵² Pew Forum, 'Few Say Religion Shapes Immigration, Environment Views', *Pew Research Center's Religion & Public Life Project* (blog), <http://www.pewforum.org/2010/09/17/few-say-religion-shapes-immigration-environment-views/>.

people adjust their affiliation to accommodate their beliefs”.⁵³ Catholics remain in the Church despite disagreements with Church teaching. The growth in the rise of (informed) conscience, after the Second Vatican Council, may also explain this.⁵⁴ Herberg notes that the Calvinist understanding of religion as a societal activity where all would be incorporated into religion “gave way to a profound theological individualism, in which the individual was held sovereign”.⁵⁵ Therefore, individualism cannot be related simply to Protestantism and is more complex than a Catholic as communitarian, Protestant as individualism distinction.

For most Catholics the divisions, and statements of the USCCB were of little relevance. Catholics’ knowledge of national episcopal events is limited. One illustration being only a third of Catholics said they knew either something or a significant amount about the bishops and their activities. More than a quarter said they knew nothing or did not know.⁵⁶ Even on issues not relating to war, Catholics seemed ill-informed. In 1986 the bishops issued, *Economic Justice for All*. Despite efforts to publicise it, a 1987 poll suggested that 71% of adult Catholics were not aware of its existence.⁵⁷ Consequently, the capability of the bishops to maximise their soft power, to then leverage Catholic support, proved difficult. More broadly, there is a loss of public knowledge about the way the Church frames issues of war and peace.⁵⁸

Perhaps because of this lack of knowledge, cultural frames became more important to Catholics. In turn this bolstered connections between Jacksonianism and exceptionalism. The community of Americans was stronger than the community of Catholics. Allen notes the divide between Catholics in the United States and the Church in Rome. Some in Rome, he argues, view the United States “as a culture forged by Calvinism and hostile to a genuinely Catholic ethos”.⁵⁹ Calvinism being associated with a binary predestination which divides individuals between the elect and the damned.⁶⁰ This left a powerful cultural legacy that reduced Holy See soft power and shaped US foreign policy. One demonstration being President Bush’s

⁵³ Andrew M. Greeley and Michael Hout, *The Truth About Conservative Christians: What They Think and What They Believe* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 24.

⁵⁴ David DeCosse and Kristin E. Heyer, eds., *Conscience & Catholicism* (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 2015).

⁵⁵ Herberg, *Protestant--Catholic--Jew*, 106.

⁵⁶ William V. D’Antonio et al., *American Catholics Today: New Realities of Their Faith and Their Church* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007), 106.

⁵⁷ McAndrews, *What They Wished For*, 228-229.

⁵⁸ James Turner Johnson, “Just war thinking in recent American religious debate over military force” in Charles Reed and David Ryall, eds., *The Price of Peace: Just War in the Twenty-First Century* (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 93.

⁵⁹ Allen, *All the Pope’s Men*, 230.

⁶⁰ Uhlmann and Sanchez-Burks, ‘The Implicit Legacy of American Protestantism’.

comparison between Hitler and Saddam Hussein.⁶¹ This disagreement of views weakened Holy See ability to influence both public opinion and the Bush administration.

Finally, the divisions, both between and within Catholics and the Holy See were ideological. An example of this is after his election, Pope Francis had high “favourability” ratings. One poll showed his approval at 76%. This declined with part of the explanation being a decline among conservatives, “45% of whom view him favorably, down sharply from 72% last year”.⁶² Far from being wholly Catholic, they viewed issues through ideological and partisan lenses. As Streb and Frederick claim, “Catholics as a whole have become like most Americans. Partisanship matters more than group affiliation”.⁶³ They concluded more broadly that in addition to partisanship, whether voters are religious or secular helps distinguish between voting blocs.⁶⁴ Catholics are no longer special in voting consistently for one party over another. So, Holy See attempts to attract Catholics to its way of resolving the Iraqi invasion through *milieu* goals foundered in this context.

Several reasons weaken the Holy See’s ability to influence. The aforementioned weakness of a unified Catholic vote divided religious from non-religious while raising the importance of attachment to partisanship. American disposition towards a binary mentality, between good and evil, contrasts with the Holy See. A lack of basic knowledge of bishops and their activities also contributed to an inability to influence. Lastly, complex Catholic theology does not equate politics and economics with absolutist sexual morality.

Media Divisions: Two Ideological Communities

Ideological divisions between and within Catholics were mirrored, even enhanced, by the Catholics press. Hence, the potential for influence amongst Catholics diminished. Conservative publications were generally supportive of the war and favoured US possession goals. These conservative publications agree with Church teaching, especially on equal marriage, yet crucially this did not extend to the war. Liberal Catholic journals broadly agreed with John Paul II’s anti-war stance. While divisions are apparent, the politicisation of Catholics is clear. Baum and Potter argue that the availability of information and a diverse opposition and media

⁶¹ A. Trevor Thrall and Jane K. Cramer, eds., *American Foreign Policy and The Politics of Fear: Threat Inflation since 9/11*, First edition (London; New York, NY: Routledge, 2009), 125.

⁶² Art Swift, ‘Pope Francis’ Favorable Rating Drops in U.S.’, Gallup.com, 22 July 2015, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/184283/pope-francis-favorable-rating-drops.aspx>.

⁶³ Matthew J. Streb and Brian Frederick, “The Myth of a Distinct Catholic Vote” in Kristin E. Heyer, Mark J. Rozell, and Michael A. Genovese, eds., *Catholics and Politics: The Dynamic Tension between Faith and Power*, Religion and Politics Series (Washington, D.C: Georgetown University Press, 2008), 97.

⁶⁴ Heyer, Rozell, and Genovese, 110.

are domestic constraints on foreign policy.⁶⁵ In many ways this thesis supports their work but emphasises the need for unity among those opponents of the war.

A number of Catholic publications report on current events. Publications with larger circulation figures exist, but many are strictly religious in nature and do not report, or comment on contemporary events. Only a small number of magazines and journals did report on current events. In total four publications will be scrutinised, *First Things*, the *National Catholic Register*, *America* and the *National Catholic Reporter*. The first two of these will be classed as conservative and the second two will be categorised as liberal. All four will be examined in Chapter VI but due to a lack of available sources only *First Things* and *America* will be studied here. *First Things* will be examined in light of its critique of the broadly anti-war position. It will be argued that a lack of attention is paid to the politicisation of religion. *America*'s anti-war stance will be examined especially in view of how to resolve the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Little effort was made to see behind the broader context of the United States actions.

The journal, *First Things*, established in March 1990 largely supported the war. Although not strictly a "Catholic publication", its coverage of religion from a conservative viewpoint and the number of conservative Catholic writers merits its inclusion.

George Weigel in March 1991, gave an overview of the positions of major Christian denominations. He criticises all Christian groups for not showing "public moral leadership". He criticises the NCC for not being more balanced in its opposition and supporting the UN generally but ignoring the Security Council's support for the war.⁶⁶ Parallels exist between the Holy See and the NCC positions in their general support for the UN, but rejection of the Security Council's decision on Iraq. Weigel does not connect the NCC and Holy See. Many of his criticisms of the NCC could also be levelled at the Holy See. Weigel critiqued the NCC statement as exemplifying "poverty as a moral reflection".⁶⁷ Justifying the importance of integrating the domestic and international, Weigel notes the bishops' support for sanctions to remove Iraq from Kuwait. His critique argued sanctions will not remove Iraqi forces but, "would be felt first and hardest" by civilians, something the bishops do not address.⁶⁸

Weigel did not analyse the consequences of this line of thought. Bishops may be expected to declare the morality of each war, dangers of partisanship thus occur. He postulates

⁶⁵ Matthew A. Baum and Philip B.K. Potter, *War and Democratic Constraint: How the Public Influences Foreign Policy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015).

⁶⁶ George Weigel, 'The Churches & War in the Gulf', *First Things*, March 1991, <http://www.firstthings.com/article/1991/03/003-the-churches-war-in-the-gulf>.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

that the Catholic bishops and Mainline Protestants are now functionally pacifist, if they cannot see the war as just “then it is hard to imagine what use of U.S. military power these religious leaders would *ever* sanction” (emphasis in original).⁶⁹ Indeed this would be seen in 2003, where the bishops also opposed this war. Correspondingly, the 1991 war that they “should” have supported they opposed and the war most people opposed they also opposed. This contradiction is at the core of this thesis as the Holy See sought to shape US behaviour through altering the environment in which it operates. Yet, Holy See opposition to the war illustrates the extent to which the Holy See will protect its possession goals.

After the outbreak of the war, Richard John Neuhaus claims it showed “the moral corruption of much religious witness”.⁷⁰ This demonstrates three things: first, that just war theory is open to interpretation, second that these various interpretations can be used to justify differing positions. Third, the divergence between this reading and that of the bishops in the United States. As with Weigel, Neuhaus fails to fully appreciate the dangers regarding later military actions and seems to ignore Holy See *milieu* goals.

The Church, reflecting the complexity of its “actorness” (as both a state like actor and a religion), had the difficult task in seeking a middle way between saying nothing and lending its support, or opposition, to war. An added complication existed when remaining silent could be construed as approval. While the Holy See should have openly supported the war, its support would lead it into difficult positions in the future. Balanced opposition, with a focus on *milieu* goals, was perhaps the least controversial path it could take, especially in view of its possession goals. Neuhaus, uses many of the same arguments that were used by those supporting the 2003 Iraq War, especially legitimate political authority, “because there was good reason to trust their judgement calls”.⁷¹

First Things agreed with the administration. The magazine’s articles seemed to collapse notions of international order and interests into Bush administration policy. Though some denominations may have focused on the US role rather than the actions of Iraq, *First Things* seemed not to question the administration’s definition of interests.

Opposition to the war, and US possession goals, came from liberal publications. The illustration of this is the Jesuit run, *America* magazine. A September 1990 article suggested the conflict concerned US oil consumption, “that, and that alone, is what they are prepared to get

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Richard John Neuhaus, ‘More on the Gulf’, *First Things*, April 1991, <https://www.firstthings.com/article/1991/04/more-on-the-gulf>.

⁷¹ Ibid.

people killed for”.⁷² Gaffney argues the United States should consider its consumption. No suggestion of how this could be implemented or its geopolitical implications is mentioned.

Concern for rushing to war is apparent and the difficulty of the decision is made clear. It also warns that domestic problems were being elided in favour of international affairs.⁷³ Others suggest echo Holy See preference for working with a new international *milieu* by suggesting that the invasion be resolved by international arbitration.⁷⁴ Similarly, Williams asserts the recent construction of Middle East states, the dangers of rushing to war against Iraq and the fears of alienation this may cause.⁷⁵

A November editorial examined the just war criteria and applies them to the Iraq War.⁷⁶ It questioned the just cause, doubting the use of modern weapons. No mention was made of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, or Saddam Hussein’s regime. Discussing competent authority it raises the spectre of Vietnam and concluded an attack would dissolve the international consensus that “is rightly bringing to bear on Iraq”.⁷⁷ Systemic factors, namely unipolarity, and the consequences of not acting were not addressed. Turning to right intention, the editorial posited that US demands of unconditional withdrawal makes war more likely assuming Iraq honoured its obligations. On last resort, it repeats the Holy See’s position that all means must first be tried. Like the Holy See, no elaboration on the definition of the last resort is reached. Discussing probability of success and proportionality, he negated United States military strength. Concerns made of the “volatility of the region” do not answer how to remove Iraq from Kuwait. Overall its stance was, like the Holy See’s, focused on shaping the international *milieu*.

Resolution 678 authorised the use of force against Iraq in November 1990. Christiansen warned against bombing that would target civilians.⁷⁸ He alluded to the Jacksonian, and Calvinist impulse of war, “with its reliance on materiel, overwhelming force, the safety of U.S. combatants and apocalyptic images of the supreme struggle between good and evil”.⁷⁹ He claimed that public opinion can restrain officials. The possibility that the public, rather than restrain the Jacksonian impulse, actually stoke it is not sufficiently addressed.

⁷² James Gaffney, ‘The Moral Equivalent of War in the Middle East’, *America* 163, no. 6 (8 September 1990): 125–26.

⁷³ ‘Crisis of Contradictions’, *America* 163, no. 5 (25 August 1990): 99.

⁷⁴ Joseph C McKenna, ‘A Way to Peace’, *America* 163, no. 10 (13 October 1990): 235–36.

⁷⁵ John Alden Williams, ‘America and the Muslim World’, *America* 163, no. 20 (22 December 1990): 499–500.

⁷⁶ ‘To Attack or Not?’, *America* 163, no. 14 (10 November 1990): 339.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸ Drew Christiansen, ‘The Ethics of U.S. Strategies in the Persian Gulf’, *America* 163, no. 18 (8 December 1990): 450–62.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

A December 1990 article suggests that the bishops were united. Waldrop's data for this hinges on the bishops' support for then-Archbishop Mahony's letter to James Baker and conference president Archbishop Daniel Pilarczyk's letter to President Bush.⁸⁰ Waldrop does not entertain the possibility that they only received support because they represented the most basic level of agreement. Moreover, the author seems to collapse the views of the bishops into their interpretation of just war, as Archbishop Pilarczyk did in laying out the "clear" case against the war.

An editorial argues that the United States has little reason for intervening in Iraq, even if it acquires nuclear weapons. Ironically it focuses on very narrow possession goals, "Iraq threatens neither the lives of citizens of the United States nor their 'vital interests'".⁸¹ However, the consequences of this position is not addressed. It ends alluding to the possible use of nuclear weapons generally, with pacifism as the answer to this.

A more nuanced article shows the post-Conciliar development of just war thinking, with increasing elements of pacifist thought. It mentioned the greater prominence given to conscience. Duffey addressed the need for continuous societal thought about just war and the dangers of the "temptation to see the justness of the cause in such absolute terms".⁸² In particular the Holy See could be accused of this.

Even after the war, many articles were still opposed. One discusses the need to address the Palestinian question and domestic spending.⁸³ Rather than discussing the invasion, it seems to follow Saddam Hussein's, and the Holy See, line of thought that linked the Palestinian questions to Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.⁸⁴ Those long term consequences had the United States not intervened are not considered.

Finally, an editorial from April, after the ceasefire had been announced and troops have begun to return, said that John Paul II was right about the economic, ecological and political consequences. It contrasts these critiques with Bush's New World Order.⁸⁵ Yet the editorial summarised the pope's anti-war stance as "the common good of *humanity* – a cause that needs special pleading at a time when the United Nations apparatus has been enlisted on one side of the Gulf conflict" (emphasis in original).⁸⁶ This stressed Holy See *milieu* goals in opposing the

⁸⁰ Gregory Waldrop, 'U.S. Bishops' Meeting', *America* 163, no. 17 (1 December 1990): 420–21.

⁸¹ 'War or Peace?', *America* 164, no. 1 (12 January 1991): 3.

⁸² Michael K. Duffey, 'The Just War Teaching'.

⁸³ 'Questions the War Left Behind', *America* 164, no. 10 (16 March 1991): 283.

⁸⁴ Dodaro, 'The Gulf War'.

⁸⁵ 'On Not Cheering the Parade', *America* 164, no. 15 (20 April 1991): 435–36.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

war but appeals to papal authority would normally be seen in conservative publications. It is illustrative that a liberal/left publication would highlight the papal role in this context. Accordingly, divisions and politicisation within Catholicism are apparent. Further, the editor's contention that the pope represents the common good of humanity is notable, especially when placed against the UN. To argue that the UN has been "enlisted" by the US seems unusual. Given the close links between the Holy See and the UN, such a comment would seem especially odd.⁸⁷

For *America*, it faced almost the opposite problem of *First Things*. Many of its editorials and articles, echoed the Holy See position and hoped to alter Iraqi behaviour through Holy See, or other, *milieu* goals. Related to this, a lack of appreciation in *America* of original sin could be seen. Little effort appeared to be made to see behind the broader context, interests and order of the United States and coalition actions. Several seemed to place more of the responsibility on the side of the United States than Iraq.

Overall, *America* took an anti-war stance. Christiansen and an editorial both cited the 1983 letter of the US bishops, *The Challenge of Peace*. Some have pointed out it was a Cold War document and "such a threat, by Cardinal Bernardin's own admission, had diminished considerably".⁸⁸ *America* generally echoed the Holy See's view, that more talks will resolve the crisis. Broadly it was less supportive of war. Overall, the role of the UN made little difference to its stance. Some are supportive of sanctions but sanctions' effectiveness was not explored in any depth. Systemic forces and the consequences of acting against Iraq are assumed to be negative. Clearly, divisions over the war existed.

Broadly these divisions are reflected in the publications, *First Things* is broadly supportive of the war, while *America* agreed with the papacy and took an anti-war stance. Some of the writers in *First Things* claim that the bishops were pacifist. Yet the consequences of the bishops supporting the war is not discussed. Obvious divisions existed amongst the laity, bishops and media. Those on the left tended to claim papal authority to bolster their position, while those who supported the war emphasised the place of the civil authorities.

⁸⁷ Chong and Troy, 'A Universal Sacred Mission and the Universal Secular Organization'.

⁸⁸ McAndrews, *What They Wished For*, 251.

Political Institutions: Presidential Order and Congressional Interests

Institutional dynamics strengthened the president's powers and increased the likelihood of war. In this context, this section will argue the Holy See's and Catholic bishops reduced ability to influence events was further eroded by Congressional deference to the executive branch. This section also explores the Congressional resolution supporting the war, and shows that the Bush administration relied less on Congress and more on the UN for legitimacy. This strengthened US soft power making its position more attractive. Congress did not use all the Constitutional powers ascribed to it, making war more likely. Moreover, while Bush refused to accept a Congressional role, Democratic divisions assisted in the resolution's ultimate passage. Jacksonian elements were prominent in Bush's worldview and actions which were joined by Congressional refusal to block Bush's objectives. As will be argued, this improved the US coalition's unity and thus its soft power and ability to implement its *milieu* goals.

One scholar contended, "the episode represented a textbook example of how an audacious executive, acquiescent legislature and deferential judiciary have pushed the Constitution's system of separation of powers steadily backwards".⁸⁹ Corwin maintained that control over US foreign policy was an "invitation to struggle", in reality the executive dominated the foreign policy process.

Opposing the war, some cited the 1973 War Powers Act. This tried to restrict executive power in foreign policy by limiting US military deployments, pending Congressional approval. An initial, draft resolution was presented by the administration to the Senate Republicans in September 1990. It encouraged executive action on possession goals to "protect American lives and vital interests".⁹⁰ Democrats were fearful of challenging the president so close to midterm elections that November.⁹¹

Initially, two separate resolutions were proposed. The first, proposed by Democrats in October 1990, accepted the use of force but stated that sanctions should be given time. This somewhat better represented the Holy See's position. However, it was defeated 46-53 in the Senate and 250-183 in the House. At the time the Democrats had 56 Senators and 270 House

⁸⁹ Michael J. Glennon, 'The Gulf War and the Constitution', *Foreign Affairs* 70, no. 2, Spring 1991 (28 January 2009).

⁹⁰ Hiro, *Desert Shield to Desert Storm*, 191.

⁹¹ *Ibid*, 191.

members.⁹² Large numbers of Democrats opposed the resolution initiated by their own party. Most Democrats opposed a war to remove Iraq from Kuwait. Administration officials, acting while Congress was in recess, prepared to remove Iraq militarily. Simultaneously they pushed for a UN resolution authorising force.⁹³ Bush's decisions to go to the UN and to prepare militarily led to accusations of a rush to war. To assuage this fear, US-Iraqi talks were proposed. The administration said these would reiterate the UN demand for an Iraqi withdrawal. During this time the administration downplayed the role of Congress, "became more assertive of presidential war-making prerogatives".⁹⁴

Varying interpretations of interests clearly existed. Democrats, saw the interests of the United States differently. They rejected the Iraqi invasion. However, they appeared more reticent to define US possession goals as the administration had.

Congressional approval was sought by the administration yet Bush "did not concede any aspect of what he considered his constitutional authority to wage war". While accepting the resolution, Bush stated it was not legally necessary. He argued he had the requisite Constitutional authority as commander-in-chief in addition to the UN resolutions.

The ultimately successful second resolution was crafted by three Republicans, two senators and one Congressman, and one Democratic Congressman. It allowed the use of force to apply to the previous Iraqi related UN resolutions. However, it required the president to inform the House speaker and president *pro tempore* of the Senate that all diplomatic avenues had been attempted before force was used. Crucially it would appear that the president would define this. It was passed by 52-47 in the Senate, including 10 Democrats, and 250-183, including 86 Democrats.⁹⁵ Some Congressmen approved in the hope that it would force Iraq to change its behaviour.⁹⁶ Emphasising the importance of unity, it has been posited that "divisions within the Democratic Party ensured passage of the war resolution".⁹⁷

Bush's relations with Congress show how he appeared to be more attuned to Jacksonianism. However, a sense of justice, a belief in the necessary use of force and a sense of order may have induced others to support the war. Ultimately, Bush defined US possession goals and his definition overpowered that of others because of the constitutional powers of the

⁹² Ibid, 300.

⁹³ Gary R. Hess, 'Presidents and the Congressional War Resolutions of 1991 and 2002', *Political Science Quarterly* 121, no. 1 (2006): 93-118.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Hiro, *Desert Shield to Desert Storm*, 300.

⁹⁶ Ibid, 301.

⁹⁷ Hess, 'Presidents and the Congressional War Resolutions of 1991 and 2002'.

presidency. Moreover, he received indirect assistance from UN support for this definition of US possession goals. UN support bolstered his case for war both domestically, as will be illustrated in the next section and in Chapter VI, and internationally through coalition support.

Although Congressional support was uncertain, ultimately it was unwilling to block administration policy. Neither factor was significant enough to alter the administration's definition of possession goals to change policy. Lastly, the "rally-around-the-flag" effect contributed to these elements.⁹⁸ The Jacksonian folk community with its emphasis on duty and honour may have been particularly bound by this effect.

Others have contended that the administration waited until just before the deadline for an Iraqi withdrawal before pushing for a Congressional resolution. This course limited Congress's options and choice of rejecting Bush's wishes. Some have suggested that the administration was uncertain that such a resolution would pass.

Indeed the administration sought to build an international coalition, rather than turn to Congress.⁹⁹ Doing so maximised US soft power, making it easier to achieve both its possession and *milieu* goals. Accordingly the Holy See's soft power to oppose the war and advance its own *milieu* goals was subsequently weaker.

Hess argues both domestic and international factors led President Bush to go to Congress. However, the timing of the request gave Bush the advantage of "bipartisan support, and using the "bully pulpit" to enlist public backing".¹⁰⁰ Bush's decision may have been related to the relative unity of the Security Council and the divisions within Congress.

Article One of the Constitution gives Congress the power to raise appropriations. Essentially, Congress did not use the powers it held. Democratic majorities in Congress could have blocked administration policy. That they did not has been described as an "abdication" of responsibility.¹⁰¹ Fear of being seen as unpatriotic are among the reasons why it did not use this power strengthening the administration.

The president's constitutional role as commander-in-chief means he is in a privileged position on national security matters. Presidential dominance in foreign policy is underlined when the Reagan administration sent a full ambassador, rather than a more junior diplomat, to the Holy See. This was challenged in court. Essig and Moore maintain that "the district court

⁹⁸ Barbara A. Bardes and Robert W. Oldendick, *Public Opinion: Measuring the American Mind*, 5th Revised edition (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2016), 257.

⁹⁹ Matthews, *The Gulf Conflict and International Relations*, 178.

¹⁰⁰ Hess, 'Presidents and the Congressional War Resolutions of 1991 and 2002'.

¹⁰¹ Louis Fisher, *Congressional Abdication on War and Spending* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2000).

ruled that it was not empowered to pass judgement on Reagan's decision to establish diplomatic relations with the Holy See".¹⁰² This may have enabled cultural Jacksonian tendencies that already existed.

Chan and Safran argue public opinion should constrain the actions toward war where there is a powerful legislature.¹⁰³ Yet, Congress was unwilling to restrain the executive. Crucially, the authors do not seem to account for the executive's ability to direct and shape public opinion.¹⁰⁴

Therefore, executive control of foreign policy is, though not total, substantial. Though seeking a resolution from Congress, Bush maintained his constitutional authority in foreign affairs. His dominance enabled his definition of possession goals to frame the debate. He was assisted by the UN which buttressed his legitimacy and thus US soft power both domestically and internationally. Consequently, Holy See soft power was substantially weaker making it virtually impossible to advocate for its *milieu* goals. As Neustadt argued, the power of the presidency is the "power to persuade". In this instance Congress did not use its powers to limit policy decided by the president.

¹⁰² Essig and Moore, 'U.S.-Holy See Diplomacy'.

¹⁰³ Steve Chan and William Safran, 'Public Opinion as a Constraint against War: Democracies' Responses to Operation Iraqi Freedom', *Foreign Policy Analysis* 2, no. 2 (1 April 2006): 137–56.

¹⁰⁴ Thrall and Cramer, *American Foreign Policy and The Politics of Fear*.

Polls: Driven by Bush

Overall polling supported the war, consequently Holy See soft power in advocating for its *milieu* goals was diminished. Strong support did not exist but was sufficient to be used by the Bush administration. Indeed, the administration seemed to shape polling to support its actions. Before military action, the debate was partisan and thus “the public tended to be similarly divided by party”.¹⁰⁵ Those who opposed the war failed to build sufficient support against it.¹⁰⁶ Such a split weakened the Holy See’s and bishops’ ability in opposing the war. Many Catholics had moved away from their affiliation to the Democratic Party making it harder for the bishops to lobby them as a single bloc.¹⁰⁷ How motives for war altered as circumstances changed will be scrutinised. Moreover, Bush’s letter to his children will be examined in the context of his binary worldview on the conflict. Problems about discerning the precise level of support will be explored with this section arguing how approval and disapproval can shift depending on the question asked and its phrasing. It will be argued that this aided Bush’s support for war. The next section will contend that support for the war shows a Jacksonian element. The section on polling will end by stressing the importance of the UN for Bush and how this bolstered his legitimacy and ultimately soft power to advance his possession and *milieu* goals.

The administration had mixed motives. These ranged between stopping Iraqi aggression, protecting oil supplies and keeping domestic jobs. This resulted in a narrow majority agreeing that Bush had given sufficient reasons, approval of handling the crisis at 50% and a rising disapproval rate.¹⁰⁸ Instead, the administration seemed to drive public opinion in its desired direction, so it could implement its possession goals. The changing motives for war may have indicated changing circumstances. The US desire to assert its possession goals, but also its understanding of authority and power cannot be separated from its actions.

In October 1990, before the outbreak of the war, Bush equated Saddam Hussein to Hitler. Bush strengthened the analogy by comparing Poland to Kuwait and a failure to respond as appeasement.¹⁰⁹ Arguably, this simplification fed into a binary, Calvinist, view of humanity

¹⁰⁵ John Mueller, *Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War*, First edition (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 1994), 23.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid, 23.

¹⁰⁷ Streb and Frederick, 'The Myth of a Distinct Catholic Vote', 93.

¹⁰⁸ Hiro, *Desert Shield to Desert Storm*, 247.

¹⁰⁹ Ronald R. Krebs and Jennifer Lobasz, "The sound of silence: rhetorical coercion, democratic acquiescence, and the Iraq War", in A. Trevor Thrall and Jane K. Cramer, eds., *American Foreign Policy and The Politics of Fear: Threat Inflation since 9/11*, First edition (London; New York, NY: Routledge, 2009), 124-125.

already prevalent in US culture.¹¹⁰ Furthermore, this view appears to be personally held by Bush, as seen in a letter describing the war as a fight of good against evil.¹¹¹ Prominent divisions existed between those who thought the war would be short and those who saw it as unavoidable.¹¹² Both the Holy See and bishops faced challenges in persuading the US public of their varied positions.

Precise levels of support cannot be ascertained due to wording of questions and perception of the usefulness of sanctions. Mueller argued impatience with sanctions existed and “a shift of several percentage points from sanctions toward war took place”.¹¹³ Thus, the ability to influence would be dramatically weaker. Both the bishops and the Holy See were disadvantaged, as even a small shift could help justify Bush administration actions. There may have been throughout the entire debate on sanctions and war “no notable shift of opinion at all”.¹¹⁴ This suggests the malleability of polls.

Equally, Mueller notes the question’s phrasing can dramatically raise or lower support for war. Support for sending additional troops, in November 1990, fell by 20% when the option to wait was given.¹¹⁵ Kagay warns that some polls do not give the respondent the choice of choosing non-military coercion. Another poll reports that 45% preferred military action while 48% wished to allow more time for economic sanctions. One noted that 37% consistently favoured military action to remove Iraq from Kuwait while 30% oppose military action. The remainder shifted depending on the question.¹¹⁶

Two points come from these findings. The first is those who supported the war were a core group, but also contained a fluctuating group reticent to approve military action. Secondly, if non-violent options had been better articulated this group may have been open to Holy See arguments. Polls seemed to show strong support around August 1990 after the Iraqi invasion, and strong support just before the war. Chan and Safran cited institutional aspects that could restrain, or enhance, the influence of public opinion on decisions. One of these is the proximity

¹¹⁰ Uhlmann and Sanchez-Burks, ‘The Implicit Legacy of American Protestantism’.

¹¹¹ Orrin Schwab, *The Gulf Wars and the United States: Shaping the Twenty-First Century* (Westport, Conn: Praeger Publishers Inc, 2008), 52.

¹¹² Mueller, *Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War*, 23.

¹¹³ Ibid, 36.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Mueller, ‘A Review: American Public Opinion and the Gulf War: Some Polling Issues’, *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 57, no. 1 (1 April 1993): 197’.

¹¹⁶ Michael R. Kagay, “Variability Without Fault: Why Even Well Designed Polls Can Disagree,” in Thomas E. Mann and Gary R. Orren, eds. *Media Polls in American Politics* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 106-108.

of the next election.¹¹⁷ In the case of the war, military action began on 16 January 1991. The next election, for Congress and the presidency was in November 1992.

Support for the war appeared to be highest at the beginning of the crisis. One example is a poll conducted in early August 1990, which gave an 81% approval rating supporting Saudi Arabia's defence. Three weeks later support had risen to 86%.¹¹⁸ When asked the more general question about sending troops to the Persian Gulf, with the alternative of staying out, 66% approved sending troops, with 31% opposed.¹¹⁹ Crucially this poll was conducted after the passage of Resolution 678 authorising war.

One poll taken from 17-18 January 1991, just after the coalition bombing began, gave an 81% approval rating in support of President Bush's decision to "go to war at this time".¹²⁰ Support for war rose in January but only "to levels attained in August [1990]".¹²¹ Support did not appear to be a consistent majority. A high percentage supported for war, albeit after it began, indicated a strong Jacksonian impulse. The extent of the challenge facing the Holy See in advocating for its *milieu* goals was clear with this level of support for US possession goals.

That the US bishops, Holy See and laity were divided dramatically weakened the Church's ability to exercise its perceived moral authority. One poll that specifically referenced the UN resolution showed a 10% increase in support for war.¹²² Thus, the Holy See was in a difficult position, as UN support advantaged the Bush administration. This UN support strengthened US soft power which supported its pursuit of both possession and *milieu* goals. Moreover, the need for UN support was used by the Holy See in its opposition to the 2003 war.

Generally, support for military action existed in August 1990. However, few "unambiguous changes in public opinion over the course of the pre-war period from August 1990 and the middle of January".¹²³ It appeared Bush pushed public opinion in the direction of US possession and *milieu* goals and overall reacted favourably to administration policies through rally-round-the-flag effects. Consequently, the war's support meant Holy See soft power in pursuit of its *milieu* goals was minimal.

Motives for war altered as circumstances did but low approval of Bush's management of the crisis did little to assist his position initially. Bush's own personal views were analysed

¹¹⁷ Chan and Safran, 'Public Opinion as a Constraint against War'.

¹¹⁸ Mueller, 'A Review'.

¹¹⁹ Mueller, *Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War*, 198.

¹²⁰ *Ibid*, 201.

¹²¹ *Ibid*, 31.

¹²² *Ibid*, 32.

¹²³ Mueller, *Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War*, 43.

with reference to a letter to his children where he described Saddam Hussein as evil. Issues around the precise level of polling support were raised and how the phrasing altered support for the war was pointed out. High levels of support were noted after the beginning of the war with this taken as indicative of the power of Jacksonian thought. Lastly the importance of UN support was pointed out and how this may have damaged Holy See soft power. Ultimately a rally-round-the-flag effect occurred with Bush benefiting from support after his actions.

Systemic factors that weakened Holy See soft power

Having discussed the domestic aspects, this section will examine the factors that weakened Holy See influence at the systemic level. These are: the Holy See's special legal status and its foreign policy principles. It will be posited that, when combined, these factors reduced its soft power.

Holy See Legal Status: Just Another Small State

This section casts doubt on how the usefulness of the Holy See's extraordinary "actorness" due to its complexity and thus its ability to exert soft power. Of special importance is it being neither a state, nor an NGO. Rather than be beneficial its special status may have been a disadvantage. This section will claim it was essentially treated as just another small state. Holy See association with the papacy failed to bring an advantage to its exercise of soft power.

This section will open by questioning the usefulness of the Holy See's unique status in fulfilling its objectives. It will suggest that its special "actorness" as neither a state nor NGO was a disadvantage. Following this, its moral authority will be questioned and its desire for equality among states examined with how this damaged its soft power before the war. It will be contended that its "actorness" constrained it, especially in light of other religions advocating similar means to resolve the crisis. Subsequently, its special transnational status will be viewed in relation to its support for international law and the UN, and how UN support for the war undermined its relevance. Systemic reasons for the lack of Holy See success will be argued. It will be posited that John Paul II's charisma did little to maximise Holy See soft power and its advocacy of *milieu* goals. The final points made will be about the moral authority of Christianity generally and how this is shared out among different denominations, who mostly opposed the war. An exception to this was the Southern Baptist Convention (SBC) who was closely linked to the Republican Party and supported the war but without the Holy See's special legal status.

The Holy See's self-perception as a moral authority and its desire for equality between states did little to make it relevant to US pursuit of its possession goals. Additionally, the Holy See was constrained as it wished to remain neutral partly due to its unique "actorness". Other religious denominations, without the Holy See's status, opposed the war on similar grounds,

with some supporting sanctions. This weakened the relevance of its special status. Finally, some Protestant denominations supported the war, using their moral authority to bolster the view of the war as just. These divisions did little to aid the anti-war case.

In applying soft power to the Holy See's status, two points can be made. The first is its view of international law. It believes in equality of all states. Viewing the Holy See through soft power results in it being seen as a transnational actor with soft power.¹²⁴ However, its ability to oppose international law despite its transnational nature in this case, was virtually impossible. US coalition enforcement of UN resolutions made the Holy See's special legal and moral status irrelevant in its opposition to the war. It simultaneously opposed the war, and the UN actions, but also sought to end the Iraqi invasion. Under these circumstances, power was more important than claims to any transcendent status. Its capacity to operate as a "state", instead of giving it flexibility, may have heightened its paralysis by being unable to maximise its soft power by advocating more forcefully against the war without theological limitations placed that existed. Ironically, this assisted the Holy See in pursuit of its possession goals.

The second factor is systemic. The sharply contrasting views between the two actors weakened Holy See influence. The United States sought to support its possession goals through force but did so in a way that maximised its soft power, through the UN. For the Holy See, its opposition to war rested on the parties negotiating to resolve their differences. Even with the charisma, and thus soft power potential, attributed to John Paul II he was closely associated with sexual morality. A survey argued that few link religion to issues such as the environment.¹²⁵ It could now be inferred that the same could be said for religion's role in foreign policy. UN support for US coalition actions buttressed the US conception of the system and gave the US added legitimacy. For the Holy See its special status, "actorness", made it harder to relate to, and less relatable, to other states. Thus, its status weakened its soft power.

Due to the United States' history, and perception as a Christian nation, religion can have moral authority and influence. The diverse nature of Christianity, has the result of creating moral authority that "can be invested to shape public policy".¹²⁶ However, this moral authority is spread among diverse denominations. Accordingly, the likelihood of specific policies being

¹²⁴ Nye, *Soft Power*, 9.

¹²⁵ 'Few Say Religion Shapes Immigration, Environment Views', *Pew Research Center's Religion & Public Life Project*, <http://www.pewforum.org/2010/09/17/few-say-religion-shapes-immigration-environment-views/>.

¹²⁶ Grzymala-Busse, *Nations under God*, 231.

implemented is greatly reduced. Several Mainline Protestant groups opposed the war, though some, the SBC, viewed it as just.¹²⁷

The NCC called for enforcement of UN sanctions until Iraq withdraws and urged President Bush to seek a “negotiated political solution”. It desired the US military build-up be withdrawn, excluding those troops to implement the UN Charter.¹²⁸ The NCC demand for dialogue, echoed the Holy See position. Thus, the Holy See’s special status had little effect, especially when other groups were advocating positions so similar to its own.

Contrasting this was the SBC who closely identified the war’s outcome with their religious belief, similar to many conservative Catholics. At the end of the conflict, the SBC sought to maximise its moral authority as it issued a resolution arguing that the victory expanded “freedom, democracy and peace”. The statement concludes praising President Bush and the armed forces “and their overwhelming victory”.¹²⁹ The SBC may have been caught up in the post-Cold War triumphalist mood. Links between the SBC and the Republican Party have been demonstrated elsewhere.¹³⁰ This may indicate the SBC’s relationship to identity, political ideology and nationality. This appeared similar to many conservative Catholics who placed ideology and nationality before papal pronouncements. Bush’s victory may have aided the SBC’s moral authority but perhaps only *after* the war’s successful conclusion. Yet, moral authority can also come from opposing. Chapter VI will maintain that the association of the pope with the anti-war cause was one of the reasons for George W. Bush meeting the pope’s envoy to deliver an anti-war message instead of the Holy See’s status. The SBC’s statement meant it could be viewed as an “all-American” denomination, imbued with the dominant Protestant culture. Conservative Catholics, being instilled with this culture felt little attachment to the Holy See’s arguments. Neither were they attracted to the Holy See’s status which reduced its soft power and ability to attract Catholics to its *milieu* goals.

More fundamentally, the usefulness of its exceptional legal status has been called into question, it appeared unable to leverage this to its benefit. It was both unwilling and unable to

¹²⁷ Peter Steinfels, ‘War in the Gulf: The Home Front; Church Leaders Reaffirm Opposition to War’, *The New York Times*, 15 February 1991, <http://www.nytimes.com/1991/02/15/us/war-in-the-gulf-the-home-front-church-leaders-reaffirm-opposition-to-war.html>.

¹²⁸ “Message and Resolution From the General Board of the National Council of Churches”, Turner Johnson and Weigel, *Just War*, 110-111.

¹²⁹ “Resolution on Operation Desert Storm”, *Southern Baptist Convention*, <http://www.sbc.net/resolutions/433/resolution-on-operation-desert-storm>.

¹³⁰ Oran P. Smith, *The Rise of Baptist Republicanism* (New York: NYU Press, 2000), 2; Michael Lipka, ‘U.S. Religious Groups and Their Political Leanings’, *Pew Research Center*, 23 February 2016, <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/02/23/u-s-religious-groups-and-their-political-leanings/>.

go beyond what it was doing. Political and theological constraints muted its ability to mobilise public opinion against the war. It appeared unable to connect with the community of Catholics in the United States to maximise its attraction. Doing so would endanger its neutrality. Only matters of sexual morality, such as its opposition to equal marriage, are absolutist.¹³¹ Indeed, as this thesis argues, the Holy See's political neutrality is one reason why it was not successful in altering government policy. Yet, this very neutrality allowed it to follow its possession goals through its opposition to the war.

This section has examined the usefulness of the Holy See's unique status as it was neither a state nor NGO. Its desire for equality among states was examined and it was maintained that this damaged its soft power. As other religious groups also opposed the war its "actorness", it will be contended, was less significant. Despite its transnational status UN support for the war damaged the relevance of its claim to broader authority. Other points made address its dearth of success in spite of John Paul II's charisma and the SBC supporting the war as it was imbued with a conservative Protestantism that made it an "all-American" denomination.

¹³¹ Stummvoll, 'A Living Tradition', 41.

Principles of Holy See Foreign Policy: Finding Ways to Oppose

This section examines how the Holy See adapted its foreign policy principles to oppose the war. CST undermined the Holy See's attempts to influence. Holy See foreign policy stems from CST. Basic principles of which comprise multilateralism, the importance of international law and institutions, the unity of mankind and the common good. These shape its foreign policy but their interpretation varies depending on context. Each of these will be examined in turn and it will be argued they reduced its ability to attract the United States to its *milieu* goals. Furthermore, its status as a moral actor will be questioned as its hostility to the war seemed to make the moral use of force all but impossible on a practical basis. Connected to this, its possession goals of protecting Christians may have made it less "disinterested", with the United States, arguably, taking the broader view. CST's flexibility is illustrated when comparing the 1991 and 2003 wars. Holy See opposition to both came from the same principles but were interpreted differently. In 1991 it prioritised just war theory, last resort. In 2003 shifted to a lack of UN sanction, legitimate authority.

Holy See emphasis on multilateralism is important because it shows how it interprets CST in the abstract and how it is applied in this case to advance its possession goals. Scholars have noted the tension between multilateralism, legitimacy and unilateralism.¹³² Despite the UN resolutions and US coalition support, the Holy See refused to support the war. CST sees the unity of mankind as one, with emphasis on all being equal. The Holy See engages in multilateralism as its preferred method of diplomacy.¹³³ Links between theological ideas of community and mankind can be drawn with this preference for multilateralism. Therefore, the Holy See's implicit rejection of the UN support for war (Resolution 678) was particularly striking. Holy See rejection of Resolution 678 damaged its soft power and thence its ability to persuade others to adopt its *milieu* goals.

¹³² Shepard Forman and Stewart Patrick, eds., *Multilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: Ambivalent Engagement* (Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 3.

¹³³ 'Holy See to WTO: Multilateral Agreements Better than Regional Ones', http://en.radiovaticana.va/news/2015/12/17/_holy_see_to_wto_multilateral_agreements_better/1195119; Jodok Troy, *Christian Approaches to International Affairs* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 101.

Holy See foreign policy may have been less attractive because of its belief in international law to unite the “juridical and moral orders”.¹³⁴ Such desires were not extended after Iraq’s invasion. Contrasting this, the Bush administration referenced international law in their arguments.¹³⁵ Differing interpretations meant the Holy See was insufficiently capable of attracting the United States to its *milieu* goals. The Holy See’s advocacy for negotiation, even as the UN mandated deadline expired for Iraq to leave Kuwait, showed the flexibility of the Holy See’s own foreign policy principles. These same principles were detrimental to its attractive power.

Stake argues the pope, “never articulated a full application of the just war criteria to the case”.¹³⁶ Doing so may have blunted the pope’s arguments. Stake posits the pontiff’s concerns lay with “other aspects of the just war tradition, those related to last resort, the probability of success, and proportionality”.¹³⁷ Yet, these were not stated explicitly, doing so may have helped its neutrality and possession goals but did little for maximising its soft power in advocating for its *milieu* goals.

The Holy See shunned force but also wished to uphold Kuwaiti sovereignty.¹³⁸ Shelledy argues, Holy See resonance was diminished by the right to self-defence, UN support and its contradictory position.¹³⁹ Shelledy does not address the unity of mankind, which reduced its soft power in separating this aspect of its theology from its proposed solution to the Iraqi invasion. Further complications occurred as the unity of mankind is rooted in the theological belief that, “God is at work also among other nations”.¹⁴⁰ Closely associated with this are the doctrines that Christ died for all and the belief that Christian teachings expound a model of a united humanity.¹⁴¹ Therefore, it is unlikely to change.

Thus, the Holy See had few options to criticise the Bush administration’s approach which assisted in the pursuit of its possession goals. The Holy See viewed the region as

¹³⁴ Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, no. 436, http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/justpeace/documents/rc_pc_justpeace_doc_20060526_compendio-dott-soc_en.html#Unity of the human family.

¹³⁵ George Bush, ‘President George H.W. Bush’s Address on Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait, 1990’, Council on Foreign Relations, <http://www.cfr.org/iraq/president-george-hw-bushs-address-iraqs-invasion-kuwait-1990/p24117>.

¹³⁶ Stake, ‘The Holy See and the Middle East’, 67.

¹³⁷ Ibid, 67–68.

¹³⁸ Dodaro, ‘The Gulf War’.

¹³⁹ Shelledy, ‘Legions Not Always Visible on Parade’, 192.

¹⁴⁰ Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, no. 430, http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/justpeace/documents/rc_pc_justpeace_doc_20060526_compendio-dott-soc_en.html#Unity of the human family.

¹⁴¹ Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, no. 432, http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/justpeace/documents/rc_pc_justpeace_doc_20060526_compendio-dott-soc_en.html#Unity of the human family.

unstable, and partly because of its special “actorness” everything as inter-connected which meant the corollary was that *any* war would lead to greater instability. It was sceptical of war because it was war, but also feared a clash of civilisations.¹⁴² Thus as well as seeking to advance its *milieu* goals it also sought to use the “clash of civilisations” narrative to protect Christians in the region. This could be categorised as a possession goal.

Holy See conceptions of the common good weakened its influence. Nationalism and individualism, challenge the common good. Holy See foreign policy is based on the unity of mankind but also the common good. While its “policy” did not change before the war began, it seemed to ignore UN resolutions calling for Iraq to withdraw.

The Holy See’s status as a moral actor should be questioned. Understandably, it opposed the war. However, its hostility was based on a strict reading of the just war theory that seemed to, when taken with the 2003 war, almost never accept the moral use of force. Such a stance was not practical and highlighted the Holy See’s own contradictory position. Equally, its possession goals made the case for it as an outside observer harder to make. Indeed, it could be argued that it was the United States that, on this occasion, had a more “global” view of the Iraqi invasion and its consequences.

Holy See foreign policy principles are based around the tenets of Catholic Social Teaching. Thus they are extremely flexible and can be interpreted differently to oppose any war, irrespective of circumstances. Themes such as the multilateralism, international law, the unity of mankind and the common good were all minimised, if not disregarded by the Holy See before the Iraq War. While this enabled the Holy See to maintain its neutrality and not politicise its status by appearing to “bless” the war, it came at a price of maximising its soft power and its advocacy for its *milieu* goals.

¹⁴² Shelledy, ‘Legions Not Always Visible on Parade’, 164–65.

Conclusion

This chapter, following on from the previous chapter that explored the stark differences in positions between the two actors, has advanced two related arguments as to why the Holy See was not successful at exerting soft power. Domestic factors undermined the Holy See's ability to use its soft power. Political culture, a divided Church, institutional factors as well as overall support for the war all weakened Holy See soft power. All these reduced Holy See soft power and its effectiveness at attracting the US to its position. Systemic factors also reduced its soft power. Principally these were a nascent post-Cold War unipolarity and the Holy See's unique international legal status, its "actorness", due to its anti-war posture.

Chapter II argued that culture helps shape foreign policy. This chapter has argued how Jacksonianism aided the possibility of war with a mood of post-Cold War triumph heightened feelings of American exceptionalism. Elements of Calvinism assisted in creating a binary narrative against Iraq. Consequently, the cultural differences between the Holy See and Catholics in the United States was unbridgeable. This reduced Holy See attractive ability to implement its *milieu* goals. Equally, Chapter II stressed the connection between soft power and Wolfers' *milieu* and possession goals and how soft power is weak when it comes to overcoming possession goals. However, this chapter has sought to apply Wolfers' categories to the Holy See and US to advance theory. It has been postulated that both actors had possession and *milieu* goals. Consequently, it has contended that the distinctions blur with even the normally "non-traditional" Holy See seeking to advance its possession goals. It sought to protect Christians in the Middle East from being associated with US coalition actions through opposing the war in the hope of breaking the link in the minds of non-Middle Eastern Christians.

Crucially the divided nature of the Church weakened its lobbying efficacy and ability to exert soft power to advance its *milieu* goals. Divisions existed between the bishops and amongst the laity. These were reflected in the media which were divided along ideological lines. This may have heightened the divided nature of Catholicism and made leveraging Catholics as a bloc all but impossible.

Institutional factors may have assisted the possibility of war. Various Congressional resolutions were analysed and the divided nature of Congress was stressed and how this strengthened the executive branch. Constitutional powers given to Congress were not used which increased executive dominance. Fear of being seen as unpatriotic weakened the position of those who opposed the war.

Other factors that may have attributed to this lack of influence are public opinion itself. Gradually the public seemed to support the war making Holy See opposition all but irrelevant. Religious affiliation amongst Catholics in the United States was not absolute. The Holy See's relevance has also been debated. Polling data has claimed that more see religion as relevant in matters of sexual morality than war and peace.

Soft power was applied to both United States and Holy See. It was not strong enough to overcome US hard power. It was argued that the Holy See was hindered from maximising its soft power because of its "actorness" and its theological and political (a desire for neutrality) constraints. Concurrently, this unique status made it a "voice in the wilderness" that distanced itself from the United States and aided its possession goals of protecting Christians through its hostility to the war. Consequently, its ability to promote its *milieu* goals of dialogue to resolve the Iraqi invasion fundamentally undermined its soft power on the United States. Conversely, the United States maximised its soft power through its shared interests with the UN and establishment of a coalition to remove Iraq from Kuwait. US use of just war rhetoric left the Holy See unable to attract sufficient numbers of Catholics to its arguments. Therefore, it was enabled to pursue both its possession goals as well as its *milieu* goals of shaping the international system after the Cold War at the same time.

Systemic factors formed the second part of the argument in weakening Holy See soft power. The United States entered a conducive international environment. China and the USSR were not sufficiently strong to challenge American unipolarity. The Holy See was not able to leverage its special international status into sufficient soft power. It is neither an NGO nor state, thus gained none of the advantages of being one or the other. Indeed, its moral status was questioned by those who supported the war. Similarly, the high standard it set for the moral use of force weakened its claim to a practical moral actor, while its possession goals may have made it less "disinterested" than it may claim.

Holy See foreign policy principles were based on its own version of liberal internationalism, stressing multilateralism, international law, the unity of mankind and the common good allowed for flexibility. Yet, these principles, and their interpretation, weakened its attractive capacity and its ability to implement its *milieu* goals. However, UN support for the war weakened the relevance of its opposition and moral claims.

Its opposition left the Holy See isolated internationally which contributed to a reduction of its ability to influence. For the United States, a combination of interests and ideology mixed to buttress US leadership. While the UN Security Council's support for war made little

difference to the Holy See's views, but meant it had to diminish ideas of the unity of mankind to protect its possession goals.

Several factors that are prevalent in the 1991 Iraq War will also be prominent in the succeeding chapter. In 2003 Holy See arguments were based on international law and the centrality of the UN. The place of unipolarity will also feature in the George W. Bush administration's calculus. While Holy See opposition to US policy will reach new levels, leaving the relationship between the two actors at their modern nadir. At the same time the view of the Holy See as a moral actor reached its zenith due to its resolute opposition to the war.

Part Three – 2003 Iraq War

The 2003 Iraq War was the modern nadir of the US-Holy See relationship. Part Three contends the Holy See was unsuccessful in halting the 2003 US war with Iraq. Similar to Part Two addressing the 1991 Iraq War, there are domestic and international reasons for this lack of soft power.

US expectations of Holy See moral support existed as many presidents described popes and the Holy See as a moral actor.¹⁴³ Accordingly, these views weakened the Holy See's ability to influence the Bush administration.

While the Holy See clearly opposed the US led coalition, it also had to maintain its neutrality. Consequently, it could not simply dismiss Bush administration concerns. Holy See opposition to the war stemmed principally from the absence of a UN Security Council resolution.¹⁴⁴ Previously the UN had accepted the 1991 war but the Holy See opposed this also. Thus, it opposed both wars, but for contradictory reasons.

¹⁴³ Ronald Reagan, 'Remarks Following a Meeting With Pope John Paul II in Vatican City', *American Presidency Project*, 7 June 1982, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=42610>; George Bush, 'Remarks at the American Seminary in Vatican City', *American Presidency Project*, 8 November 1991, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=20198>; Bill Clinton, 'Remarks Following Discussions With Pope John Paul II in Denver', *American Presidency Project*, 12 August 1993, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=46985>.

¹⁴⁴ 'Vatican Says No Strike on Iraq without UN Approval', *The Irish Times*, <http://www.irishtimes.com/news/vatican-says-no-strike-on-iraq-without-un-approval-1.436303>.

Chapter V

The Holy See hath no fury

This chapter will argue the Holy See had insufficient soft power to attract the United States to its *milieu* goals to address the security problems posed by Iraq. Ultimately, the Holy See's position on the war was too weak to give it enough soft power to entice the US to implement its anti-war stance. Critically, the 11 September attacks heightened the Bush administration's desire for greater security and (in)tolerance of threats.

Holy See advocacy of its *milieu* goals to resolve the crisis was mismatched with addressing US threat perception of Iraq. The UK, France, Germany and Russian stances will be analysed. Although similarities existed between the Holy See and French, German and Russian stances, this opposition was insufficient to stop the United States from going to war. Holy See neutrality and theology substantially hindered its ability to lobby more forcefully against the war. However, the strength of its opposition aided Holy See possession goals, to separate Middle Eastern Christians from being associated with the US-led coalition's actions.

Copying Chapter III's layout, this chapter will address the: rationale, which was mainly the US desire for security over all else; context, which was US-Iraqi relations and connecting the domestic activities of a state to its international behaviour; the positions of the two actors will be scrutinised with the Holy See's opposition based on UN Security Council approval, its efforts to stop the war through public diplomacy, and its slow response to events to protect its neutrality and possession goals will be stressed. Mirroring this, the US position on the war will be outlined, it will be argued that the Bush administration saw containment as a failure and Iraq as a threat; US actions before war, at the Holy See and in the UN will be studied and the Holy See's inability to attract the United States will be highlighted.

The title of the chapter, is a reference to William Congreve's *Mourning Bride*. This contains the famous line, "nor hell a fury, like a woman scorned". It was chosen to project the passion with which the Holy See opposed the coalition against Iraq and reflects how it advanced its possession goals before the outbreak of the war through its vocal opposition.

Soft power will help analyse the weakness of Holy See *milieu* goals. Thus, similar to Part Two, narrow US possession goals dominated Holy See *milieu* goals, making war all but

certain. Yet, the 2003 war differs from the 1991 war. This made the war more concentrated on possession goals heightening the security narrative. Naturally, the Holy See's *milieu* goals were unable to challenge this given its constraints and innate religious character.

Chapter Rationale: US Desire for Security

The importance and relevance of this chapter is fourfold. Firstly, it shows both continuity and difference in the US-Holy See relationship. It reveals continuity as it discusses a US conflict with Iraq. Yet, it also shows divergence, being after the 11th September attacks. Holy See opposition to the war will give a better insight into its understanding of modern warfare and international law and stress the US conception of these at a time of heightened threat perception.

Secondly, is the importance of the war as a world event. Its consequences are being, and will continue to be, felt. Holy See opposition was largely predicated on the lack of a UN mandate.

Thirdly, public support for the war was, at least initially, high. This contrasts to the 1991 Iraq War where the polls were more circumspect. The relationship between public support and the Holy See's inability to attract will be examined. It will be argued that its soft power in advocating for *milieu* goals was insufficiently to attract Catholics to its anti-war position who sought security from the Bush administration plans.

Lastly, the debate surrounding the conflict will be studied. It will be maintained that Holy See officials used undiplomatic language that did not maximise attraction. Evidence suggests that parallels were drawn between the 1991 Iraq War and the US debate around the 2003 conflict, making war more likely. Holy See resistance to those who saw the war as just will be explored. It will be maintained that US Catholics were principally Americans, seeing the Bush administration as more relevant than the pope. Catholics, in essence, became integrated into the Jacksonian folk community. Accordingly, they agreed with Bush's view of the war and prioritised US possession goals over Holy See *milieu* goals. As before, the just war theory's differing interpretations led to stark disagreement. The Holy See's view of right authority, on this occasion, was based on the UN Security Council and differed radically from the United States. Tensions emerged over international law's role and the UN's legitimacy. Bush administration officials, and the war's supporters, argued it was the role of politicians to decide on war. Some used the Church's own *Catechism* to support their arguments.

Context and Causes for the 2003 Iraq War

The conflict in Iraq cannot be understood without the context of the 11th September attacks. Prevalent ideas, around the “end of history”, pre-emption and how domestic events impact the international system will provide background. When these are combined with unipolarity, they made the war with Iraq more likely. An explanation of “neoconservatives”, no-fly zones, the 1998 Iraq Liberation Act, Condoleezza Rice’s 2000 *Foreign Affairs* article, the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) and lastly the Bush doctrine contextualise the war and it will be argued were fundamental ideas that built the case for it. These ideas show the differences between the US and Holy See in addressing threats, which explain Holy See lack of soft power to attract the US to its position. Importantly, Ritchie and Rogers contend that “a confrontation between the Bush administration and Iraq was likely even if 9/11 had not occurred”.¹

The term “neoconservative” has been used frequently but ignores the broader tradition within which Bush administration actions sat. Attempts to define it lack specificity, and could define much American foreign policy across party and time.² Hence, this chapter will not use this term, for its lack of accurate definition and because of its connotations and malevolent inferences. No agreed definition exists, as Brooks argues “if you ever read a sentence that starts with ‘Neocons believe’, there is a 99.44 per cent chance everything else in that sentence will be untrue”.³ One scholar has claimed that “Neocons are either imperialists (or Zionists) (and, therefore, wicked) or liberal fanatics, (and, therefore, naive)”.⁴ Several academic works have been published exploring the “neoconservative” foreign policy preferences and worldview.⁵ The term has been used to describe several prominent politicians, including Hillary Clinton.⁶ Instead these individuals sit within the US foreign policy tradition.

¹ Ritchie and Rogers, *The Political Road to War with Iraq*, 71.

² Timothy J. Lynch, “Did Bush Pursue a Neoconservative Foreign Policy?”, in Iwan Morgan and Philip John Davies, eds., *Assessing George W. Bush’s Legacy: The Right Man?* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 122–26.

³ David Brooks, “The Neocon Cabal and other Fantasies”, in Irwin M. Stelzer, ed., *The Neocon Reader*, First edition (New York: Grove Press / Atlantic Monthly Press, 2004), 42.

⁴ Morgan and Davies, *Assessing George W. Bush’s Legacy*, 121.

⁵ Jacob Heilbrunn, *They Knew They Were Right: The Rise of the Neocons*, Reprint edition (New York: Anchor Books, 2009); Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, *America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order* (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

⁶ Jacob Heilbrunn, ‘Are Neocons Getting Ready to Ally With Hillary Clinton?’, *The New York Times*, 5 July 2014, <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/06/opinion/sunday/are-neocons-getting-ready-to-ally-with-hillary-clinton.html>; Doug Bandow, ‘With Democrat Hillary Clinton Likely 2016 Neoconservative Standard Bearer, Republicans Should Offer A Real Alternative -- Such As Rand Paul’, *Forbes*, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2014/08/18/with-democrat-hillary-clinton-likely-2016-neoconservative-standard-bearer-republicans-should-offer-a-real-alternative-such-as-rand-paul/>.

After the 1991 War, UN no-fly zones around Iraq were created. Resolution 986 established the oil-for-food programme. Under this Iraq was allowed to export oil to buy food and medicine. In 1996, Resolution 1060 was passed which demanded weapons inspectors' access to Iraqi military sites. Throughout this period the Holy See, through *milieu* goals, sought to mitigate the sanctions on Iraqis.⁷ Even at this stage differences emerged on the treatment of Iraq.

In January 1998, the Project for a New American Century think tank, called for President Clinton to remove Saddam Hussein, in doing so they stressed the Jacksonian strand of the US foreign policy tradition. That October, Iraq said it would no longer co-operate with UN inspectors.⁸ That month Clinton signed the Iraq Liberation Act, stating US policy was to remove Saddam Hussein from power and promote "the emergence of a democratic government".⁹ Narratives of liberal progress and the "end of history" are prominent in the legislation. Iraq's hindrance of UN inspectors was noted and how Iraq persisted "in a pattern of deception and concealment regarding the history of its weapons of mass destruction programs".¹⁰ US mistrust of Iraq, coupled to a heightened threat perception, would become central to Bush's case for war. Signing the act, President Clinton stressed the Enlightenment ideas of the universality of freedom, "I categorically reject arguments that this is unattainable due to Iraq's history or its ethnic or sectarian makeup".¹¹ Some officials in the Departments of State and Defence did not view the act as a serious piece of legislation.¹² The act's passage speaks to the level of mistrust in the US-Iraqi relationship. The legislation could simply be a public relations exercise but helped lay the groundwork for Bush administration policy.

During the 2000 presidential campaign, future National Security Adviser, Condoleezza Rice wrote about the post-Cold War US role. She outlined a linear conception of history, with the United States leading the way to democracy and free markets. Rice lays out expansive possession goals to deter war, promote free trade and "deal decisively with the threat of rogue regimes".¹³ Rice claimed Iraq was on the wrong side of history with the regime "determined to develop WMD. Nothing will change until Saddam is gone". The threat posed by Iraq was clear.

⁷ Christiansen, "Holy See Policy towards Iraq", 87.

⁸ BBC, 'Timeline: Iraq', *BBC*, 16 February 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/1174753.stm.

⁹ Benjamin Gilman, 'Text - H.R.4655 - 105th Congress (1997-1998): Iraq Liberation Act of 1998', legislation, 31 October 1998, <https://www.congress.gov/bill/105th-congress/house-bill/4655/text>.

¹⁰ Gilman.

¹¹ Bill Clinton, 'Statement on Signing the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998', The American Presidency Project, 31 October 1998, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=55205>.

¹² Johanna McGeary et al., 'Taking Out Saddam', *Time International (Canada Edition)* 152, no. 22 (30 November 1998): 26.

¹³ Condoleezza Rice, 'Promoting the National Interest', *Foreign Affairs* 79, no. 1 (2000): 45–62.

The 2002 NSS builds on pre-emption, providing the Bush administration a framework for its actions. Thus, Holy See influence was reduced from the outset. The NSS links the domestic and international, “poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders”.¹⁴ The document argues that there is a “single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise”.¹⁵ Linear conceptions of progress are apparent. Importantly these ideas stem from secular *and* religious sources. The NSS states that “America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed”.¹⁶ It echoes Bush’s June 2002 West Point speech where he elucidated the dangers of “radicalism and technology”.¹⁷ Pre-emption is part of the US foreign policy tradition.¹⁸ Indeed, pre-emption has not been disavowed since.¹⁹

Jervis argues that the Bush doctrine is based around four points: the importance of a state’s domestic regime, willingness to use preventive war, unilaterally if need be, and “peace and stability require the United States to assert its primacy”.²⁰ Jervis stresses Bush’s shock which “greatly increased his feelings of danger and led him to feel that drastically different policies were necessary”.²¹ In contrast, the Holy See sought to use its *milieu* goals to retain the *status quo*. The attacks’ impact shaped President Bush, his advisers and the whole United States. The Holy See’s ability to influence the debate was weakened. Cultural and philosophical differences were already great before the attacks, the attacks exacerbated these. Jervis critiques the Bush doctrine arguing “optimism and pessimism are linked in the belief that if the United States does not make the world better, it will grow more dangerous”.²² Such ideas are echoed in exceptionalism. Inherent in this are ideas of progress and the US role in advancing this progress. Thomas Paine’s invocation, “we have it in our power to begin the world over again” helps describe the Bush administration mentality. Thus, the United States is both a *status quo* and at the same time a revolutionary power.²³ One example was when it constructed a rules

¹⁴ George W. Bush, ‘The National Security Strategy 2002’, The White House, , <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/>.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ritchie and Rogers, *The Political Road to War with Iraq*, 89.

¹⁸ Thomas M. Kane, *Theoretical Roots of US Foreign Policy: Machiavelli and American Unilateralism*, First edition (New York: Routledge, 2009).

¹⁹ Barack Obama, ‘Remarks by the President at the Acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize’, whitehouse.gov, 10 December 2009, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-acceptance-nobel-peace-prize>.

²⁰ Robert Jervis, ‘Understanding the Bush Doctrine’, *Political Science Quarterly* 118, no. 3 (2003): 365–88.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

²³ Michael Cox, Timothy J. Lynch, and Nicolas Bouchet, eds., *US Foreign Policy and Democracy Promotion: From Theodore Roosevelt to Barack Obama* (New York, New York: Routledge, 2013).

based international order.²⁴ The Holy See sought to avoid war but also desired sanctions relief for Iraqis.²⁵ In contradistinction to this, Jervis posits that the Bush doctrine is reductionist “because the state’s foreign policy is shaped, if not determined, by its domestic political system”.²⁶

Some of these policies were based on the Enlightenment and a desire to attract. They were effectively possession goals, rooted in the use of hard power with security as the principal aim. For Bush, soft power was not relevant although it may have been seen as a by-product of his actions, or useful *after* the use of hard power.

It was in this context that the Holy See’s opposition to the war took place. Given the historical tensions between Iraq and the United States, the 11th September attacks, and the consequent increased threat perception, the Holy See had an almost impossible task in maximising its soft power to overcome US possession goals. As a fundamentally religious actor it was not seen as relevant by either the administration or Catholics. By 2002 the theoretical framework was in place prioritising possession goals with the 1998 Iraq Liberation Act, Condoleezza Rice’s 2000 *Foreign Affairs* article and the 2002 NSS all building on ideas and working against the Holy See’s wishes.

²⁴ G. John Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order*, Reprint edition (Princeton, N.J.; Woodstock: Princeton University Press, 2012).

²⁵ Christiansen, “Holy See Policy towards Iraq”, 87.

²⁶ Jervis, ‘Understanding the Bush Doctrine’.

The Holy See's Position

Holy See Opposition: International Law and Neutrality

Holy See hostility to the war rested on two points, it did not appear to be the last resort and it did not have UN Security Council authorisation.²⁷ Other reasons were its perceived unilateralism, and a desire to protect the just war tradition from preventative war while also desiring enhanced disarmament and non-proliferation.²⁸ One of this thesis' contributions is that Holy See possession goals were also an element in its broader foreign policy and its opposition to the war.

This section will examine Holy See neutrality. It will argue this is linked to its pursuit of both its *milieu* and possession goals. Following this, and using leaked cables, Holy See strategy will be assessed through its use of "global stability". Cardinal Ratzinger's, the future Benedict XVI, objections to the war will be explored. It will be argued that his view of the UN as the sole legitimate authority ignored the Holy See's opposition to the 1991 Iraq War. This will be contrasted with President Bush's view and the inherently political outlook of the UN. From this, Holy See possession goals will be examined with emphasis on Christians in the Middle East and the views of Holy See officials who fear the connections made between those attacking Iraq and Christians in the region. Archbishop Martino's undiplomatic comments will be scrutinised and how the Church's rejection of consequentialism shaped its views on unilateralism. The final points made will be how the largely Italian debate bypassed Catholics in the United States and the French, German and Russian positions against the war and their links to the Holy See's opposition.

Each of these reasons for Holy See hostility reflected the Holy See's unique "actorness" in how it viewed, and opposed, the conflict. It supported containing Iraq, but equally sought to remove sanctions. This policy jarred with the US policy of greater security through war. Importantly, the Holy See did not suggest a heightened threat level after the 11 September attacks to international security. Similar to the 1991 war, it feared regional spill-over, with the possibility of Israeli involvement.²⁹ This spill-over could be said to include Christians in the region which would lend credence to Holy See possession goals and the extent of its opposition. Thus, the Holy See had profoundly different understandings of interests than the United States.

²⁷ Matthew A. Shadle, *The Origins of War: A Catholic Perspective*, Original edition (Washington, D.C: Georgetown University Press, 2011), 202.

²⁸ Christiansen, "Holy See Policy towards Iraq", 92.

²⁹ D. Brent Hardt, 'Holy See and the Roadmap for Iraq Public Diplomacy', Wikileaks Public Library of US Diplomacy (Vatican City, 13 September 2002), https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/02VATICAN4444_a.html.

This explains why it was unable to use its soft power. Furthermore, nothing could overcome these differences as they were in part, deeply rooted in culture. Finally, the French, German and Russian stances, will draw out the different approaches to force between the United States and the Holy See. Consequently, the Holy See's "liberal internationalism" was closer to the general European preference for international organisations. Hultdt contends that despite its simplicity, Kagan's assertion "still holds a grain of truth about European legalism and preference for procedure and negotiation".³⁰

Perhaps above all else the Holy See prioritised neutrality. Shelledy contended "although the Vatican recognizes the moral ambiguity of neutrality, it appears to be more concerned with the dangers of a moral sanction of war than criticisms of neutrality".³¹ This lends credibility to how it views *all* states as value neutral. Neutrality, as Chapter II outlined, restricted Holy See options in how it opposed the war. One illustration being the 1991 war, where its stance "was cautious in the extreme".³² Ultimately, neutrality was chosen over a desire to use its soft power to attract others to its *milieu* goals. As expected, this choice dictated the response to the conflict. However, its preference for *milieu* goals were not its sole concern. Repeating its tactic during the 1991 war, its possession goal was to protect Christians in the Middle East. Indeed, it may have felt it had to speak out to protect its self-perception as a moral actor and to protect these Middle Eastern Christians.³³ So although it prioritised *milieu* goals it, like the United States, also had possession goals.

The US embassy to the Holy See's view before the war were shown in diplomatic cables. One cable, from the embassy to Washington, suggested the Holy See is aware of the nature and danger of the Iraqi regime. The cable posits that the Holy See might support a war. However, those conditions comprise taking the consequences for Iraqis and "global stability" into account, but "only" with the consent of the UN.³⁴ The Holy See may be setting the conditions for its support so high as to be impossible for US acceptance. Terms like "global stability" were not scrutinised but the very existence of such a term could be questioned in an anarchic world. However, this term reveals the Holy See's intrinsically global worldview. Thus, the reasons behind Holy See *milieu* and possession goals are clearer. The cable noted

³⁰ Bo Hultdt, "The Iraq War and the transatlantic relationship", in Jan Hallenberg and Håkan Karlsson, eds., *The Iraq War: European Perspectives on Politics, Strategy and Operations* (London; New York: Routledge, 2005), 48.

³¹ Shelledy, 'Legions Not Always Visible on Parade', 163.

³² Christiansen, "Holy See Policy Towards Iraq", 89.

³³ Allen, *All the Pope's Men*, 46.

³⁴ D. Brent Hardt, 'Holy See and the Roadmap for Iraq Public Diplomacy', Wikileaks Public Library of US Diplomacy (Vatican City, 13 September 2002), https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/02VATICAN4444_a.html.

“the possibility of military action” if these conditions were met. If this position was true and were implemented it may have increased Holy See soft power. However, this would have questioned Holy See neutrality. Even assuming UN support, the nature of its “actorness” and given the elasticity of “global stability”, the Holy See could have altered its stated position and opposed the war. Understandings of “global stability” reflects the emphasis of international community’s importance in Holy See foreign policy principles, although it was ignored in 1991. Nevertheless, in 2003, community was a central theme to its anti-war stance and rhetoric.

In 2002 the Italian Episcopal Conference’s newspaper, *L’Avvenire*, published a speech given by Cardinal Ratzinger criticising the possibility of war. Ratzinger refused to view the war as just war. He cited the UN’s existence while stressing its authority as a reflection of the “international community”.³⁵ Ratzinger’s view does not address other nations support for the United States, his criticism of unilateralism remains unclear. From a US, Jacksonian, viewpoint the UN does not have inherent legitimacy. Ratzinger appears to contradict himself, arguing it is not within the Church’s competence to decide on the war’s morality, then appearing to view the UN as the only body able to decide. To pronounce, so definitively, on the morality of any war is unwise, particularly when the Holy See opposed the 1991 conflict while having a UN mandate. There is little acknowledgement that other just war readings might be valid on a non-dogmatic issue, one that directly relates to Church theology and teaching.

Bush directly contradicted this view. His supporters contended the Church’s own teaching put the decision in a state’s leader’s hands.³⁶ Thus, part of the just war debate between the two sides was over legitimate authority. As Brown postulates, “the UN is a political body, beholden to the politics of national and/or regional ideologies and agendas”.³⁷

As part of its possession goals to protect Christians in the Middle East from any backlash from the war. Holy See opposition played a role in minimising this. In an interview in *La Repubblica*, Archbishop Jean-Louis Tauran, then secretary for Relations with States, expressed concern for Christians and Muslims and how the war could be used for anti-Christian and anti-Western purposes.³⁸ Similarly, after a meeting between the president of the Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue and the al-Azhar Institute in February 2003, a statement

³⁵ ‘Cardinal Ratzinger Says Unilateral Attack on Iraq Not Justified’, Zenit, 22 September 2002, <https://zenit.org/articles/cardinal-ratzinger-says-unilateral-attack-on-iraq-not-justified/>.

³⁶ David Willey, ‘Catholic Theologian Says Iraq “Just War”’, BBC, 10 February 2003, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2747199.stm>.

³⁷ Davis Brown, ‘Judging the Judges: Evaluating Challenges to Proper Authority in Just War Theory’ *Journal of Military Ethics* 10, no. 3 (2011): 133-147.

³⁸ Allen, *All the Pope’s Men*, 325.

was issued that noted the increased tensions between Muslims and Christians and the Muslim members at the meeting welcoming John Paul II's call for peace.³⁹

In January 2003 two interventions suggest frustration, on both sides. The first, by then-Archbishop Renato Martino, used undiplomatic language. Martino had served as Holy See permanent observer to the UN until October 2002 when he was appointed president of the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace. Martino, accused the United States of unilateralism and derided the notion of a "universal policeman" and how the United States should adapt to the needs of other nations. Notions of community underpin Martino's comments. Ironically, his comments were the mirror image of the Bush administration. His refusal to acknowledge a difference in US interpretations may help explain the Holy See's lack of soft power in attracting the United States to its *milieu* goals. Furthermore, Martino's view overlooks such instances when a "policeman" is sometimes necessary such as the 1991 Iraq War. It also ignores the Security Council's role, upon which Holy See opposition rested.

Martino's comments were based on the Church's view that no act should be judged on its consequences, "the end does not justify the means. Thus the condemnation of an innocent person cannot be justified as a legitimate means of saving the nation".⁴⁰ Such a profound difference between the US and Holy See highlights the scale of the task facing the latter. Arguments based on Bush's supposed unilateralism are closely associated to the Holy See's understanding of a world without the UN, where "the global stage is left to commercial and military actors that do not have the same motivations to pursue the welfare of all".⁴¹ Unilateralism is rejected due to fear of the global common good being minimised. There appears to be little nuance in Martino's objection, rather a blanket dismissal. This criticism is negated by the Bush administration's broad coalition.⁴² Some scholars asked rhetorically, "Is there then a certain, magic number of supporting nations that bestows legitimacy? Or is it the quality of one's allies that matters more than the quantity when defining 'multilateralism'?"⁴³

When assessing the UN's role others have noted the "disinclination to place too much reliance on a collection of nations not individually chosen by the United States".⁴⁴ This critique

³⁹ Ibid, 349.

⁴⁰ Catechism of the Catholic Church, Section One, Chapter 1, Article 4, 1753, http://www.vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/archive/catechism/p3s1c1a4.htm.

⁴¹ Allen, *All the Pope's Men*, 187.

⁴² Steve Schifferes, 'US Names "Coalition of the Willing"', *BBC*, 18 March 2003, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/2862343.stm>.

⁴³ Robert Kagan, *Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* (Atlantic, 2004), 146.

⁴⁴ John R. Bolton, "Unilateralism is not isolationism", in Gwyn Prins, ed., *Understanding Unilateralism in American Foreign Relations*, (London: Chatham House, 2001), 74.

is only partially transferable to Holy See attempts to maximise its soft power. Relatedly an Italian journalist accused the pope of anti-Americanism. He noted the gassing of Kurds at Halabja in the 1980s and the war with Iran that was begun by Iraq.⁴⁵ As much of the debate was in Italian, its impact was limited on Catholics in the United States. Were they aware of the tone and content, it could conceivably have had the opposite effect, strengthening US support for war. Martino's comments that America should adhere to other nations needs could be construed as undiplomatic. Additionally the remarks, either knowingly or not, show a lack of appreciation of American political culture. Greater understanding of this political mythology could lead to a more nuanced foreign policy discourse.

Holy See neutrality meant it could not form an anti-war coalition. This damaged its ability to attract but also aided its possession goals by not being seen as allying with "Western" powers "against" the Middle East. Other states could use its presumed moral status to their own benefit. Though this status comes, in part from a sense that it stands outside the international system. Yet, its possession goals complicate this image of an actor seeking only the "common good". The French and German positions will be examined presently with commonalities between them on the UN's importance explored and how they related to the Holy See's opposition. Despite a shared view of the UN, this was insufficient to halt the war.

French opposition can be ascribed to, economic links to Iraq, public opposition to both war and sanctions, in addition to structural factors. Initial French hostility to Iraq's treatment was noted in 1997 by absencing from Resolution 1134, on monitoring Iraq's weapons programme. Some claim it showed "deep divisions with the Security Council".⁴⁶ France and the US, even in 1997, had different visions of community and possession goals. Economic reasons were also a factor for French opposition. In 2000, it urged the Security Council to lift sanctions with French, Chinese and Russian companies signing oil contracts.⁴⁷ In both France and Germany, polls showed a "crystal clear picture"⁴⁸ of opposition to the war. Popular opposition may have strengthened the governments' positions against the administration. Cogan asserts that Chirac saw the UN as a potential "rubber stamp" and thus unacceptable.⁴⁹

⁴⁵ Allen, *All the Pope's Men*, 327–28.

⁴⁶ Ritchie and Rogers, *The Political Road to War with Iraq*, 24–25.

⁴⁷ Ibid, 27.

⁴⁸ Jürgen Schuster and Herbert Maier, 'The Rift: Explaining Europe's Divergent Iraq Policies in the Run-Up of the American-Led War on Iraq', *Foreign Policy Analysis* 2, no. 3 (1 July 2006): 223–44

⁴⁹ Charles Cogan, 'The Iraq Crisis and France: Heaven-Sent Opportunity or Problem from Hell?', *French Politics, Culture & Society* 22, no. 3 (2004): 120–34.

This position contrasted with the Holy See who saw the UN as a way to implement their *milieu* goals.

French possession goals appeared to negate any move to war, this may have been compounded by the war's seriousness and its consequences. Interests and community were mixed when French support for Resolution 1441, and tentative Iraqi compliance, resulted in support for inspections.⁵⁰ Resolution 1441 passed unanimously by the Security Council in November 2002, gave Iraq a last chance to adhere to his disarmament obligations. The resolution warned of severe consequences if Iraq did not comply. However, the resolution declared the regime in "breach" of its obligations and gave it "a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations".⁵¹ Some could interpret this as sufficient legal justification for war. Yet this was complicated by later attempts to gain a second resolution. After 1441's passage, Marfleet and Miller suggest both Bush and Chirac had flawed perceptions of their own understanding of each other, leading to a breakdown in relations and the UN's failure.⁵² After Resolution 1441's passage French action was apparent when after the veto threat the Bush administration seemed to accept delayed military action and more time for inspectors.⁵³ Marfleet and Miller write France, Russia and Germany proposed a disarmament plan to the Security Council, "in the belief that US leaders were not committed to defecting from the UNSC, and that French diplomatic preponderance could, at the very least, force the United States to the bargaining table".⁵⁴ This attempt assumed the Bush administration would *only* work with the UN and subsume its possession goals into the UN. France diminished the significance of Bush administration internal dynamics and indirectly emboldened those who sought war.⁵⁵ Realising their mistake, Chirac offered an expedited deadline for inspections.⁵⁶ An unsigned US diplomatic cable reveals Holy See support was conditioned on UN approval.⁵⁷ Holy See diplomats noted other factors, such as regional and global consequences, would also be taken into account which is indicative of its *milieu* goals. Given its structural dominance it

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ United Nations, 'SECURITY COUNCIL HOLDS IRAQ IN "MATERIAL BREACH" OF DISARMAMENT OBLIGATIONS, OFFERS FINAL CHANCE TO COMPLY, UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTING RESOLUTION 1441 (2002)', United Nations, 8 November 2002, <http://www.un.org/press/en/2002/SC7564.doc.htm>.

⁵² B. Gregory Marfleet and Colleen Miller, 'Failure after 1441: Bush and Chirac in the UN Security Council', *Foreign Policy Analysis* 1, no. 3 (1 November 2005): 14.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ritchie and Rogers, *The Political Road to War with Iraq*, 95.

⁵⁶ Marfleet and Miller, 'Failure after 1441'.

⁵⁷ 'One Year After September 11: Holy See Fm Welcomes Global Condemnation of Terror; Cautions Against Action in Iraq Without U.N.', Wikileaks Public Library of US Diplomacy (Vatican Vatican City, 10 September 2002), https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/02VATICAN4398_a.html.

is unsurprising that the United States did not feel bound to the UN. Unlike in Chapter III, the specific historical factors that enabled the US to work with the UN had passed. A final US and UK supported resolution authorising war was tabled but was withdrawn after a French rejection and veto threat.⁵⁸ Soft power integrates the domestic and international levels of analysis. Ignoring domestic factors, leaves a weak explanation, “there were no cases in which public opinion served as the only explanation for the relevant country’s political position”.⁵⁹ Hultdt stresses structural factors for French hostility, “France together with Germany.....had been emphatic. Force could only be legally used against Iraq if sanctioned by the Council”.⁶⁰

After a UN meeting in January 2003, French foreign minister, Dominique de Villepin threatened to veto any resolution authorising war. After this France, Germany and Belgium blocked military aid to Turkey. The US thought France would abstain in a second resolution and the French thought the US would not go to war. France, “acted as though the weight of international opinion, as reflected in the UN Security Council, could deter or postpone the attack”.⁶¹ The French assumed that UN soft power and *milieu* goals would be sufficient to restrain US actions.

Similarities existed between the French and Holy See positions over the UN’s role but France seemed more flexible in dealing with the US. At times France accepted US demands and only just before the war prioritised the UN’s *milieu* goals. Such commonalities were not consistent enough over the war’s build-up for France to consistently reflect the Holy See’s moral authority to prevent the rush to war.

Germany’s resistance to the conflict stemmed from cultural factors, public opinion, personality differences between Bush and Schroder and structural explanations. Its position has been characterised by a “culture of reticence”.⁶² Malici defines this as one “of moderation, restraint and circumspection, multilateralism”.⁶³ Such a view is in stark contrast to much of US culture. In particular Jacksonianism which stresses the overwhelming use of force. Yet, broad similarities between the German and Holy See positions are marked with its stress on *milieu* goals, notably multilateralism to shape the international environment. Like the Holy See, Germany appeared to opt for the *status quo*. German foreign minister Joschka Fisher visited

⁵⁸ Marfleet and Miller, ‘Failure after 1441’.

⁵⁹ Schuster and Maier, ‘The Rift’.

⁶⁰ Bo Hultdt, “The Iraq War and the transatlantic relationship”, 47.

⁶¹ Cogan, ‘The Iraq Crisis and France’.

⁶² Akan Malici, ‘Germans as Venutians: The Culture of German Foreign Policy Behavior’, *Foreign Policy Analysis* 2, no. 1 (1 January 2006): 37–62.

⁶³ Ibid.

Rome to meet the pope. The visit may have been due to Fisher's desire to leverage the Holy See for his own anti-war ends. Malici posits that both Schroder and Fisher "acted quickly when conciliatory opportunities arose".⁶⁴ Nonetheless, despite the speed with which Germany operated, it too was unsuccessful. This could be partly attributed to Jacksonianism's cultural strength over soft power. Forsberg argues a lack of consultation, differences over how to resolve Iraq and a tradition of pacifism, rather than simple anti-Americanism, were the causes of German opposition.⁶⁵ He claims that German actions can be explained by "a need to be recognized, consulted, respected".⁶⁶ Hours before the deadline for the war, the French, German and Russian foreign ministers denounced the US led coalition.⁶⁷ Others have posited structural arguments for German opposition.⁶⁸ The Schroder government's ideology has been postulated as another important factor. In Western Europe, with the UK and France as exceptions, the governing party's ideology had a substantial role in deciding the policy.⁶⁹ Personal issues also had a role, Bush agreed not to begin preparing for war before federal elections. Schroder promised not to make Iraq an electoral issue. Both promises were not kept. Tensions between the two were heightened when a German minister said the US war was a distraction from domestic issues, a tactic Hitler used.⁷⁰

Russian opposition to the war was consistent. Between the 11 September attacks and its outbreak, US-Russian relations were warm. The US had significant international sympathy and soft power after the attacks. Illustrating this Vladimir Putin was the first leader to call President Bush after the attacks.⁷¹ Nevertheless, culture and its own possession goals kept the Russian government from supporting the war. Hostility to US plans, came from two main sources, a desire to preserve world order and sovereignty and a desire to fight terrorism.⁷² Disagreeing with the United States may have increased Putin's support.⁷³

A sense of US-Russian community existed but it was not strong enough to withstand divergent possession goals. This lack of strength resulted in little co-operation between the

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Tuomas Forsberg, 'German Foreign Policy and the War on Iraq: Anti-Americanism, Pacifism or Emancipation?', *Security Dialogue* 36, no. 2 (1 June 2005): 213–31.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Malici, 'Germans as Venutians'.

⁶⁸ Schuster and Maier, 'The Rift'.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Forsberg, 'German Foreign Policy and the War on Iraq'.

⁷¹ Charlotte Wagnsson, "Russia's choice: preserve the status quo", in Jan Hallenberg and Håkan Karlsson, eds., *The Iraq War: European Perspectives on Politics, Strategy and Operations* (London ; New York: Routledge, 2005), 64-65.

⁷² Ibid, 62.

⁷³ Ibid, 70.

United States and Russia. Wagnsson writes of Russian fears of upsetting “the status quo in world politics”.⁷⁴ Russian resistance was as much about curtailing US hegemony as other factors.

Structural factors are important, as Russian and European attempts to constrain the United States show. Russia was unable to overcome unipolarity but a desire to avoid disruption was mutual. However, it was not significant enough to avoid war. Incorporating domestic aspects, Russian inability to influence the United States is also apparent.

Patriarch Alexy II, the head of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), opposed the war in Iraq.⁷⁵ Co-operation between the Holy See and Alexy would be expected due to their theological similarities and their shared capacity for soft power. Instead of combining their soft power against the war, they remained distinct. However, the Church has had to defend itself against accusations of proselytising in Russia.⁷⁶ Yet there was only a reported 800 conversions to Catholicism “in the entire decade of the 1990s”.⁷⁷ This shows the tense relationship and problems of co-operation on wider political issues.

Alexy II’s statement just before the war, stated concerns about weapons of mass destruction and support for inspections and diplomacy. It urged the lifting of sanctions and pressured the Iraqi government to “remove all doubts of the international community”.⁷⁸ The ROC’s sense of international community seemed similar to the Holy See’s which lead them to comparable stances. Yet, their shared sense of community appeared insufficient for a joint stance to maximise their soft power. It is unclear why the ROC opposed the war, if it thought it was genuinely bad policy or sought to lend support to Vladimir Putin, or both. It has been posited that Putin used the ROC to legitimate his agenda. Indeed this is similar to what President Bush did when he met Cardinal Laghi to show he met opponents of the war. Soroka contends, that Putin relies on the ROC for respect, while the ROC needs Putin to support its position as a moral guardian for society.⁷⁹ For the war, both seemed to rely on each other.

⁷⁴ Ibid, 69.

⁷⁵ ‘His Holiness Alexy II’, 5 December 2008, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/3567608/His-Holiness-Alexy-II.html>.

⁷⁶ Zenit Staff, ‘Cardinal Bertone: We Don’t Proselytize’, Zenit, 5 December 2006, <https://zenit.org/articles/cardinal-bertone-we-don-t-proselytize/>.

⁷⁷ John L. Allen, ‘The Perils of Weak-Kneed Ecumenism with Russia’, Crux, 1 November 2014, <https://cruxnow.com/church/2014/11/01/the-perils-of-weak-kneed-ecumenism-with-russia/>.

⁷⁸ Department for External Relations of the Moscow Patriarchate, ‘Statement by Patriarch Alexy II of Moscow and All Russia and the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church on the Situation around Iraq’, Orthodox Europe, 17 March 2003, www.orthodoxeurope.org/print/5/3.aspx.

⁷⁹ George Soroka, ‘Putin’s Patriarch: Does the Kremlin Control the Church?’, *Foreign Affairs*, 11 February 2016, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2016-02-11/putins-patriarch>.

Although the ROC and Holy See had a shared position on the war, relations between the two were insufficiently close to co-operate. Pope Francis and Patriarch Kirill only met in February 2016, the first ever meeting between a pope and a patriarch of the ROC. This highlights their tense relationship. Accordingly, it would have been too much to expect the Holy See and ROC to jointly advocate for *milieu* goals to the United States. From the United States viewpoint, ROC-Holy See divisions may have been marginally beneficial to its foreign policy. Lastly, Russian attempts to halt the war, may have been tempered by Putin's use of terrorism to advance his own security and political objectives.⁸⁰

Generally, France and Germany were anti-war, but French opposition was not consistent. German hostility was more constant and closer to the Holy See's attempts to advocate for *milieu* goals. Russian opposition was based on both secular and religious strands but these did not assist the Holy See's anti-war view partly due to Church-ROC relations.

Days before the deadline for Saddam Hussein and his sons to leave Iraq, the Holy See issued a terse 24 word statement, "whoever decides that all the peaceful means made available under international law are exhausted assumes a grave responsibility before God, his conscience, and history".⁸¹ This statement reflects the Holy See's *milieu* goals over the narrower US possession goals. That the United States and its allies were not bound by the UN illustrates the sharply contrasting worldview of both actors. Nevertheless, it also shows how, until the very end, it sought to distance itself and Middle East Christians, from US actions.

This section has examined the reasons for Holy See opposition to the war and argued this is linked to its pursuit of both its *milieu* and possession goals. Holy See strategy was scrutinised through the lens of "global stability". Cardinal Ratzinger's objections to the war were examined but the contradiction in the Holy See's position between the 1991 and 2003 wars was not dealt with by him, which differed from the fundamentally political stance of the UN. Indeed, UN-Holy See tension on this highlights their respective differences on the potential for the moral use of force. Holy See possession goals, seeking to protect Christians in the Middle East, and how the Holy See officials linked these Christians to the wider "West" which they then sought to separate through Holy See opposition was a central aspect of Holy See foreign policy. A lack of diplomatic comments and how the Church rejected consequentialism were explored in light of the Holy See's blanket rejection of unilateralism.

⁸⁰ Thomas F. Remington, "Putin, parliament and presidential exploitation of the terrorist threat", in John E. Owens and Riccardo Pelizzo, eds., *The War on Terror and the Growth of Executive Power?* (London: Routledge, 2012), 118.

⁸¹ McAndrews, *What They Wished For*, 339.

The French, German and Russia stances were examined in relation to how close they adhered to the Holy See's own opposition to the war and its inability to form an anti-war coalition.

Holy See Diplomacy to Stop the War: Speeches and Envoys

The Holy See's anti-war strategy consisted of soft power through public diplomacy. This section will assess Holy See speeches and interviews against the war by the pope and Holy See officials. It will argue these measures were insufficient to attract the United States to the Holy See's anti-war position. Differences in tone existed between the pope and his aides, before this one of the Holy See's foreign minister's interview will be examined. This tone did little to attract the United States to Holy See *milieu* goals. However, it will be argued that the Holy See's (vocal) opposition, reflecting its "actorness" as a religious body, was sufficient to implement its possession goals of protecting both the wider Christians in the Middle East in addition to Iraqi Catholic Chaldeans. The pope's 2003 New Year address to the diplomatic corps accredited to the Holy See will also be scrutinised. His speech used apocalyptic language to stress the dangers of war for the region and implicitly those Christians living in the region. After this, leaked diplomatic cables and the sending of papal envoys will be examined. It will be contended that these envoys revealed the seriousness with which the Holy See viewed the situation. Lastly, the day before the outbreak of hostilities John Paul's Angelus where he expressed a hope of Iraqi compliance will be seen in the context of Holy See neutrality.

John Paul II used more diplomatic language to attract the United States, adhere to Holy See neutrality but also advance its possession goals. A distinction could be drawn between John Paul II and some of his Roman Curia collaborators with the pope forcefully opposing, but not condemning the war.⁸² Allen posits that the pope will speak generally "leaving it to his aids and to the global media to fill in the blanks in terms of the practical implications".⁸³ Holy See lack of precision had a detrimental impact on its attractive capacity. As will be noted below, "speaking generally" leads to individuals seeing what they want in the pope's words. Coupled with the atmosphere and the task facing it, the Holy See required soft power levels impossible to achieve.

Archbishop Jean-Louis Tauran, the secretary for Relations with States, gave a significant anti-war interview in September 2002.⁸⁴ He argued, reflecting the Holy See and

⁸² Sandro Magister, 'War in the Gulf. What the Pope Really Said', L'Espresso, 20 March 2003, <http://chiesa.espresso.repubblica.it/articolo/6928?eng=y>.

⁸³ Allen, *All the Pope's Men*, 317.

⁸⁴ Allen, *All the Pope's Men*, 320.

broader European view, that only the UN could decide on military action and any war's world-wide consequences should be considered. This approach reflects Holy See *milieu* goals. Simultaneously, it also sought to protect, or at least let it be known, that it wished to protect Middle Eastern Christians. Such an intervention could be considered as possession goals. It took into account an impossibly wide array of factors. Obviously, US possession goals were more narrowly focused. Such differences could not be reconciled, undermining Holy See soft power.

John Paul II wrote to President Bush in October 2002 arguing in favour of the UN's *milieu* goals and for more time for sanctions and weapons inspections.⁸⁵ In September, the Iraqi government offered to allow, without conditions, the return of weapons inspectors. However, Iraq rejected a new UN resolution implementing new rules for inspections.⁸⁶ President Bush signed the Authorisation for the Use of Military Force (AMUF) on 16 October. This left the pope few choices in appealing to different US interests. The pope was unable to persuade Bush to adopt his *milieu* goals. Consequently, his soft power was reduced and as will be discussed in the next section led him to prioritise neutrality.

Subsidiarity, taking decisions at the lowest possible level, is central to Catholicism.⁸⁷ The AMUF's political nature, and lack of Church doctrinal content, meant Roman intervention was unlikely. As far as is known, no parallel letter to Saddam Hussein exists. This appears to be a departure from the Holy See's neutrality.

Civiltà Cattolica a semi-official journal, reviewed by the Secretariat of State before publication, demonstrated the Church's overwhelming hostility to the war. In November 2002 it argued only an impending Iraqi attack would legitimate war.⁸⁸ This claim underpinned Bush administration policy. For the Holy See, community and its own *milieu* goals were exemplified within the UN system. The Holy See suggested Iraqi *and* US adherence to the international community, under the UN, would please both actors without the need for war. Bush administration officials saw the UN as a vehicle to secure its possession goals. Thus when a second UN resolution, would not pass, they circumvented the UN system to attain these.

John Paul II in January 2003 gave his usual New Year address to the diplomatic corps accredited the Holy See. The pope's objections to war were clear, though Iraq is only

⁸⁵ McAndrews, *What They Wished For*, 337.

⁸⁶ 'Timeline: Iraq Weapons Inspections', *BBC*, 18 November 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/2167933.stm.

⁸⁷ John F. O'Grady, *Catholic Beliefs and Traditions: Ancient and Ever New* (New York: Paulist Press International, 1999), 138.

⁸⁸ Allen, *All the Pope's Men*, 323.

mentioned explicitly twice. Famine and disease were mentioned first. He noted “the unresolved problem of the Middle East, with the Holy Land and Iraq”.⁸⁹ This could be interpreted as a reference to the Israeli-Palestinian dispute as well as the status of Christians in the region. Including broader issues, that were reflective of its possession goals, mirrored Holy See diplomacy in 1991.⁹⁰ This broader approach clashed with the United States who saw the issue narrowly. The pontiff makes six separate points. He urged respect for life, proposing that war is “an attack on human life”. This argument linked to the Church’s broader teaching on life from “conception to natural death”. He affirmed domestic and international law. By emphasising international law, the Holy See returned to its previous stress on *milieu* goals and community, through the UN, it had diminished in 1991. In doing so it further distanced itself from the US position and reduced its relatability and thus soft power. Related to this Cardinal Sodano argued that pre-emptive war was not in the “UN’s vocabulary”.⁹¹

In apocalyptic language the pope asserted, “*choices need to be made so that humanity can still have a future*” (emphasis in original). Such language may illustrate Holy See possession goals in an attempt to make the Iraqi regime aware of Holy See opposition to the war. Doing so have been part of a strategy to protect the Christians in the wider Middle East as well as the 800,000 Iraqi Catholic Chaldeans that existed before the war.⁹² The pope’s three negative statements were vague. The first of these rejects abortion and euthanasia as attacks on the person, the second refers to the poor. The last refers explicitly to Iraq. Disputes were to be resolved through *milieu* goals of, “international law, honest dialogue, solidarity between States”. This is a denunciation of perceived US policy and lack of co-operation with the UN. Trying to maintain neutrality, John Paul II does not explicitly reference the United States. Except for denouncing the embargo, few references are made to Iraq. Its human rights abuses were not mentioned. Though not clear, one reason for this may be Holy See possession goals. War is described as “the very last option and in accordance with very strict conditions”. Similar to previous instances, no framework to decide when the last option had been reached were outlined.

⁸⁹ John Paul II, ‘Address of His Holiness Pope John Paul II to the Diplomatic Corps Accredited to the Holy See’, Vatican, 13 January 2003, http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/speeches/2003/january/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_20030113_diplomatic-corps.html.

⁹⁰ Dodaro, ‘The Gulf War’.

⁹¹ D. Brent Hardt, ‘Aim at Preemptive Strike, EU Constitution’, 2002, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/02VATICAN5714_a.html.

⁹² ‘Iraqi Christians’ long history’ BBC, 1 November 2010, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11669994>.

US diplomatic cables state the pope “made a strong appeal against war”, adding that “he did not close the door on war as a last option”.⁹³ Using different interpretations clear attempts to diminish Holy See-US disagreement exist. Such interpretations are possible due to the Holy See’s vague language. The cable argues for the pope to “support” the war, UN agreement is needed. The 1991 war is not mentioned. Ambassador Nicholson writes that Holy See officials said there were no plans to send papal envoys to Iraq “at this time”. Envoys were sent before the conflict began. Whether this was a deception or simply that no decision had been taken is not known. Nicholson stressed the speech “avoided direct criticism of the U.S.”.⁹⁴ Using the pope’s ambiguous language, the cable presented John Paul II’s words as favouring the United States. Nicholson suggests that the pope’s reference to international law assisted the United States.

John Paul II’s speech could question the Holy See’s neutrality. Much of the speech is directed toward the Bush administration. Vatican Radio asked Nicholson about the US desire to withdraw from international agreements, such as the Kyoto Treaty. Nicholson replied that the pontiff was referring to Iraqi lack of compliance.⁹⁵ Again Nicholson used unclear language to his benefit.

Similar to 1991, the Holy See intervened just before the conflict’s outbreak. In February and March 2003 it sent special envoys to transmit papal letters. This demonstrates the Holy See’s desire to avoid war but their reliance on their soft power. Alternatively it may illustrate Holy See advancement of protecting Iraqi and Middle East Christians, its possession goals, seeking to have its opposition to the war known so as not to directly have local Christians “blamed” for the war. In February Cardinal Etchegaray, was sent to Iraq.⁹⁶ He delivered a letter from John Paul II that called for greater co-operation.⁹⁷ After meeting Hussein, Etchegaray thought he “was anxious to avoid war”.⁹⁸ Interviewed afterwards, Etchegaray emphasised the Holy See’s exceptional “actorness”. He claimed that Saddam Hussein speaking to him was a

⁹³ Jim Nicholson, ‘Pope’s Message to Diplomatic Corps Focuses on War, Peace and Solidarity Among Nations’, Wikileaks Public Library of US Diplomacy (Vatican City, 14 January 2003), https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/03VATICAN135_a.html.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Allen, *All the Pope’s Men*, 329.

⁹⁶ ‘Iraqi President Meets Papal Envoy Etchegaray’, *The Irish Times*, <http://www.irishtimes.com/news/iraqi-president-meets-papal-envoy-etchegaray-1.461842>.

⁹⁷ ‘Pope Enters Iraq Fray’, *BBC*, 10 February 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/2743987.stm.

⁹⁸ McAndrews, *What They Wished For*, 338.

sign of the “moral authority of the Pope”.⁹⁹ The Holy See never stated that it might be used by the regime. Asked about the Iraqi Christians, which include some Catholics¹⁰⁰, he replied “Christians are Iraqis above all”.¹⁰¹ Etchegaray’s comments are unexpected, as following theology, he should stress the universality of Catholics. Instead, he seemed to underline Catholics loyalty to Iraq as a way to advance Holy See possession goals.

US diplomatic perceptions of Cardinal Etchegaray’s and Hussein’s meeting notes how Etchegaray stressed the situation’s seriousness. The cable conveyed Holy See belief in firm but non-confrontational diplomacy, amid fear of humiliating the regime. Nicholson, writes the Holy See accepts the success made because of the credible threat of force.¹⁰² The cables revealed the Holy See saw threats as useful in forcing Iraqi co-operation with inspectors. Following its policy the Holy See failed to define when threats constitute aggression.

Cardinal Etchegaray’s mission was balanced by Cardinal Laghi’s. He visited the United States, advocating *milieu* goals and encouraging Bush to use international law. Sending envoys demonstrates the gravity with which the Holy See viewed the situation. Cardinal Laghi met President Bush just two weeks before the outbreak of hostilities. McAndrews notes the importance of the personal meeting, Laghi’s “visit assumed a special niche in the Catholic campaign to dissuade the Methodist commander in chief from attacking the Muslim nation”.¹⁰³

The letters revealed the Holy See’s vision of the international community based on the UN. It may have felt obligated to speak, irrespective of the probability of success. In increasingly testy language, in a February 2003 English language interview, Martino criticising US possession goals agreed the war was also about oil.¹⁰⁴ The Bush administration was accused of this by some.¹⁰⁵ These criticisms were repeated on Vatican Radio.¹⁰⁶

⁹⁹ Jim Cosgrove, ‘Saddam Has the Will to Avoid War, Cardinal Etchegaray Says’, *National Catholic Register*, 2 March 2003,

http://www.ncregister.com/site/article/saddam_has_the_will_to_avoid_war_cardinal_etchegaray_says/.

¹⁰⁰ The Catholic Church is made up of 24 Churches. The Roman Catholic being the most numerous of these makes up the Latin Rite. The Chaldean Catholic Church originating in what is now Iraq, is one of 22 other Eastern Catholic Churches. Their origins are mostly in the Middle East and Asia. All recognise, and are in full communion with, the pope.

¹⁰¹ Cosgrove, ‘Saddam Has the Will to Avoid War, Cardinal Etchegaray Says’.

¹⁰² Jim Nicholson, ‘SADDAM MEETING WITH CARDINAL ETCHEGARAY: VATICAN SEES “LAST CHANCE FOR DIPLOMACY”’, Wikileaks Public Library of US Diplomacy, February 2003, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/03VATICAN683_a.html.

¹⁰³ McAndrews, *What They Wished For*, 338.

¹⁰⁴ Allen, *All the Pope’s Men*, 334.

¹⁰⁵ John Chapman, ‘The Real Reasons Bush Went to War’, *The Guardian*, 28 July 2004, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/jul/28/iraq.usa>.

¹⁰⁶ Allen, *All the Pope’s Men*, 350.

Archbishop Celestino Migliore's speech on 19 February at the UN, prioritised neutrality. Migliore differentiated the war's aims and methods. He reiterated the Holy See's objections and noted the international community's role in mandating Iraqi compliance.¹⁰⁷ Balance between opposing war and understanding the dangers of WMD is a consistent theme throughout the speech. He reiterates the unjust nature of the proposed conflict, arguing Iraqi civilians would suffer. Iraq's human right abuses are not mentioned.

Tauran's speech on 24 February could be construed as undiplomatic. News reports term the speech "some of the Vatican's strongest language". Tauran recounts the possibility of war as a "crime against peace".¹⁰⁸ Other reports nuance Tauran's comments noting the right to self-defence on the possibility of aggression. He urged inspectors to continue their work, hoping for Iraqi compliance.¹⁰⁹ The speech did little to ease tensions or improve Holy See soft power or its advocacy of its *milieu* goals.

Pointedly, Tauran noted the existence of WMD outside the Middle East.¹¹⁰ Crucially Krebs and Lobasz posit "the dominance of the War on Terror narrowed the space for debate over foreign policy".¹¹¹ Fundamentally the Holy See could not alter US threat perception. Belief in linear progress may have led the US to dismiss the war's opponents. Holy See influence was undermined when "challenging the war in Iraq required challenging a portrait of Saddam Hussein as evil and as a terrorist, terms in which he had long been cast".¹¹² Saddam Hussein's image in the US weakened Holy See attractive power while its neutrality hindered its ability to challenge this view of Saddam Hussein.

An undated US cable informs the State Department of Archbishop Tauran's meeting of all the ambassadors accredited to the Holy See in Rome. Tauran stressed Holy See advocacy of *milieu* goals through a peaceful resolution.¹¹³

¹⁰⁷ Celestino Migliore, 'Intervention of the Holy See on the Iraqi Issue', Vatican, http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/secretariat_state/2003/documents/rc_seg-st_20030219_migliore-security-council_en.html.

¹⁰⁸ Associated Press, 'Vatican Strongly Opposes Iraq War', Fox News, 12 March 2003, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/2003/03/12/vatican-strongly-opposes-iraq-war.html>.

¹⁰⁹ Zenit Staff, 'Unilateral War Would Be a "Crime Against Peace," Says Archbishop', Zenit, <https://zenit.org/articles/unilateral-war-would-be-a-crime-against-peace-says-archbishop/>.

¹¹⁰ Allen, *All the Pope's Men*, 350.

¹¹¹ Ronald R. Krebs and Jennifer Lobasz, "The sound of silence: rhetorical coercion, democratic acquiescence, and the Iraq War", in A. Trevor Thrall and Jane K. Cramer, eds., *American Foreign Policy and The Politics of Fear: Threat Inflation since 9/11*, First edition (London; New York, NY: Routledge, 2009), 123.

¹¹² Thrall and Cramer, 123.

¹¹³ D. Brent Hardt, 'VATICAN FM TAURAN PRESSES HOLY SEE'S POSITION ON IRAQ TO DIPLOMATIC CORPS', Wikileaks Public Library of US Diplomacy, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/03VATICAN933_a.html.

Lastly the day before hostilities began, in his usual Sunday Angelus, John Paul II urged Iraq to comply to avoid war. During the same speech, he urged the UN Security Council to use force only “after having exhausted every other peaceful solution”.¹¹⁴ The same speech noted the consequences “for the balance of the Middle East region”. Unusually for the Holy See, its diplomacy addressed balance of power issues. Addressing these issues may have led it to be seen by others as favouring one state over another. Importantly, this is a small indication from the Holy See, that not all nations are equal, with some more powerful than others. It may have been an oblique reference to Iran, but felt unable to mention Iran specifically given close Holy See-Iranian ties.¹¹⁵ He concludes advocating talks, though the deadline for Saddam Hussein to leave Iraq for exile was hours away.

Similar to the 1991 Iraq War, the Holy See’s methods were diplomatic interventions, speeches and interviews. The pope exhorted the United States to seek its possession goals by using *milieu* goals, though the UN. However, as was stated on the Holy See’s reasons for opposition, actions should not be judged on their consequences.¹¹⁶ A possible exception to this was sending envoys to Baghdad and Washington. Holy See definitions of *milieu* and possession goals varied wildly from the United States. Nothing could be done to bridge the gap between the two actors, leading to negligible Holy See soft power.

Holy See Diplomacy: Sacrificing Soft Power for Neutrality

This section will examine the speed of the Holy See’s response to events. Britain’s wish for a second UN resolution will also be examined in the context of maximising Holy See soft power. Flowing from this, Cardinal Etchegaray’s and Cardinal Laghi’s meetings will be examined. It will be contended that they were too late to influence the war’s outbreak. Overall, the Holy See consistently chose neutrality over chances to maximise its soft power and advocate for its *milieu* goals. Consequently, its capacity to promote these were diminished.

The stated British desire for a second UN resolution in January 2003 may have been an ideal time for the Holy See to lend encouragement for its *milieu* goals, and thus a greater UN role. Yet it chose neutrality over attempts to work with the UN. However, Archbishop Tauran

¹¹⁴ John Paul II, ‘Angelus’, Vatican, 16 March 2003, http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/angelus/2003/documents/hf_jp-ii_ang_20030316.html.

¹¹⁵ John L. Allen, ‘The Bond between the Vatican and Iran Is a Partnership Destined to Endure’, *Crux*, 26 January 2016, <http://www.cruxnow.com/church/2016/01/26/the-bond-between-the-vatican-and-iran-is-a-partnership-destined-to-endure/>.

¹¹⁶ Catechism of the Catholic Church, Section One, Chapter 1, Article 4, 1753, http://www.vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/archive/catechism/p3s1c1a4.htm.

suggested that even if a second resolution was granted, the Holy See would remain opposed.¹¹⁷ This stance contradicted earlier private comments that the Holy See may support a war with a UN resolution. No circumstances appear to exist where it would countenance viewing *any* conflict as just. Despite Holy See emphasis on the UN and the close links between them¹¹⁸, Holy See belief in the UN has clear limits. Essentially the Holy See's notion of (the international) community is used when in accord with its *milieu* and possession goals. Due to this position little soft power was achieved. Planning for the war without a second resolution had begun before the first resolution had been put to the Security Council.¹¹⁹ Thus, little could have been done to persuade the Bush administration to act differently as it saw its possession goals as paramount.

Cardinal Etchegaray met Saddam Hussein on 15 February he handed him a letter. It is believed that it urged the Iraqi president to comply with UN demands for inspections. In the context of Colin Powell's Security Council presentation warning about the dangers posed by Iraq, and Hans Blix's report noting Iraqi co-operation, it appeared out of step for attempting to attract a US audience.

Cardinal Laghi's meeting with Bush was held just two weeks before the war's outbreak. Holy See emphasis on the need for *milieu* goals, through a Security Council resolution, was undermined by Iraqi attempts to divide it. Iraq said it would abolish its missiles on 28 February.¹²⁰ After this came the joint declaration of Russia, France and Germany which said they will block any further resolution authorising military action.¹²¹ Given the statements from Colin Powell at the Security Council warning of the dangers posed by Iraq, Laghi's meeting with Bush served little purpose as it was so far behind events.

Consequently, the basis of the Holy See's hostility to the war seemed to be both expedient and theological. In the end, the Holy See may have accepted it had no influence. Instead it may have felt it had to speak against the war and in defence of its possession goals. Ultimately, the Holy See's lack of haste did little to maximise its soft power to halt the war's outbreak.

¹¹⁷ Allen, *All the Pope's Men*, 332.

¹¹⁸ Chong and Troy, 'A Universal Sacred Mission and the Universal Secular Organization'.

¹¹⁹ Chris Ames and Richard Norton-Taylor, 'Blair and Bush Planned Iraq War without Second UN Vote, Letter Shows', *The Guardian*, 29 August 2011, <http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2011/aug/29/tony-blair-iraq-un-resolution>.

¹²⁰ Oliver King and Paul Hamilos, 'Timeline: The Road to War in Iraq', *The Guardian*, 2 February 2006, <http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2006/feb/02/iraq.iraq>.

¹²¹ John Tagliabue, 'France, Germany and Russia Vow to Stop Use of Force Against Iraq', *The New York Times*, 5 March 2003, <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/05/international/europe/05CND-PARI.html>.

United States Position

US Response: Containment's Failure, Iraqi Threat

Bush administration policy believed that Iraq's containment, of its weapons programme and the regime itself, had failed. Throughout the section stark divisions over Holy See *milieu* goals against US possession goals will be underscored. The importance of oil for the war will be rejected. US-Iraqi relations will be examined with particular reference to the Clinton administration's containment policy. Following this Bush's perceived failure of Clinton's policy will be explored. Bush's prioritising possession goals demonstrates US desire for international order, without the UN if necessary. This illustrates the threat it saw in Iraq. The case for war will be scrutinised, which rested on the history of US-Iraqi relations, concerns it possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD), links with terrorists and perhaps most importantly, a heightened threat perception. In this context Michael Novak's speech at the US embassy to the Holy See will be analysed. US and Holy See possession goals will be contrasted after this. Finally, this section examines the UK's role in supporting war which made conflict more likely.

Ritchie and Rogers highlight oil and WMD's role as the major US concerns from the 1970s into the 1990s.¹²² Oil can be given greater significance than is due. When the conflict began, the US imported more oil from Canada and Saudi Arabia than Iraq.¹²³ Furthermore, by 2005, US dependence on foreign oil peaked, and declined thereafter.¹²⁴

After the 1991 war, the George H.W. Bush administration hoped the Iraqi regime would fall. When this did not occur, UNSCOM (United Nations Special Commission to inspect and supervise the destruction of WMD) was established and sanctions were imposed.¹²⁵ This strategy continued throughout the Clinton administration. By the late 1990s Iraqi non co-operation resulted in UNSCOM inspectors leaving. Consequently Operation Desert Fox, US missile strikes, were launched on suspected WMD sites. After these strikes, "Saddam Hussein refused to submit to any further UN inspections".¹²⁶ It was in this context that the 1998 Iraq Liberation Act was passed. By 2000, UN inspectors had been absent for two years, "the

¹²² Rogers and Ritchie, *The Political Road to War with Iraq*, 18-19.

¹²³ Joanne Shore and John Hackworth, 'Impacts of the Venezuelan Crude Oil Production Loss', Energy Information Administration, http://www.eia.gov/pub/oil_gas/petroleum/feature_articles/2003/venezuelan/vzimpacts.htm.

¹²⁴ 'EIA's Energy in Brief: How Dependent Are We on Foreign Oil?', U.S. Energy Information Administration, https://www.eia.gov/energy_in_brief/article/foreign_oil_dependence.cfm.

¹²⁵ Ritchie and Rogers, *The Political Road to War with Iraq*, 20.

¹²⁶ *Ibid*, 21.

sanctions regime was buckling under international pressure and the administration refused to remove Saddam Hussein by force”.¹²⁷ Thus, US actions during these years sought to achieve its possession goals through *milieu* goals blurring the lines between these categories.

Critics of containment have focused on Saddam Hussein’s irrationality, citing his wars with Iran and Kuwait.¹²⁸ It reveals US focus on possession goals over wider *milieu* goals. Lynch and Singh maintain that “effective containment and deterrence rely heavily on the core premise that targeted opponents are value-maximizing, rational actors”.¹²⁹ Bush’s argument was that after the 11 September attacks containment could no longer be tolerated.¹³⁰ Bush heightened fears in his 2003 State of the Union where he warned of terrorists armed by Saddam Hussein using chemical weapons.¹³¹ The Holy See could do little to challenge this due to its neutrality. Neither could it question, what could be viewed as, a desire for absolute security. Holy See arguments were focused on *milieu* goals and were unable to overcome the administration’s possession goals. Executive branch dominance of the threat assessment was clear. Unlike the US, French commercial ties to Iraq were extensive. Some suggested this was part of French resistance to the war.¹³²

Kaufmann argues that the administration was able to overcome the “marketplace” of ideas. Primarily this was due to manipulation of the “median voter”, their control of information, coupled with the president’s authority, the inability of the media to successfully challenge the administration’s arguments and the impact of the 11 September attacks.¹³³ The term marketplace is apt as, similar to an unregulated free market, the arguments of the strongest (states) dominate, resulting in only the semblance of choice. This helped shape the Bush administration response and help US possession goals dominate the domestic discourse.

Two important speeches laid out the administration’s arguments for war. In his 12 September 2002 UN speech, Bush reaffirmed his right to act unilaterally. He suggested the regime could remain if Iraq destroyed its WMD, ended support for terrorists, stopped oppressing of its people, freed missing 1991 war personnel and ended illegal trade. However,

¹²⁷ Ritchie and Rogers, *The Political Road to War with Iraq*, 21.

¹²⁸ Timothy J. Lynch and Robert S. Singh, *After Bush: The Case for Continuity in American Foreign Policy* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 157–158.

¹²⁹ *Ibid*, 159.

¹³⁰ Ritchie and Rogers, *The Political Road to War with Iraq*, 100.

¹³¹ *Ibid*.

¹³² John Laurenson, ‘Ties with Iraq: French Industry Stands to Lose’, *The New York Times*, 7 March 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/07/opinion/07iht-edlauren_ed3_.html.

¹³³ Chaim Kaufmann, ‘Threat Inflation and the Failure of the Marketplace of Ideas: The Selling of the Iraq War’, *International Security* 29, no. 1 (Summer 2004): 5–48.

Hess calls this moderation “disingenuous”.¹³⁴ Hess contended that these conditions were effective internal regime change. However, Gaddis argues that Bush desired to advance US *milieu* goals through UN resolutions and at the same time undermine other non-democratic regimes through his speech.¹³⁵

Attempting to explain US policy, the US embassy to the Holy See brought Michael Novak to Rome to speak on Iraq and just war.¹³⁶ Although it was described as a private citizen’s visit, his views closely aligned with the US government’s.¹³⁷ His visit may represent a presumption of Holy See morality and a Bush administration hope to gain Holy See “blessing” for the war. Novak spoke to officials at the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace and the Second Section of the Secretariat of State. Archbishop Martino, instead of attending Novak’s presentation was absent and delegated the meeting to his staff. His absence was not mentioned in US diplomatic cables.¹³⁸ Novak defended the use of force without international support. He suggested that some Holy See comments were anti-American, especially those concerning oil, arguing that the conflict was one of self-defence.¹³⁹ Use of such undiplomatic language underlines the poor relations between the two actors. Varying definitions over stability and interests are apparent.

Stressing Holy See possession goals, Cardinal Kasper, then president of the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity doubted Novak’s arguments on the justness of the war. Moreover, Kasper noted how many Muslims link Christianity and the West. He went on to note the problems this could cause for the region if war occurred.¹⁴⁰ This is further direct evidence of Holy See possession goals spoken by a senior official.

If Iraq did wish to avoid war, this would have been the ideal moment. Bush’s offer did not view Iraq as having a choice. Nevertheless, had the Iraqi regime begun to implement these demands, the administration’s position would be weaker. It would have strengthened the Holy See’s stress on *milieu* goals to resolve the crisis. Such steps would have reduced the war’s support in the United States and Europe. It would be imprudent to place all the “blame” for war on the United States.

¹³⁴ Hess, ‘Presidents and the Congressional War Resolutions of 1991 and 2002’.

¹³⁵ John Lewis Gaddis, *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience*, First edition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 93-94.

¹³⁶ Michael Novak, “‘Asymmetrical Warfare’ and Just War”, Chiesa.espressonline.it, 10 February 2003, <http://chiesa.espresso.repubblica.it/articolo/7677.html>.

¹³⁷ Allen, *All the Pope’s Men*, 336.

¹³⁸ Melvin Floyd Sembler, ‘Evaluation of U.S. Speaker Michael Novak’, Wikileaks Public Library of US Diplomacy (Italy Rome, 7 April 2003), https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/03ROME1455_a.html.

¹³⁹ Allen, *All the Pope’s Men*, 337–38.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid, 331.

Considering the Holy See's *milieu* goals, this would have been an ideal time to intervene. Its nuncio to Iraq, then-Archbishop Fernando Filoni, may have urged Saddam Hussein to comply privately. In a 2012 interview Cardinal Filoni stated that "there were conditions for negotiations. Saddam had indicated to me also that this was his request..... if you wanted to deal with him you had to avoid humiliating him".¹⁴¹ No papal public statement urged Iraqi compliance. Filoni's response was almost one sided, with Iraq's violations and human rights abuses not addressed to enable the Holy See to protect its possession goals.

Days after Bush's UN speech, Iraq said it would readmit inspectors unconditionally.¹⁴² In a rapid response, John Paul II praised the "possibility of a resumption of the collaboration of Iraq with the international community".¹⁴³ Unlike Kofi Annan, the pope did not mention Bush's role. The Holy See used its soft power in John Paul II to stress its *milieu* goals in favour of the UN. The Holy See's focus seems to have been on the Bush administration, rather than on Saddam Hussein.¹⁴⁴ Hess argues Bush's speech "shifted much of American attention away from questions about the justification for war to whether the United Nations would act in a sense, UN failure would justify a unilateral preemptive war".¹⁴⁵ This was the exact opposite to the Holy See who sought to bolster the UN as the representation of how its *milieu* goals could be implemented. If it was unilateral the United States would have been the sole belligerent nation against Iraq. This was patently not the case.¹⁴⁶

In an October 2002 speech, President Bush laid out his case for war. The speech comprised three categories: because Iraq was not a democracy it was dangerous, had links to terrorism and had dangerous technology. These encapsulate the mix of *milieu* and possession goals that motivated the United States that the Holy See could not overcome. He argued Iraq broke its UN obligations to end its WMD programme and halt support of terrorist groups.¹⁴⁷ While raising the threat level, Bush divided Iraq and the world in two, "Saddam Hussein has chosen to build and keep these weapons despite international sanctions, U.N. demands, and

¹⁴¹ Gianni Valente, 'A Rosary for the Whole World', 30 Days, May 2012, http://www.30giorni.it/articoli_id_78473_l3.htm.

¹⁴² Matthew Engel, Ewen MacAskill, and Nicholas Watt, 'Saddam Caves in on Inspectors: UN Confirms Iraq Will Allow Return with No Strings Attached', *The Guardian*, 17 September 2002, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/sep/17/iraq.ewenmacaskill1>.

¹⁴³ John Paul II, Angelus, Vatican, 18 September 2002, http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/audiences/2002/documents/hf_jp-ii_aud_20020918.html.

¹⁴⁴ Allen, *All the Pope's Men*, 318–20.

¹⁴⁵ Hess, 'Presidents and the Congressional War Resolutions of 1991 and 2002'.

¹⁴⁶ Schifferes, 'US Names "Coalition of the Willing"'.
¹⁴⁷ George W. Bush, 'Address to the Nation on Iraq From Cincinnati, Ohio', American Presidency Project, 7 October 2002, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=73139>.

isolation from the civilized world”.¹⁴⁸ This rhetorical device strengthens the cultural tendency to a binary Jacksonian world-view. It implies anyone who defends Iraq cannot be civilised. Bush went on to defend Iraqi links to al-Qaeda, which the public widely believed.¹⁴⁹

Bush dismissed the separation between what has been termed the war on terror and Iraq, arguing that the two are linked, “Saddam Hussein is harboring terrorists and the instruments of terror, the instruments of mass death and destruction. And he cannot be trusted. The risk is simply too great”.¹⁵⁰ This allowed Bush to tell his audience, “Iraq could decide on any given day to provide a biological or chemical weapon to a terrorist group or individual terrorists”.¹⁵¹ The US bishops¹⁵² and the Holy See, were in a difficult position as their *milieu* goals were unable to counter such narrow possession goals. They supported measures against terrorism but could not speak on specific policies.¹⁵³ Unable to openly oppose Bush’s actions the bishops, like the Holy See, were deeply circumscribed in how far their support, and hostility, could extend.

Indeed, Allen in this context noted, “key officials in the Bush administration were initially taken off guard by the depth of Vatican opposition to the war”.¹⁵⁴ Such views fundamentally misread US-Holy See relations. It appears to assume the Holy See is “just another state” able to ally with other states, rather than a theologically and politically constrained, neutral religious actor. Furthermore, it presumes Holy See values overlay perfectly with the United States.

Perhaps the most famous example is from Condoleezza Rice, saying she was unable to understand Holy See opposition, “I don’t see how it could be immoral to prevent the deaths of tens of thousands, maybe hundreds of thousands, maybe millions of people by acting against a brutal regime”.¹⁵⁵ Using soft power to integrate the domestic and international elements, domestic explanations shape the stances of US allies. For example, UK support can be attributed to executive dominance, cultural similarities and the electoral system. US soft power

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Scott L. Althaus and Devon M. Largio, ‘When Osama Became Saddam: Origins and Consequences of the Change in America’s Public Enemy #1’, *PS: Political Science & Politics* 37, no. 4 (October 2004): 795–799.

¹⁵⁰ Bush, ‘Address to the Nation on Iraq From Cincinnati, Ohio’.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, ‘Statement on Iraq’, United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, <http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/human-life-and-dignity/global-issues/middle-east/iraq/statement-on-iraq-2002-11-13.cfm>.

¹⁵³ McAndrews, *What They Wished For*, 348.

¹⁵⁴ Allen, *All the Pope’s Men*, 314.

¹⁵⁵ Associated Press, ‘Pope Calls for “complete Commitments” from Iraq to Disarm’, *USA Today*, 14 February 2003, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2003-02-14-pope-iraq_x.htm.

and the 11th September attacks played a role in attracting the UK to US foreign policy decisions. US soft power allowed the UK to gain concessions. Prime Minister Tony Blair urged President Bush to use the UN in August 2002.¹⁵⁶ The Iraq Inquiry, chaired by Sir John Chilcot GCB, examined the UK role in the war.¹⁵⁷ Chilcot argued war was decided before other options were fully explored.¹⁵⁸ In a July 2002 letter to President Bush, Blair said that he would support Bush unconditionally.¹⁵⁹ Given this “blank cheque”, it would be unwise to assume Blair’s pressure was a decisive factor in seeking a UN resolution. The UK’s importance did not extend to securing a second resolution as US possession goals took priority over attracting UK support particularly given Blair’s letter. Bush refused to ask for another resolution despite Blair “desperately needed a second resolution”.¹⁶⁰ No “concessions” were granted to the Holy See suggesting the weakness of its *milieu* goals. So, if the United States had a less entrenched position on the war, soft power may have attracted the US to the Holy See’s position. Unlike countries opposing the war, the UK saw unrest and street protests.¹⁶¹ Chan and Safran argue “politicians’ sensitivity to popular anti-war sentiments is mediated by their country’s electoral system”.¹⁶² The first-past-the-post electoral system weakened the Liberal Democrats, who opposed the war, and strengthened the Conservative Party, who agreed with Blair.¹⁶³ Those who opposed the war did not see their identity represented within the British government’s support for the war. Concurrently, cultural similarities between the United States and UK strengthened the community feeling between both. Schuster and Maier suggest the UK and France were exceptions to the correlation between the ideology of the governing party and the country’s position on the war. Some scholars have noted the role played by Tony Blair in the UK decision.¹⁶⁴ Personal factors overlook UK-US cultural similarities, with the UK being closest to the US in levels of individualism and belief in military force’s efficacy.¹⁶⁵

¹⁵⁶ Ritchie and Rogers, *The Political Road to War with Iraq*, 94, 167.

¹⁵⁷ ‘Iraq Inquiry - The Report’, <http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/the-report/>.

¹⁵⁸ Luke Harding, ‘Tony Blair Unrepentant as Chilcot Gives Crushing Iraq War Verdict’, *The Guardian*, 6 July 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/jul/06/chilcot-report-crushing-verdict-tony-blair-iraq-war>.

¹⁵⁹ Robert Booth, ‘“With You, Whatever”: Tony Blair’s Letters to George W Bush’, *The Guardian*, 6 July 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/jul/06/with-you-whatever-tony-blair-letters-george-w-bush-chilcot>.

¹⁶⁰ Ritchie and Rogers, *The Political Road to War with Iraq*, 111–12.

¹⁶¹ Schuster and Maier, ‘The Rift’.

¹⁶² Chan and Safran, ‘Public Opinion as a Constraint against War’.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁴ Stephen Benedict Dyson, ‘Personality and Foreign Policy: Tony Blair’s Iraq Decisions’, *Foreign Policy Analysis* 2, no. 3 (1 July 2006): 289–306.

¹⁶⁵ Pew Research Center, ‘The American-Western European Values Gap’, Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project, 17 November 2011, <http://www.pewglobal.org/2011/11/17/the-american-western-european-values-gap/>.

This section has examined how the US saw Iraq. It has taken a historical approach and argued that successive administrations challenged Iraqi behaviour. It rejected oil as a reason for the war and stressed the perceived threat Iraq posed. Holy See and US goals were contrasted with the lack of knowledge of how the Holy See operates illustrated by Condoleezza Rice's quote. Finally, the UK role was seen as central in supporting the Bush administration's possession goals.

US Actions: Addressing the Iraqi Threat

On 17 March 2003 in a televised address, Bush said that "the United Nations Security Council has not lived up to its responsibility, so we will rise to ours".¹⁶⁶ This statement encapsulates the administration's prioritising possession goals. At the same time it sought to paint US actions at least partly, as *milieu* goals. Bush's statement chose hard power and refusal to be bound by institutions and states that sought to constrain it. Hard power and choice of possession goals will underline US power over both Iraq and the Holy See. Initial attempts at containing Iraq through "smart sanctions" will be explored. Ultimately the Bush administration rejected these as insufficient at addressing the perceived threat. Efforts by secretary of State Colin Powell and Tony Blair for greater UN involvement will be examined. How the Holy See's focus on *milieu* goals relates to possession goals will be analysed and it will be contended that it failed to answer questions of heightened threat perception. These elements lessened the attractiveness of the Holy See's stance. Iraq's readmission of weapons inspectors led to their January 2003 interim report which found missile warheads suitable for chemical weapons. Bush's binary warning that only full compliance would avert war became important. The Holy See could not counter this binary outlook that was rooted in US culture. French, German and Russian *milieu* goals for a second resolution will be seen as weak in contrast to US possession goals. Lastly, Michael Novak's visit to Rome will be discussed and maintained that he ultimately failed to convince the Holy See of the war's justness.

Military planning for the war began in November 2001. US military officials expressed concern about Iraq using chemical or biological weapons. By December 2001 approval for a gradual troop increase was granted.¹⁶⁷ The final war plan was presented in August 2002 with more aggressive no fly zone missions part of the build-up.¹⁶⁸ Powell hoped smart sanctions

¹⁶⁶ George W. Bush, 'Address to the Nation on Iraq', American Presidency Project, 17 March 2003, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=63713>.

¹⁶⁷ Ritchie and Rogers, *The Political Road to War with Iraq*, 91.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid, 91–92.

would be targeted at the regime. These efforts received Russian support, though Russian officials questioned the need for other measures.¹⁶⁹ By January 2003 Bush disregarded smart sanctions, viewing them as part of the failed containment strategy.¹⁷⁰ The post-11 September security environment helps understand how the administration saw sanctions as unable to meet the threat. A 2002 USCCB statement on Iraq supported smart sanctions, advocating sanctions “which do not threaten the lives of innocent Iraqi civilians”.¹⁷¹ The pope and bishops appeared to oppose sanctions due to the consequences on Iraqis.¹⁷² The lack of a definitive statement on smart sanctions could have been viewed as a missed opportunity for maximising soft power and encouraging *milieu* goals, but was balanced against fear of seeming partisan. This reduced the Church, and Holy See’s, ability to unite on an issue where they agreed. Bush’s view of sanctions’ failure echoed his concentration on possession goals, his binary mentality and desire for greater security.

Bush’s 2002 UN speech made clear, war would only occur if Saddam Hussein did not comply. The speech had a specific framing with the UN seeking to shape US possession goals. Bush prioritised these as he “and his senior foreign policy advisers agreed on a strategy that would not allow the UN to delay or dictate the terms of war”.¹⁷³ Throughout the crisis the administration’s speed did little to alter the Holy See’s otherwise slow response. This reflected the competing ideas of the UN behind both the Holy See and the United States. These differences could not be bridged with Holy See soft power therefore negligible.

Vice President Dick Cheney in an August 2002 speech, asserted definite links between Iraqi WMD programmes and their willingness to use them.¹⁷⁴ Holy See *milieu* goals did not address the perceived altered security environment. The Holy See and Bush administration disagreed on the threat and its resolution. Disagreements on this basic level made Holy See soft power, and its *milieu* goals to solve the crisis, irrelevant.

United States consideration for a UN role, could be seen as a substantial Holy See victory. Obviously, it was not the only actor calling for this, so it was short lived and nebulous. The passage of Resolution 1441 warned of “serious consequences” if Iraq did not comply with its obligations.¹⁷⁵ The importance of possession goals and the threat in the administration’s

¹⁶⁹ Ibid, 92.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid, 92–93.

¹⁷¹ United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, ‘Statement on Iraq’.

¹⁷² ‘Pope’s Prayer for Iraq’, BBC, 19 March 2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/682407.stm.

¹⁷³ Ritchie and Rogers, *The Political Road to War with Iraq*, 94.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid, 95.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid, 99.

mind rose from possible to probable with all nuance and doubt being erased.¹⁷⁶ On the other hand, the Holy See and bishops are unable to advocate for any decision except one maintaining the *status quo* through *milieu* goals.

Given the importance of their possession goals, US administration officials warned that containment and deterrence were no longer viable options. It was convinced links “existed between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaida, and that it was inevitable that Iraq would eventually supply WMD to al-Qaida to be used against the United States”.¹⁷⁷

Inspectors were readmitted in November 2002 with an interim report issued in January 2003. It argued that no weapons were found, but “warheads designed for chemical weapons” were found but not declared. This played into the administration’s worst fears as the Iraqi regime had given false accounts before. Thus, it may have assisted the administration and its allies in their conviction of the importance of possession goals. Weapons inspectors reported in March 2003 that co-operation had resumed but some issues were still outstanding.¹⁷⁸ Obviously, if Iraqi compliance had been total, the administration would have also found it harder to persuade allies that war was necessary. By November 2002 mobilisation orders were issued and by February, 200,000 troops were in the region. Bush saw his role as enforcing unheeded UN resolutions (*milieu* goals) and resolving what he saw as a dangerous threat.¹⁷⁹ Iraq then submitted a 12,000 page declaration which convinced neither President Bush nor Hans Blix. Bush had previously stated that anything less than full compliance would not be accepted. Failing this, it would be seen as an act of aggression.¹⁸⁰ These binary terms meant war was all but inevitable. The Holy See was irrelevant as it could not, and would not, counter this deeply embedded mindset with its *milieu* goals, so its opposition focused on its possession goals.

France, Germany and Russia called for a second UN resolution. These nations’ failure to restrain the US at carrying out its interests should be unsurprising. Their calls for a second resolution indicated a desire to constrain the United States, which may have only made France, Germany and Russia more aware of the strength of US will to implement its possession goals. Bush saw Resolution 1441 as a sufficient basis, claiming threats to US security, did not need “permission” to be addressed.¹⁸¹ Exceptionalist ideas are highlighted here, such attitudes

¹⁷⁶ Ibid, 101.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., 99.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid, 109.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid, 110.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid, 111.

¹⁸¹ Ibid, 112.

illustrate the US belief that it could not be constrained by others. Chapter VI will analyse how the Bush administration's reading of exceptionalism underlined the right of the United States to act how it saw fit. Holy See hostility to the war, manifested in its *milieu* goal narratives of international law and human security were insufficiently attractive to overcome security desires weakening its soft power.

To inform the Holy See of its position, in February 2003, the US embassy brought Michael Novak to Rome. Powers argues that the move aimed “to counter the Vatican's outspoken moral opposition to the war”.¹⁸² Novak's presentation stressed the civil authority's right to define the common good. The differences in position between the two actors were too great to be bridged as their definitions of community were too distinct. The United States saw the UN as important, but Iraq's threat was seen as too great to rely on it. While the Holy See saw the UN as the only forum for deciding on war's legality. Both sides were as entrenched as the other, making a confrontation inevitable. Novak argued that the war was under the traditional self-defence rubric by merging the 11 September attacks and the threat thought to be have been posed by Iraq.¹⁸³ Naturally the Holy See saw these as distinct. It is noteworthy that no similar event took place before the 1991 Iraq War with a friendly US scholar challenging the Holy See's view in Rome.

The failure of smart sanctions has been discussed as a way to avert war. It was argued that the Holy See's focus on *milieu* goals were unable to address the increased threat level felt by the Bush administration. Consequently this reduced its soft power. The readmission of weapons inspectors was assessed but Bush's binary worldview meant their findings fuelled his fears. French, German and Russian attempts at a second resolution were examined along with Michael Novak's visit to Rome to argue for the war's just nature but this did not convince the Holy See of the war's justness.

¹⁸² Gerard F. Powers, 'The U. S. Bishops and War since the Peace Pastoral', *U.S. Catholic Historian* 27, no. 2 (2009): 73–96.

¹⁸³ Allen, *All the Pope's Men*, 340.

Conclusion

This chapter, echoing Chapter III, has laid out the positions and actions of the Holy See and United States concerning the 2003 Iraq War. It has argued their stances were too distinct for the Holy See to successfully attract the United States to its position and implement its *milieu* goals. The Holy See opposed the war because it lacked a UN mandate and did not meet its just war criteria. Despite this public stance, it has been argued that it would have still opposed the war, even if it had received UN Security Council support. This reflects the Holy See's *milieu* goals in seeking to shape the environment in which the Bush administration operated, but reduced its soft power. However, its efforts to halt the war strengthened its possession goals aimed at distinguishing Christians in the "West" and those residing in the Middle East. Additionally, Holy See's complicated "actorness", led it to prioritise neutrality. In turn this hindered its ability to lobby more forcefully against the war. When choosing between maximising its soft power and bolstering its neutrality, it consistently chose its neutrality. Holy See diplomacy was consistently slow in reacting to events. Terms like "global stability" were questioned which seemed constructed to allow the Holy See to oppose the war, regardless of events. While this protected Holy See neutrality, it did little to increase its soft power but allowed it to both remain neutral and oppose the war with the aim of advancing its possession goals.

After the 11 September attacks the United States believed the security environment changed, making containment unacceptable. Consequently, it favoured pursuit of its possession goals above all else. These priorities clashed with the Holy See's *milieu* goals, making the United States less receptive to its anti-war position and making Holy See soft power irrelevant. Moreover, the chapter emphasised Holy See irrelevance as a religious actor engaged with a traditional security issue. The UK, French, German and Russian stances have also been examined. War was more likely due to the UK's unconditional support for the United States, while the French, German and Russian positions were insufficiently strong to halt the conflict despite being closer to the Holy See's *milieu* goals.

Chapter VI

“I don’t see how it could be immoral”: Why the Holy See was unsuccessful

This chapter, mirroring the structure of Chapter IV, argues the Holy See had insufficient soft power to pursue its *milieu* goals for domestic and systemic reasons. Domestically, US political culture, notably Jacksonianism and exceptionalism; intra-Church divisions, between the bishops, laity and media; institutional factors, such as presidential power and weak Congress; specific events, namely the 2002 sex abuse crisis and polling data favouring the war, all weakened Holy See soft power.

Systemic factors form the second half of the argument. Holy See legal status made little difference in attracting the United States. Yet, it will be argued that it assisted in the Holy See’s possession goals of protecting Christians in the Middle East almost because it was not successful in utilising its soft power. At the same time, it will be contended that, this lack of soft power highlighted that it was a voice in the “wilderness”. In turn this stressed its differences with the United States and assisting its possession goals. Holy See neutrality hindered its lobbying capability with the United States. Holy See foreign policy principles, despite their flexibility, weakened its soft power to halt the war. For the US, community was not directly connected to the UN. Its possession, and even *milieu*, goals took precedence over Holy See *milieu* goals and could be facilitated by war. As will be illustrated, the Holy See placed the UN at the core of the community. This helped bolster those who supported its neutrality and its wider *milieu* goals. The Holy See criticised decisions taken by others while minimising the perceived threat faced by the United States. This would lend doubt to its commitment to maximise its soft power and instead focus more attention on its possession goals. Accordingly, its (presumed) status as a moral actor could be questioned especially in light of its opposition to the 1991 war.

In essence, soft power was too weak to overcome US hard power. The theory chapter highlighted the links between soft power and *milieu* and possession goals. Theory development occurs as the weakness of *milieu* goals over possession goals is seen. It will be highlighted that both actors had possession and *milieu* goals. Therefore, the boundary between these is less

clearly delineated between traditional and non-traditional actors than would otherwise be imagined. The title quote comes from then-secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and is representative of the divide between the two actors over the war.

Domestic factors that weakened Holy See soft power

Mirroring Chapter IV, this section will contend domestic factors reduced the Holy See's attractiveness. How US political culture, Jacksonianism and exceptionalism, undermined Holy See soft power will be examined. Crucial to understanding the Holy See's lack of soft power is Catholicism's divided nature between the bishops, laity and media. Given the centrality of divisions and unity to this thesis these will be explored and highlighted. Political institutions, namely presidential strength and Congressional divisions and weakness, made war more likely. It will be maintained that the sex abuse crisis damaged the Church's credibility. Lastly, polling, which consistently supported the war, will be scrutinised in relation to Holy See soft power. It will be argued the Holy See could not overcome public support for war. Consequently, the Holy See was unable to attract enough Catholics to its opposition to the war. Together all of these domestic factors reduced the Holy See's attractive ability.

US Political Culture

Jacksonianism: Power, US View of Order and the (National) Community

Bush's approach to Iraq was rooted in the Jacksonian tradition. Jacksonianism's differences with the Holy See contributed to weakening Holy See soft power. Essentially, Jacksonianism's links to Reformed theology, with its negative conception of human nature, buttressed a binary worldview that made the Holy See's *milieu* goals less attractive.

This section will be broken into five parts: a brief introduction to Jacksonianism, Jacksonianism's belief in total war, its rejection of international organisations, how a narrow definition of community and a binary outlook contributed to war and finally how this relates to the Holy See before a short conclusion. An example of this binary outlook will be Bush's rhetoric focused on evil.¹ This mentality overpowered the Holy See's language. Holy See weakness can be explained against the deeper cultural resonances in Bush's rhetoric.

The Jacksonian tradition is dissimilar to Wilsonian idealism, Jeffersonian patience and Hamiltonian advocacy of trade.² Viewing Iraq as a threat, the Jacksonian typology is the most appropriate. Yet, Bush's administration was not solely Jacksonian. In his UN General Assembly address on 12 September 2002, he advocated a Wilsonian vision of *milieu* goals, where the United States joined with "the world to supply aid where it reaches people and lifts up lives".³ Other Wilsonian elements are his HIV prevention work in Africa.⁴ However, in the context of threats, liberalism can breed a "dark side in which any challenge can be seen as a threat to liberty itself".⁵ Bush's vision of community entailed US leadership, with or without the UN. His understanding of community was it working with, and under, the United States in achieving its possession goals. Ultimately this was rooted in US military power. Differences between the Holy See and the United States are thus evident.

Total war is fundamental to Jacksonianism. In the context of the 1991 Iraq War, Mead writes, George H. W. Bush's worst decision from a Jacksonian view "was not to send ground forces into Iraq, but to stop short of the occupation of Baghdad and the capture and trail of

¹ George McKenna, *The Puritan Origins of American Patriotism*, First edition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 364.

² Mead, *Special Providence*, 225.

³ George W. Bush, 'Address to the United Nations General Assembly in New York City', American Presidency Project, 12 September 2002, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=64069>.

⁴ Christian Caryl, 'What George W. Bush Did Right', *Foreign Policy*, 14 February 2013, www.foreignpolicy.com/2013/02/14/what-george-w-bush-did-right.

⁵ Lane Crothers, 'The cultural roots of isolationism and internationalism in American foreign policy', *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 9, no. 1 (2011): 21-34.

Saddam Hussein”.⁶ Thus, it can be argued that the 2003 war was Jacksonian *par excellence*. Links between realism, or what Mead calls *realpolitik*, and Jacksonianism were noted in Part Two. Thus, Holy See soft power and promotion of its *milieu* goals to resolve the Iraq crisis was limited due to Jacksonianism’s sway in shaping Catholics and framing how US foreign policy possession goals were to be achieved. Even though the Holy See had concerns about Iraq’s behaviour, they disagreed on how it could be resolved. Krauthammer portended the dangers of WMD armed states, terming the post-Cold War era, the “era of weapons of mass destruction”.⁷ After the 11th September attacks the threat shifted. War in the Jacksonian school is “a switch that is either ‘on’ or off.’ They do not like the idea of violence on a dimmer switch”.⁸ Accordingly, not only did traditional state against state warfare “return” but Jacksonianism provided a cultural framework within which the war would be implemented on a substantial scale with Iraq. Heightened threat perception, unipolarity and the sway of Jacksonian thought all made war more likely. At the same time the Holy See’s *milieu* goals could not overcome US threat perception. Equally, Holy See advocacy for sanctions and containment could not offer a credible alternative to the United States, reducing its soft power.

Jacksonians either reject, or are suspicious of, international institutions. Referring to the 1991 war, Mead outlines that, “had there been no UN Charter and had Kuwait been even more corrupt and repressive than it was, Jacksonian opinion would still have supported the Gulf War”.⁹ The Jacksonianism-UN relationship illustrates the US understanding of community where the US possession goals national community took priority. For the 2003 war, the administration’s refusal not to be bound by a second resolution’s failure fit into a Jacksonian cultural framework. Its links to realism, and possession goals is stressed, as “Jacksonians have the least regard for international law and international institutions”.¹⁰ Stark contrasts between this and the Holy See are clear.¹¹ International law could not be enforced against the United States, it was powerless to halt US pursuit of its possession goals.

Jacksonianism’s idea of community and its binary outlook are particularly important for framing US possession goals. Both of these limited Holy See soft power in its desire to advance its *milieu* goals. Jacksonian conceptions of community are “based on the very sharp

⁶ Walter Russell Mead, ‘The Jacksonian Tradition’.

⁷ Charles Krauthammer, ‘The Unipolar Moment’, *Foreign Affairs* 70, no. 1 (1990/1991 1991): 23–33.

⁸ Mead, ‘The Jacksonian Tradition’.

⁹ Mead, *Special Providence*, 246.

¹⁰ Mead, ‘The Jacksonian Tradition’.

¹¹ Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, *Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church*, 434, Vatican, [http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/justpeace/documents/rc_pc_justpeace_doc_20060526_compendio-dott-soc_en.html#CHAPTER NINE](http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/justpeace/documents/rc_pc_justpeace_doc_20060526_compendio-dott-soc_en.html#CHAPTER_NINE).

distinction in popular feeling between the inside of the folk community and the dark world without".¹² For the war, the distinction was especially stark. Three examples are particularly illustrative. Bush's address to Congress where, he clearly divided the world, "Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists".¹³ Drawing this distinction serves a political purpose. This reinforces evidence for the cultural legacy of Reformed, or Calvinist, predestination theology. Another example was the 2002 State of the Union speech where Bush defined the axis of evil.¹⁴ He warned of dangers to the United States and its allies, as part of the wider "folk community". A binary distinction is made between opposition to the United States, and by implication, its supporters. Finally, these Jacksonian views were not confined to President Bush. The secretary for Defence, Donald Rumsfeld appeared to divide Europe between "old" and "new".¹⁵

Allen summarises the Holy See's position, "Calvinist concepts of the total depravity of the damned, the unconditional election of God's favored.....all seem to play a powerful role in shaping American cultural psychology. The Iraq episode confirmed Vatican officials in these convictions".¹⁶ Jacksonian tendencies meant Holy See soft power was insufficiently attractive to alter administration policy.

This section has argued Jacksonianism was significant in framing the response of the 2003 war. In particular the Jacksonian themes of total war, a rejection of international organisations and a narrow definition of community and binary worldview can all be found in Bush administration rhetoric. Its actions in pursuit of its possession goals followed this pattern. Accordingly, Holy See soft power in achieving its *milieu* goals was greatly diminished.

¹² Mead, 'The Jacksonian Tradition'.

¹³ George W. Bush, 'Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11', American Presidency Project, 20 September 2001, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=64731>.

¹⁴ George W. Bush, 'Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union', American Presidency Project, 29 January 2002, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29644>.

¹⁵ 'Outrage at "old Europe" Remarks', *BBC*, 23 January 2003, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2687403.stm>.

¹⁶ Allen, *All the Pope's Men*, 315–16.

Exceptionalism: Stronger community

Exceptionalism made Holy See *milieu* goals to resolve the crisis less attractive to both the US government and Catholics. By 2003, public awareness of exceptionalism had risen significantly.¹⁷ Some claim that Bush administration rhetoric was “bulging with references to the principles of exceptionalism”.¹⁸ Five points will be made, how exceptionalism’s interpretation has changed, its idea of mission, the relationship between exceptionalism and Europe, how exceptionalism can heighten patriotism and the Holy See’s weakness in light of this will each be taken in turn. Nonetheless exceptionalism had a strong sense of community, centred on the United States but this allowed the Bush administration to portray its possession goals, at least partly, as *milieu* goals. This blurred the lines between these goals for the United States. Combined this attempt to merge *milieu* and possession goals weakened Holy See soft power on attracting Catholics in the United States to its own *milieu* goals.

Tomes maintains the meaning of exceptionalism has adapted over time. After 1945, security became more prominent, as Americans “supported efforts to neutralise potential threats at their source”.¹⁹ Security concerns merged with the lessons of Pearl Harbour and “appeasement”.²⁰ He postulates Bush broke from liberal internationalism.²¹ Closer analysis disputes this, as co-operation with the UK, Spain and Poland fits this definition. His criticism of a dearth of co-operation with “international regimes” is vague. Resolution 1441 was passed in November 2002 by the Security Council which was an example of *milieu* goals being driven by possession goals. This was more than in 1999 when the United States, under NATO auspices, bombed Serbia. Exceptionalism was flexible enough coupled with the need for security pushed the United States to form different alliances.

Ceaser stressed the idea of mission, “in fulfilling a larger purpose” for US foreign policy.²² Bush could use this idea to portray the United States as implementing *milieu* goals for the benefit of the wider world as he argued in his Ohio speech. In this he stressed how possession goals can serve *milieu* goals, warning the danger Iraq posed not just to the US but

¹⁷ Philip S. Gorski and William McMillan, ‘Barack Obama and American Exceptionalisms’, *The Review of Faith & International Affairs* 10, no. 2 (1 June 2012): 41–50.

¹⁸ John McCormick, ‘American Exceptionalism: The Implications for Europe’, *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 3, no. 2 (1 April 2005): 199–215.

¹⁹ Robert R. Tomes, ‘American Exceptionalism in the Twenty-First Century’, *Survival* 56, no. 1 (2 January 2014): 27–50.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

²² James W. Ceaser, ‘The Origins and Character of American Exceptionalism’, *American Political Thought* 1, no. 1 (2012): 3–28.

the world.²³ Such ideas would merge with martial Jacksonian ideas and their focus on possession goals giving the United States both in its case for war. The conflict could be seen as exceptionalism writ large, as adherents “bristle at the notion of America being governed by diktats of the international community”.²⁴ Historical precedents exist as early Revolutionaries tied freedom in international affairs to domestic freedom.²⁵ Unipolarity’s enabled the US to act unencumbered. Given exceptionalism’s prevalence, fused with hard power, it was inclined to pursue its possession goals.

When exceptionalist ideas interact with Europe, some nations, especially the UK, find commonalities with the United States though exceptionalism also creates divisions. This makes it easier for them to challenge the US. Consequently, it is more difficult for the Holy See to attract the United States when other nations join the US alliance. McCormick claims that exceptionalism makes the United States more unilateralist while the “EU is more multilateralist.....has nonetheless pursued less controversial foreign policies”.²⁶ This overlooks the different roles of both. The EU is not currently a state. Despite a foreign minister, the member states have ultimate control over their foreign policy. Needless to say, the United States is not in this position. Furthermore, the EU is able to pursue a “less controversial” foreign policy because it is not the world’s only superpower. Consequently, US readings of exceptionalism bolstered its possession goals but distanced it from some continental European states.

Exceptionalism’s use in presidential rhetoric heightens patriotism and claims exemptions because of its exceptional status.²⁷ An example is US-UN relations before the conflict’s outbreak. Gilmore states the most important discourse themes, cast the “United States as being a single exception to the international community”.²⁸ Bush’s invocations were in this mould and allowed him to press US possession goals as *milieu* goals. Two effects are important, for group dynamics, with exceptionalism representative of “perhaps the ultimate form of in-group or ethnocentric bias”.²⁹ Secondly, Gilmore argues exceptionalism impacted “attitudes about whether the country should be exempt from the same rules”.³⁰ This merges with ideas of

²³ Bush, ‘Address to the Nation on Iraq From Cincinnati, Ohio’.

²⁴ Ceaser.

²⁵ Kane, *Theoretical Roots of US Foreign Policy*, 33.

²⁶ McCormick, ‘American Exceptionalism’.

²⁷ Jason Gilmore, ‘American Exceptionalism in the American Mind: Presidential Discourse, National Identity, and U.S. Public Opinion’, *Communication Studies* 66, no. 3 (27 May 2015): 301–20.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

the US community, but reinforces exceptionalist ideas. It demonstrates the Catholic community's weakness and Holy See *milieu* goal desires, partially deriving from its "actorness", for the UN's role. Naturally, it also illustrates in addition to the strength of the idea of the (nation-)state. Powerful in-group feelings bolstered Bush administration support. Echoes of the Jacksonian "folk community" can be seen. Subsequently, it may have weakened sympathy for Iraq and made war both more possible and more likely. Holy See seeing humanity as one, hindered its message and attractiveness. Critically, its sense of community was too nebulous against US possession goals. Links between exceptionalism and United States interaction with international rules is clarified with heightened exceptionalist impulses. Bush's rhetoric lent credence to this.

Holy See inability to counter Bush's exceptionalist narrative strengthened his approach to the Iraq crisis. Evidence suggests that many "cities" hoped to be placed "on a hill" rather than just the United States.³¹ However, the Holy See was unable to challenge exceptionalism in this way. Moreover, many of the Catholic bishops who opposed the war were unable to overturn, or even nuance, the dominant exceptionalist narrative, as other denominations attempted.³² Exceptionalism's strength against soft power was seen in Chapter IV, where the administration undercut Holy See soft power. Furthermore, an idea of the community linked to the nation rather than the Catholic community reduced any Holy See soft power.

³¹ Gamble, *In Search of the City on a Hill*, 77-81.

³² Frank Griswold, "'A Super Power...Must Exercise the Role of Super Servant': The Presiding Bishop's Statement on Military Action against Iraq", The Episcopal Church, 6 September 2002, <http://www.episcopalchurch.org/library/article/super-powermust-exercise-role-super-servant-presiding-bishops-statement-military-action>.

Catholic Divisions and American Society

Episcopal Divisions: More United but Still Ineffective

Divisions are a key element in explaining the lack of Holy See soft power and the weakness of Holy See *milieu* goals. Fewer divisions seemed to exist between the US bishops and the Holy See in 2003 than in 1991. This increased unity did not yield sufficiently increased soft power to negate the divisions within the laity or Catholic media who favoured war. Constraints on the bishops who opposed, and supported, the war will be examined in turn. These consist of not being overly partisan and not treating the war as a doctrinal matter as Catholics can legitimately disagree on these. One exception to this will be scrutinised, Bishop John Botean's comments against the war, and its significance explored. Even those bishops who took a position on the war did not have the same certainty as Botean. Apart from this exception, the bishops were less able to voice a clear anti-war opposition.

In September 2002, the USCCB president presented a letter³³ to National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice. It argued for clear evidence for the war and the importance of just war principles.³⁴ The bishops met collectively in 2002, issuing a statement³⁵ which "stopped short of an absolutist pronouncement".³⁶ The bishops were following the Church's *Magisterium* (teaching authority). Similar to the Holy See being constrained by its "actorness", the bishops were hindered from condemning *or* accepting the war, as war is not a doctrinal issue.³⁷ Though the USCCB took a broadly anti-war position and supported the Holy See's *milieu* goals. Explicit condemnation would lead to charges of partisanship but also imply that the war was more important for Church teaching than other political issues such as economic inequality.

Crucially, their collective 2002 statement cast doubt on the war's justness but clearly stated, "We offer not definitive conclusions, but rather our serious concerns and questions in the hope of helping all of us to reach sound moral judgments. People of good will may differ on how to apply just war norms in particular cases".³⁸ The Church, due to the emergence of widespread and persistent child sexual abuse, had diminished credibility.³⁹ Bishops may have

³³ Wilton D. Gregory, 'Letter to President Bush on Iraq', United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, <http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/human-life-and-dignity/global-issues/middle-east/iraq/letter-to-president-bush-from-bishop-gregory-on-iraq-2002-09-13.cfm>.

³⁴ McAndrews, *What They Wished For*, 336.

³⁵ United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, 'Statement on Iraq'.

³⁶ McAndrews, *What They Wished For*, 337.

³⁷ Stummvoll, 'A Living Tradition', 41.

³⁸ United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, 'Statement on Iraq'.

³⁹ McAndrews, *What They Wished For*, 347.

been aware of this in formulating their response to the war. Nonetheless, their statement adhered to the Church's understanding of political issues.

Clear opposition to the war came from several prelates. Bishop Thomas Gumbleton at the 2002 meeting, suggested confronting the government.⁴⁰ Perhaps the most absolutist opposition came from Bishop John Botean.⁴¹ In a March 2003 letter he stated support for the war "is objectively grave evil, a matter of mortal sin. Beyond a reasonable doubt this war is morally incompatible with the Person and Way of Jesus Christ. With moral certainty I say to you it does not meet even the minimal standards of the Catholic just war theory".⁴² Such a clear condemnation of war is understandably rare. Botean made Church opposition to the war, if not Holy See *milieu* goals, part of Catholic teaching. Botean ignores alternative interpretations of the just war theory and merges a political issue with Church doctrine. At the same time it demonstrates the emotions and the war's polarising societal effect both generally and with the bishops in particular. Botean had little of his Latin Rite's⁴³ colleague's hesitancy. Equally, the Latin bishops may have felt less able to speak credibly on moral issues due to the sexual abuse crisis. This calculus might not have affected Eastern Catholics, like Botean, at this time which may have helped facilitate Botean's comments. Botean was isolated in his stance and few condemned the war in such sweeping terms. This stance was ironically the mirror image of the Bush administration's rhetoric.

Contrary to Botean, then-Archbishop Edwin O'Brien, serving as ordinary for the archdiocese for Military Services, said that the war was morally permissible.⁴⁴ Such a bishop, connected to the US military and arguably with greater credibility, could speak on the war's morality and disagree with the Holy See's *milieu* goals is significant. However, O'Brien did not use the same theological language as Botean. Thus, he implicitly left some doubt in his support of the war.

Moreover, Archbishop O'Brien, wrote to his priests stressing the decision makers integrity, "it is altogether appropriate for members of our armed forces to presume the integrity of our leadership and its judgements, and therefore to carry out their military duties in good

⁴⁰ Laurie Goodstein, 'Bishops Turn to Writing Antiwar Policy', *The New York Times*, 13 November 2002, <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/13/national/13BISH.html>.

⁴¹ Jerry Filteau, 'Bishop Says War Kills Religion, Freedom, Conscience', *National Catholic Reporter*, 18 June 2012, <https://www.ncronline.org/news/vatican/bishop-says-war-kills-religion-freedom-conscience>.

⁴² John Michael Botean, 'Romanian Catholic Diocese of Canton', *Center for Christian Non Violence*, 7 March 2003, http://www.centerforchristiannonviolence.org/data/Media/Pastoral_Letter_Iraq_War.pdf.

⁴³ See Chapter V, footnote 100

⁴⁴ Art Laffin, "Bishops called to speak out against Iraq war", *National Catholic Reporter* http://natcath.org/NCR_Online/archives2/2004d/122404/122404r.htm.

conscience”.⁴⁵ Archbishop O’Brien’s letter, came after the war had begun. His argument hinged on the relationship between informed conscience⁴⁶ and the rights of civil authorities to decide civil matters. Similarly, during a 2003 homily at West Point, he told soldiers that they were obliged, “in conscience to obey the orders of your commander-in-chief”.⁴⁷ O’Brien seemed to assume US possession goals, as defined by President Bush, were moral in virtue of his position. O’Brien appeared to stress the responsibilities of Catholics to their government. This differs to the pope’s and other bishops’ statements opposing the war. O’Brien’s view is profoundly different to Botean’s stance. Implicitly, O’Brien accepted the war’s justness. This may reflect how well Catholics, both bishops and laity, have absorbed the culture and become part of the folk community.

After the war had begun, in a late March 2003 interview, then-Cardinal McCarrick as archbishop of Washington, D.C., noted that bishops did not see the role of soldiers fighting in Iraq as immoral.⁴⁸ Again there appears to be an understanding that, as much will be done as possible to avoid war, but once war begins, as US citizens it would be unwise to condemn soldiers obeying orders. Thus, an apparent tension between being a Catholic bishop, and being a US citizen exists.

This section has argued the bishops were divided over to what extent the war met the just war criteria. The bishops admitted that they were unable to offer clear conclusions as to the war’s justness. This was contrasted by Bishop John Botean who clearly condemned the war as immoral and unjust. Even prelates who accepted the Bush administration’s arguments, like Archbishop O’Brien it could be argued, were more circumspect in his remarks. These divisions among the bishops did little to buttress Holy See soft power in pursuit of its *milieu* goals to resolve the crisis.

⁴⁵ ‘Military Archbishop Says Troops Can Carry out Duties in Good Conscience’, CathNews, 27 March 2003, <http://cathnews.acu.edu.au/303/150.php>.

⁴⁶ Catechism of the Catholic Church, The Formation of Conscience, No. 1783, http://www.vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/archive/catechism/p3s1c1a6.htm.

⁴⁷ ‘US Cardinal Says Forces in Middle East Are Intent on Eradicating Christians’, *Catholic Herald*, 19 November 2015, <http://www.catholicherald.co.uk/news/2015/11/19/us-cardinal-says-forces-in-middle-east-are-intent-on-eradicating-christians/>.

⁴⁸ Zenit Staff, ‘Cardinal McCarrick on the War in Iraq’, Zenit, 25 March 2003, <https://zenit.org/articles/cardinal-mccarrick-on-the-war-in-iraq/>.

Lay Divisions: Detached, (Dis-)obedient and Distrustful

How lay divisions weakened Holy See influence will be discussed. It will be maintained that Catholics were detached from the Church hierarchy, disobedient to the bishops (“obedient” to secular authorities) and distrustful of the Church. Combined, these factors cancelled Holy See soft power to attract Catholics to its *milieu* goals. These factors that will be analysed here comprise: civilian detachment from military operations, problems dissenting, no military draft, a binary world view and disagreement over threat perception between the laity and Holy See. Each of these weakened the unity of the laity and their ability to operate as a single bloc. Holy See *milieu* goals were unable to counter these problems and maximise its soft power while also attempting to “counter” US possession goals. However, while balancing its neutrality at the same time, the Holy See also desired to advance its possession goals, detaching “Western” Christians from those living in the Middle East, for fear of a backlash by being associated with those in the United States and elsewhere in Europe. To protect these Christians, it will be contented that the Holy See used its international status to vocally oppose the war.

McAdreus posits six reasons, three of which have relevance here, as to why the Church failed at halting war. No compulsory draft existed, thus a majority “said that the war had not affected them personally”.⁴⁹ As fewer were effected society was less involved. Accordingly, moral arguments from the bishops and Holy See were less effective. Integrating the domestic and international levels of analysis, the public’s interests were ultimately not “harmed” by the Bush’s interpretation of possession goals. Moreover, Holy See *milieu* goals were not relevant to many Catholics. Accordingly, this made it harder for the Holy See to be seen as the core opposition against an unjust war as was the case when religious groups opposed the war in Vietnam.⁵⁰

Ties between Jacksonianism and the Bush administration were strong. Societal pressures weakened those against the war. Separating soldiers from those sending them proved difficult.⁵¹ Catholics, looked to the administration to secure US possession goals, unlike how they viewed their bishops. Accordingly, the weakness of *milieu* goals against possession goals is highlighted. These societal pressures were compounded by the “rally around the flag” effect. There was enough Catholic “disobedience” to the Church’s interpretation, that they were almost by default, “obedient” to the administration’s arguments favouring US possession goals against Iraq.

⁴⁹ McAdreus, *What They Wished For*, 344.

⁵⁰ Preston, *Sword of the Spirit*.

⁵¹ McAdreus, *What They Wished For*, 345.

Other points made are not relevant here. McAndrews mentions Bush's decisiveness, noting "the president's obduracy seemed consistent with his dualistic worldview, a Calvinist conviction that alarmed many Catholics".⁵² The Manichean worldview reflects profound cultural differences between the two actors. Holy See officials desired a more nuanced, less binary, worldview.⁵³ Such a stance may have encouraged greater support for war.⁵⁴

McAndrews points to the sex abuse crisis and the corresponding collapse in credibility, "with almost daily accounts of abusive priests there [Boston] and elsewhere, shamed the bishops into silence".⁵⁵ Therefore, lay Catholics were profoundly distrustful of the Church's backing of *milieu* goals, moral authority and consequent soft power. He mentions the distinction drawn by the pope, "when not separating himself from Bush on Iraq.....Pope John Paul II was allying himself with Bush on terrorism".⁵⁶ A distinction should be made between Bush's actions and Holy See desires. Despite their differences both wished to restore order, albeit, through vastly different means. Though it could not sanction or "approve" war, as has been argued before, Holy See neutrality took precedence.⁵⁷

Lastly, after the 11 September attacks, the threat perception was raised. Bush explicitly linked this perception to his possession goals in Iraq. One poll reported "a double standard when it comes to the U.S. first-strike policy".⁵⁸ A majority said that the United States should not engage in a first strike in general. Conversely, when Iraq was specified 66% agreed.⁵⁹ Such findings suggest the blurred boundaries between *milieu* and possession goals. Numbers who approved of a first strike against Iraq aided the administration. Such high numbers may demonstrate the perceived threat posed by Iraq. Holy See *milieu* goals based arguments were inadequately persuasive at countering this.

This section has argued that lay Catholics were detached from the Church hierarchy's anti-war views because Catholics were largely insulated from war and rejected Holy See *milieu* goals to resolve issues with Iraq. Concomitantly, the links between the administration and Jacksonianism meant Catholics looked to the administration for security and could be called "obedient" to the administration's stance. Moreover, this was especially true when placed

⁵² McAndrews, *What They Wished For*, 346.

⁵³ Allen, *All the Pope's Men*, 316.

⁵⁴ Kagan, *Paradise and Power*, 106.

⁵⁵ McAndrews, *What They Wished For*, 347.

⁵⁶ Ibid, 348.

⁵⁷ Shelledy, 'Legions Not Always Visible on Parade', 163.

⁵⁸ Lydia Saad, 'Top Ten Findings About Public Opinion and Iraq', Gallup.com, 8 October 2002, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/6964/Top-Ten-Findings-About-Public-Opinion-Iraq.aspx>.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

against Bush's decisiveness against the bishop's nuanced arguments. Finally, the sex abuse crisis, which will be discussed more fully later, resulted in a collapse in the Church's moral credibility helping to attract Catholics to his possession goals against Iraq. Accordingly, Catholics could be said to be distrustful of the Church.

Media Divisions: A Question of Obedience

Similar to episcopal and lay divisions, divisions within the media weakened Catholics' unity. Broadly they repeated their readers' biases in either opposing or favouring the war and thus their preference for *milieu* and possession goals. These divisions may have been worsened by not challenging their readers' biases and have Holy See exercise of its soft power towards the United States more difficult. Consequently, debate was more restricted had they been better able to appreciate the other side's arguments.

Reflecting the divisions, conservative Catholics normally tout their papal obedience. While liberal Catholics are told to abide by the Church's teaching especially, on sexual morality. Subverting these categories, liberals were obedient to papal pronouncements against the war, while conservatives either downplayed or ignored the pope's statements. A clear, almost jarring, divide is evident when the two sides are compared. Liberal publications should oppose the war, while conservative publications are expected to support it. *America* and the *National Catholic Reporter* will be taken as liberal examples. *First Things* and the *National Catholic Register* are conservative publications. Both liberal publications noted a lack of obedience to the pope among the war's supporters.

America, clearly opposed the war. Broadly it favoured *milieu* goals of inspections and containment.⁶⁰ Supporters of the war were given space arguing for its justness with other supporters positing it was a government decision.⁶¹ One article defended the presumption against force, warning about collapsing defensive wars into wars of aggression, supposedly resulting in wars of "all against all".⁶² This view ignores that all states are not equal, "law" cannot overcome the international jungle. The UN's inability to sanction force, for moral ends,

⁶⁰ Maryann Cusimano Love, 'Real Prevention: Alternatives to Force', *America Magazine*, 20 January 2003, www.americamagazine.org/issue/419/article/real-prevention-alternatives-force.

⁶¹ George Weigel, 'The Just War Case for the War', *America Magazine*, 31 March 2003, <http://www.americamagazine.org/issue/428/article/just-war-case-war>; Henry J. Hyde, 'Catholics in Political Life', *America Magazine*, 17 February 2003, <http://www.americamagazine.org/issue/422/article/catholics-political-life>.

⁶² Drew Christiansen, 'Wither the Just War?', *America Magazine*, 24 March 2003, www.americamagazine.org/issue/427/article/wither-just-war.

in Serbia for example, is not addressed. One anonymous editorial argued for containment and disarmament of Iraq, stressing the likelihood of anti-Americanism.⁶³ The need for soft power is alluded to but how to maximise it, or its consequences on the Holy See are not developed. Ironically, this lack of soft power towards the United States meant the Holy See was better able to advance its possession goals through its opposition. Yet, the article did not address the post-11 September security environment. The editorials' view is similar to the Holy See's, and like it, has an emphasis on *milieu* goals. Such a view may reflect *America's* liberal bias and actually deepen Catholic divisions, reducing Holy See soft power. Another unnamed editorial criticises advocates for "Americans to oppose imperial politics".⁶⁴ The implication being that Iraq was for conquest, which may reflect the views of some of the magazine's readers. Given Catholic history and its themes loyalty and patriotism, one editorial notes religious bodies' opposition to war. It suggests opposing war means "choosing both God and country".⁶⁵ The editorial, like the Holy See, collapses community and justice into the UN in achieving *milieu* goals. Kavanaugh castigates those for not obeying the pope's stance.⁶⁶ Identity and obedience are used for Kavanaugh's ends in bolstering the pope's opposition to support his argument. As sexual morality is an absolute for the Church, elsewhere it accepts legitimate disagreements.⁶⁷ So, rather than accept alternative views, he seems to desire a Church united in an anti-war position. This may have entrenched liberal-conservative divisions and weakened the pope's soft power but strengthened a theme of the Holy See voicing its concerns in the "wilderness". Kavanaugh asks conservative commentator George Weigel, "under what authority is he writing his positions, which oppose our church leaders and teachers?"⁶⁸ He suggests fidelity is conditional. Those accused of disobedience use such a criticism in their defence. In doing so they overlook its complexities, reducing Holy See attractiveness and its ability to implement its *milieu* and possession goals. In general, *America* has a clear anti-war bias. This re-enforces the publication's liberal bias and opposition to the war.

The liberal *National Catholic Reporter*, covers the same themes in opposing the war. One article suggests the conflict is part of Bush's broader possession and *milieu* goals to remake

⁶³ 'War or Peace?', *America Magazine*, 24 February 2003, <http://www.americamagazine.org/issue/423/editorial/war-or-peace>.

⁶⁴ 'Xenophobia and the Warrior Ethos', *America Magazine*, 17 March 2003, <http://www.americamagazine.org/issue/426/editorial/xenophobia-and-warrior-ethos>.

⁶⁵ 'God or Country?', *America Magazine*, 31 March 2003, www.americamagazine.org/issue/428/editorial/god-or-country.

⁶⁶ John F. Kavanaugh, 'No to War', *America Magazine*, 17 February 2003, www.americamagazine.org/issue/422/ethics-notebook/no-war.

⁶⁷ Stummvoll, 'A Living Tradition', 41.

⁶⁸ Kavanaugh, 'No to War'.

the Middle East.⁶⁹ She posits the war is to control oil reserves by “dismantling” Saudi Arabia and frighten “Arab nations and the Palestinians into capitulating to U.S. and Israeli demands.”⁷⁰ No attempt at balance is made. Bush’s stated *milieu* and possession goals are not analysed, instead the “neocons” feature prominently. The unintended consequences of not going to war are ignored. All emphasis is placed on the United States. Former Congressman and Jesuit priest, Robert Drinan warns of a “new and indefensible unilateralism”.⁷¹ Yet, at the very least, historians have argued this not novel.⁷² Drinan’s analysis merges national foreign policy into *milieu* goals, centred on international institutions. Whatever international institutions claim is seen as inherently good, or better, than US policy. He seems to imply that all “48 Islamic nations” are against the war. His sweeping claims are not addressed in any detail.⁷³ Another article omits Hussein’s behaviour and relates the war to oil, consumerism and possession goals.⁷⁴ Allen, reports on the anti-war language used by senior Curial figures. Allen writes on those that criticised the Holy See for not mentioning the Iraqi gassing of the Kurds. He does not recommend one side over another.⁷⁵ Separately, the editorial line is consistently anti-war. One piece argues “world opinion” is against the war. It rejects arguments for the war due to US inconsistencies. It connects the American people’s desires with the world.⁷⁶ The piece does not address the consequences of not going to war, so no real choice exists. Neither is there any examination of how to maximise Holy See soft power in pursuit of its *milieu* goals of supporting the UN and halting war. These views may embed, or re-enforce, Catholic divisions, contributing to a diminished soft power. Instead of linking the domestic and international, the article connects the views of one nation to the rest of the world. Two editorials illustrate Catholicism’s divided nature. The first discusses the perceived hypocrisy of those supporting Church teaching, but also supporting the war. Weigel’s disagreement with the bishops is

⁶⁹ Margot Patterson, ‘Beyond Baghdad’, National Catholic Reporter, 13 December 2002, http://natcath.org/NCR_Online/archives/121302/121302a.htm.

⁷⁰ Patterson.

⁷¹ Robert F. Drinan, ‘Bush’s Unilateralism Aggravates World’s Problems’, National Catholic Reporter, 10 January 2003, natcath.org/NCR_Online/archives/011003/011003m.htm.

⁷² John Lewis Gaddis, *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience*, 1st Edition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004).

⁷³ Drinan, ‘Bush’s Unilateralism Aggravates World’s Problems’.

⁷⁴ Dave Robinson, ‘In Iraq to Witness against War’, National Catholic Reporter, 10 January 2003, http://natcath.org/NCR_Online/archives/011003/011003o.htm.

⁷⁵ John L. Allen, ‘Vatican Criticism of War Plans Chills Relations with U.S.’, National Catholic Reporter, 23 January 2003, http://natcath.org/NCR_Online/archives/012403/012403g.htm.

⁷⁶ ‘World Opinion Resists U.S. Rush to War’, National Catholic Reporter, 31 January 2003, http://natcath.org/NCR_Online/archives/013103/013103p.htm.

mentioned and contends “if Weigel should be picking on anyone, it’s the pope”.⁷⁷ Conservatives and Church teaching diverge on the environment.⁷⁸ The other editorial mentions how Holy See opposition has caused fraught relations with the Bush administration and Catholics “who would normally use their loyalty to the pope and magisterium as proof of their Catholic authenticity”.⁷⁹ Coverage in the *National Catholic Reporter* is hostile to the war but appears more strident. Several of the articles imply, or are explicit, in supporting a foreign policy driven by *milieu* goals. These articles leave little room for doubt. *America*, criticised conservative Catholics for supporting the war. The *National Catholic Reporter* tied these disagreements into broader trends within the Church. A clear anti-war bias is observable. There appears to be a greater sense of partisanship than *America*.

The conservative *National Catholic Register* generally supported on the war. One report notes the Holy See’s opposition to both wars, though argues that it is not pacifist.⁸⁰ Thavis does not elaborate when the Holy See accepts force or its anti-war inconsistencies. This article is one of the few conservative articles to defend the Holy See’s position. Though no mention is made of Holy See’s problems in utilising the soft power it has been attributed with against the war. Separately, another article illustrates, the (Iraqi) Chaldeans in the US who “hope Saddam Hussein is overthrown but fear an attack on their homeland will devastate its infrastructure and victimize civilians”.⁸¹ The problems of war are referenced but hopes for the regime’s downfall are more prominent. Subsequently, inter-Catholic divisions are stoked, the Church in the United States risks being partisan and the Holy See’s soft power reduced. An article on military chaplains suggests the soldiers need not worry about their souls.⁸² This implies soldiers are not wholly culpable for their actions. It may buttress the views of those already supporting the war, such as Archbishop O’Brien, who stressed loyalty to civilian authorities. As a result, divisions may increase and US Catholics are in danger of becoming

⁷⁷ ‘Conservatives Dissent, but with a Spin’, *National Catholic Reporter*, 31 January 2003, http://natcath.org/NCR_Online/archives/013103/013103q.htm.

⁷⁸ Timothy Cama, ‘Jeb Bush knocks pope’s climate change push’, *The Hill*, 17 June 2015, <http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/245302-jeb-bush-knocks-popes-climate-change-push>.

⁷⁹ ‘A Model for Catholic Debate’, *National Catholic Reporter*, 14 February 2003, natcath.org/NCR_Online/archives/021403/021403o.htm.

⁸⁰ John Thavis, ‘Vatican Turns Up Volume on Cautions as U.S. Counts Down to War’, *National Catholic Register*, 19 January 2003, http://www.ncregister.com/site/article/vatican_turns_up_volume_on_cautions_as_us_counts_down_to_war.

⁸¹ Joyce Carr, ‘U.S. Chaldean Catholics From Iraq Speak Out on War With Saddam’, *National Catholic Register*, 1 December 2002, www.ncregister.com/site/us_chaldean_catholics_from_iraq_speak_out_on_war_with_saddam.

⁸² Andrew Walther, ‘Soldiers Risk Lives, Not Souls, Thanks to Chaplains’, *National Catholic Register*, 9 March 2003, http://www.ncregister.com/site/article/soldiers_risk_lives_not_souls_thanks_to_chaplains.

less Catholic and more American. Conscience, or conscientious objection, was not mentioned. Though not representative, one letter to the editor calls for greater clarity before war. It is critical of the United States and argues that Iran gassed the Kurds, not Iraq. The author ends calling for more certainty.⁸³ An opinion from April 2003, minimises the problems of looting, and is celebratory at the success of US possession goals, “a tyrant has been ousted in Iraq, and the people danced in the streets”.⁸⁴ John Paul II’s anti-war stance is questioned “what now of his now-famous assertion that ‘no problem is solved by war’? Has he been proved wrong?”.⁸⁵ Yet this statement also implies that Holy See’s standard for a just war is impossibly high. Like some Bush administration rhetoric, no complex moral decision is evident with little doubt present. This article seems to strengthen the distinction between Catholics *in* the United States and *American* Catholics over issues of war and peace. Thus, divisions are heightened rather than making attempts to reduce them, damaging Holy See credibility and its soft power. Of particular relevance is the author’s desire to “show” that the pope had been proven wrong in his pursuit of *milieu* goals. The writer makes no mention of obedience to the pope on something apart from sexual morality. He implies fighting Iraq was comparable to fighting the Soviet Union or Nazi Germany. This highlights the binary mentality from Reformed theology and Jacksonianism, which made war more likely and reduced the Holy See cultural relevance and thus its capacity to attract Catholics to its *milieu* goals. Additional coverage asks if Holy See opposition was based on fear of Muslims. He stresses the importance of the Israeli-Palestinian issue arguing which “the Holy See devotes disproportionate attention to”.⁸⁶ Holy See fear of Muslims, he contends, results in a desire to shun anything like a Christian-Muslim war. This lends weight to claims that Holy See opposition was part of its possession goals for Christians in the region. Evidence for this has been repeated by journalists.⁸⁷ The author admits most Muslims “are not interested in persecuting Christians” though little differentiation between Muslims and terrorists occurs. The Holy See’s position, far from being naïve is intensely realist.⁸⁸ Such a stance buttresses evidence for Holy See protection of its possession goals through its hostility to the 1991 and 2003 wars. This was seen in 1991 when some of the Holy

⁸³ Glenn Wright Raymore, ‘Go Easy on Iraq’, National Catholic Register, 6 October 2002, http://www.ncregister.com/site/article/go_easy_on_iraq.

⁸⁴ Jim Cosgrove, ‘Liberation Day’, National Catholic Register, 20 April 2003, <https://www.ncregister.com/site/article/editorial41>.

⁸⁵ *ibid.*

⁸⁶ Raymond J. De Souza, ‘Is the Vatican Afraid of Muslims?’, National Catholic Register, 27 April 2003, http://www.ncregister.com/site/article/is_the_vatican_afraid_of_muslims.

⁸⁷ John L. Allen, ‘Mission to White House Sends Message to Islam’, National Catholic Reporter, 14 February 2003, natcath.org/NCR_Online/archives/031403/031403e.htm.

⁸⁸ Allen, *All the Pope's Men*, 46.

See's opposition to that war related to a fear of a clash of civilisations. Lastly, Cosgrove analyses Catholicism's divided nature and reiterates the Catechism's view which places the responsibility of war on civilian leaders.⁸⁹ This argument minimises the Church's role, adding that the *Magisterium*, "doesn't tell us which war are just and unjust".⁹⁰ At the same time his use of aggression, as opposed to self-defence, questions what has been called the just war theory's presumption against war. In taking this view he risks turning Church teaching into partisan policy rather than serious moral questions on which Catholics can legitimately disagree.

First Things, supported both 1991 and 2003 wars. *First Things* did devote some coverage to those who opposed the war.⁹¹ Founder of *First Things*, conservative writer and priest, Richard John Neuhaus, writing in May 2003 emphasised the role of politicians in protecting citizens.⁹² Neuhaus posited that he was "trying to contribute a measure of moral clarity in a time of great confusion".⁹³ Rather than disagree with the pope on his moral authority, Neuhaus questions their technical competence. Further, Neuhaus notes the pope's lack of recognition that the decision was vested in political authorities. Neuhaus seems to collapse all authority into agreeing with the possession goals of contemporary US political leaders. Neuhaus, restricts what the pope can, and cannot, discuss. By implication, he seems to argue that the pope can speak on sexual morality but not war. This narrowing of the papal role is either implicit or explicit to many conservative Catholic viewpoints on the war as it (understandably) places the Church's own sexuality teaching above political questions. This narrowing enhances divisions and only weakens the more holistic approach taken by the popes on issues of sexuality and war while reducing the Holy See's attractiveness. Somewhat contradicting himself, he criticises the role of the UN but then seems to use Resolution 1441 to support his argument.⁹⁴ Neuhaus conflated the Bush administration view of the war with what was just, without questioning the implications. Similar to other conservative publications, a contrast between what the pope should, and should not speak on, occurs.

⁸⁹ Jim Cosgrove, 'Working to Stop the War', National Catholic Register, 16 March 2003, http://www.ncregister.com/site/article/working_to_stop_the_war.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Paul J. Griffiths, 'Just War: An Exchange', *First Things*, April 2002, <https://www.firstthings.com/article/2002/04/just-war-an-exchange>.

⁹² Richard John Neuhaus, 'The Sounds of Religion in a Time of War', *First Things*, <http://www.firstthings.com/article/2003/05/the-sounds-of-religion-in-a-time-of-war>.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

Several themes can be ascertained. Liberal newspapers opposed the war and conservatives supported it. This affirms Catholicism's divided nature in the United States. Liberal publications tended to have a similar outlook to the Holy See's preference for *milieu* goals and thus reject a decision with unintended (sometimes negative) consequences. Accordingly, this reflected the biases of their readers and may have worsened liberal and conservative divisions. As a result, the Holy See's soft power suffered further in pursuit of its *milieu* goals. Several authors questioned those on the right who disagreed with the pope having demanded those on the left support him in promoting the Church's views on sexual morality. Several liberal articles either did not question, or even bolstered, collapsing the Holy See's vision of community into the UN in support of their *milieu* goals.

Those that advocated for war, linked their stance to the belief that the decision was for civilian leaders. This view suggests that civilians leaders should be trusted with all major decisions. Concerns were raised that it weakens the boundaries between what it is to be American and what it is to be Catholic, with being American taking precedence. Elements of Jacksonianism are seen, particularly its ability to integrate groups into the folk community. Therefore, Holy See relevance is reduced. Supporters of the war minimised the Church's role, despite calls for obedience on issues of sexual morality. The war may have entrenched divisions. Dangers of politicising the Church were not addressed by the wars supporters. In a mirror image to those liberal opponents, the war's consequences were largely dismissed, reducing the Holy See's attractiveness.

Political Institutions: National Security and Political Interests Coalesce

The presidency shaped the response to war through its extensive foreign policy powers. Critically, Congress did not exercise its appropriation powers against the war. As a result, the executive branch was strengthened and could drive policy how it saw fit. Thus, Bush had less pressure to adopt alternative possession or *milieu* goals in dealing with Iraq. The “Imperial Presidency” will be rejected as being ahistorical and creating the unhelpful impression of a time when presidents did not act in similarly. Thus, Bush’s use of power was far from unusual which made war more likely. Subsequently, the Congressional resolution supporting the war will be examined. This formed part of the administration’s legitimation for war. Following this, conflict was made more likely. The bishops’ fear of being seen as partisan reduced their ability to lobby against the Bush’s narrow possession goals. This was a contributory factor to its Congressional passage.

Roper argues Bush revived the “Imperial Presidency”.⁹⁵ Schlesinger published *The Imperial Presidency* to decry the perceived rise in presidential power in 1973.⁹⁶ Claims of an “imperial presidency” are important as they seem to lend historical weight to an argument. Yet the term has deep historical flaws, leading to a potential misunderstanding of the president’s capacity to act in foreign policy.

Roper defines it as the executive’s capacity to engage in fighting without a Congressional declaration of war. He contends it was adopted and expanded through unitary executive theory and signing statements.⁹⁷ Roper suggests the War Powers Resolution and Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act, passed after Watergate, attempted to constrain future administrations.⁹⁸ He claims “the invasion of Iraq and its aftermath that raised the spectre that the ‘Unitary Executive’ was simply the ‘Imperial Presidency Redux’”.⁹⁹

⁹⁵ Jon Roper, “The Imperial Presidency Redux: presidential power and the war in Iraq”, in David Ryan and Patrick Kiely, eds., *America and Iraq: Policy-Making, Intervention and Regional Politics* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2009), 219-220.

⁹⁶ Arthur M. Schlesinger, *The Imperial Presidency* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2004).

⁹⁷ Roper, “The Imperial Presidency Redux”, 223–224, 227.

⁹⁸ *Ibid*, 222.

⁹⁹ *Ibid*, 228.

Roper's definition has historical and institutional flaws. Historically, United States has only declared war four times, 1812, 1898, 1917 and 1941.¹⁰⁰ Thus, nearly all presidents are "imperial". Executive dominance is the norm in the president's war-making capabilities. Constitutional provision for Congressional war-making powers do not to match practice.

This leads onto the second point, institutional. Congress did not use its powers to block, or even slow, executive pressure for war. Roper mentions, albeit in the context of military commissions, that "congressional reaction was muted. The President enjoyed widespread popular support".¹⁰¹ Checks and balances intended to have all branches "balancing" each other. Yet, Congressional inaction should not be seen as the executive's fault. Hallett writes, "it is Congress that has abdicated its powers to the executive branch, not an "imperial presidency".¹⁰² Bush had less incentive to adapt his possession and *milieu* goals to the desires of his opponents because of this. These institutional aspects do not account for cultural factors, such as Jacksonianism or exceptionalism, which would frame any decision.

Hess scrutinises the Congressional resolution authorising the war. Highlighting the importance of unity, Hess contends that Democratic divisions, the 1991 Iraq War, an enhanced threat and a powerful executive, guaranteed its passage. Initially, hostile administration reaction on Congress's role altered and become "more solicitous of Congress, promising that it would seek approval for war against Iraq".¹⁰³ By September 2002 Congress accepted Bush's possession goals and saw regime change as necessary.¹⁰⁴ However, Democrats were "encouraging Bush to become more aggressively involved in making the case for war".¹⁰⁵ The Democrats promised hearings but Bush reprimanded the Democratic controlled Senate for not responding appropriately. Under pressure, the Democrats accepted earlier hearings, before the November midterms, and a speedy vote on a war resolution. Although Democrats seemed reluctant to simply agree with Bush, political pressures, cultural factors and a desire to be viewed as patriotic weakened Democrats. Therefore, they implicitly supported the administration's definitions of community, interests and order, in effect its possession goals.

The upcoming 2004 presidential election made Senators Joseph Lieberman, John Edwards and John Kerry support Bush.¹⁰⁶ Republicans, House Speaker Dennis Hastert and

¹⁰⁰ Brien Hallett, *Declaring War: Congress, the President, and What the Constitution Does Not Say* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 5.

¹⁰¹ Roper, "The Imperial Presidency Redux", 229.

¹⁰² Hallett, *Declaring War*, 5.

¹⁰³ Hess, 'Presidents and the Congressional War Resolutions of 1991 and 2002'.

¹⁰⁴ Ritchie and Rogers, *The Political Road to War with Iraq*, 114.

¹⁰⁵ Hess, 'Presidents and the Congressional War Resolutions of 1991 and 2002'.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

Majority Leader Dick Armey both expressed reservations on the resolution.¹⁰⁷ Yet, combined Republican and Democratic support guaranteed the resolution's passage. Thus, community's definition was drawn in a partisan fashion. Rather than balance interests, the Republicans had less incentive to work with Democrats in defining possession goals against Iraq. During 2003, in both the House and Senate votes were almost 79% for administration's policies.¹⁰⁸ The bishops' fear of being accused of partisanship, on a political rather than doctrinal issue, meant that they would not stoke divisions in Congress by lobbying Hastert or Armey. Both voted for the war, with Armey later regretting his decision.¹⁰⁹ As the war was seen through a traditional security lens, it negated the relevance of the bishop's *milieu* goals and any assumed moral status stemming from the Holy See's "actorness". Survey respondents saw religion as being more relevant in sexual morality.¹¹⁰ Thus, religion can be said not to relate strongly to traditional security issues either.

Bush's threat perception was crucial to success, through "his warnings of an imminent threat, he redefined the terms of the debate".¹¹¹ So rather than adopt preemption as the issue, the Democrats accepted the administration's language. Democratic challenges to administration possession goals were drawn from both unipolarity and reinforced by political culture's framing, would be more difficult as time passed. Democrats failed to use alternate readings of these ideas to offer alternatives to Bush's policies.

Seeking to deflect the UN's role, the administration claimed that passage of the resolution would show "domestic resolve [which] would enhance the prospects for UN action".¹¹² Using this argument, the Bush administration could claim that it saw the UN as important. While arguing this, in his September 2002 speech Bush also questioned the UN's role, "Will the United Nations serve the purpose of its founding, or will it be irrelevant?".¹¹³ Bush showed the importance of *milieu* goals and questioned the UN's ability; and so,

¹⁰⁷ Ritchie and Rogers, *The Political Road to War with Iraq*, 121.

¹⁰⁸ Norman Ornstein et al., 'Vital Statistics on Congress', Brookings Institution, 18 April 2014, <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Vital-Statistics-Chapter-8-Political-Polarization-in-Congress-and-Changing-Voting-Alignments.pdf>.

¹⁰⁹ Washington Post, 'Ex-Lawmaker Says Cheney Misled Him about Iraq', *Los Angeles Times*, 16 September 2008, <http://articles.latimes.com/2008/sep/16/nation/na-cheney16>.

¹¹⁰ Pew Forum, 'Few Say Religion Shapes Immigration, Environment Views', *Pew Research Center's Religion & Public Life Project* (blog), <http://www.pewforum.org/2010/09/17/few-say-religion-shapes-immigration-environment-views/>.

¹¹¹ Hess, 'Presidents and the Congressional War Resolutions of 1991 and 2002'.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ George W. Bush, 'Address to the United Nations General Assembly in New York City'.

irrespective the administration ensured the outcome it sought. Bush's view of community was predicated on US leadership and rested on power despite it being dressed in *milieu* goals.

Hess claims some Democrats regretted not supporting the 1991 Iraq War.¹¹⁴ Consequently, some in Congress supported the war, viewing 1991 as a success. An assumption of historic repetition was evident. Inherent in this view is how 1991's success would be automatically matched in 2003.

The resolution presented to Congress in September, just after Bush's UN speech, noted the problems Iraq had caused. The resolution authorised the president to "use all means that he determines to be appropriate, including force".¹¹⁵ Changes were demanded to the resolution's wording relating to the "restoration of regional peace and security" which Democrats saw as a justification for action against other nations. They also expressed a desire for a larger Congressional role and lastly having greater co-operation with the UN. Bush "resisted the one significant attempt to limit military objectives".¹¹⁶ This may reflect a desire to maintain dominance in defining possession goals.

One poll highlighted the importance of US allies, or the UN, with either of these "public support could soar to nearly 80%".¹¹⁷ Hess writes that, debating the revised Levin-Spratt resolution "the importance of being part of a United Nations coalition as a means of enhancing the international legitimacy of any military operation" was stressed.¹¹⁸ Political culture's importance is clear when the administration's interpretation of American exceptionalism reduced, perhaps negated, the role of *milieu* goals through international institutions. Such a view fed into definitions of community which differed from the Holy See. Democratic Party leadership were divided over the Levin-Spratt resolution, which, in addition to Republican opposition saw it fail.¹¹⁹ The resolution that the administration had proposed, with the amendments was passed, 296-113 in the House and 77-23 in the Senate.

Hess ascribes the resolution's passage to, "a sharp division within the Democratic ranks".¹²⁰ Such divisions underline the importance of unity for soft power. In addition to unity, concentration, is also important. Some in Congress, focused on the 2004 presidential election, appeared not to challenge the administration. It was thus given more room to manoeuvre, with

¹¹⁴ Hess, 'Presidents and the Congressional War Resolutions of 1991 and 2002'.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Lydia Saad, 'Top Ten Findings About Public Opinion and Iraq'.

¹¹⁸ Hess, 'Presidents and the Congressional War Resolutions of 1991 and 2002'.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

war more likely as a result. The “broad and elastic” limits on executive action were seen only when an alternative resolution was proposed. Domestic issues took precedence with both parties concentrating on the upcoming 2002 midterms.

From the Holy See’s and bishops’ view several points can be made. Seeing the war as a traditional security question limited with possession goals their relevance. Survey respondents saw religion as being more relevant in sexual morality.¹²¹ Now, it could also be posited that religion is not associated with traditional security issues also, thereby weakening its soft power and attempts to advocate for its *milieu* goals. Most bishops and the Holy See, given its “actorness”, urged a greater UN role. Yet, in some senses the administration was doing exactly this through Resolution 1441. Finally, the bishops feared associating themselves with one party over the other.¹²² This would have politicised not just individual bishops, but the Church. Thus, the Democrats were less able to seek alternative conceptions of possession and *milieu* goals. Executive dominance set the debate’s tone and isolated the Democrats.

The imperial presidency was examined but rejected as being both ahistorical and unhelpful in characterising executive power in foreign policy. Evidently, this strengthened the executive power and made conflict more probable. All of these factors combined reduced the Holy See’s soft power, strengthened the executive thus increasing the probability of conflict.

¹²¹ Pew Forum, ‘Few Say Religion Shapes Immigration, Environment Views’, *Pew Research Center’s Religion & Public Life Project* (blog), <http://www.pewforum.org/2010/09/17/few-say-religion-shapes-immigration-environment-views/>.

¹²² Grzymala-Busse, *Nations under God*, 47.

Sex Abuse: An Outraged, Divided Community

In January 2002 the *Boston Globe* printed a story on the Archdiocese of Boston. It reported how Cardinal Law knowingly hid priests' abuse of minors from the public. These revelations, and the subsequent reaction, in addition to the Holy See choosing neutrality over soft power, its high standard for using force and its lack of impartiality further undermined the Church in the United States and the Holy See's claims to moral credibility and authority. Hence, their soft power while seeking to advance *milieu* goals in opposing the Iraq War were weakened.

First, polling will be used to highlight the lack of trust between Catholics and the Church. This made it harder for Catholics to trust their bishops who questioned the Iraq war's justness and Bush's possession goals. Secondly, cultural differences will be stressed between the Holy See and the United States and the strength of these differences in framing the responses to the crisis. Antagonism to Roman authority will be examined in the context of Holy See frustration and misunderstanding of American exceptionalism, with links drawn to Iraq. In the sex abuse context, tensions could partly be explained by a "morality nationalism" which pitted the Church's virtue ethics against US individualism. Such tensions may have exacerbated the crisis and reflected divergent foreign policy outlooks. Thirdly, the divided nature of Catholics in the United States will be explored. It will be argued that had the scandal not occurred, the Holy See would still have been unsuccessful at persuading the United States to adopt *milieu* goals. Divisions play a central part with liberals and conservatives divided over the causes of the sex abuse crisis and how it could have been resolved. This entrenched divisions and weakened the theological ideal of the unity of all Catholics. Lastly, the Church's response will be scrutinised. Initial papal comments on the crisis will be examined. These occurred months after it was reported. It will be maintained that these were vague, and did nothing to bolster the Church's credibility. The 2002 meeting of US cardinals in Rome and letter sent to all US priests after this meeting will be assessed. These measures were not only slow, but legalistic. They did little to assuage Catholics' concerns the Church was responding adequately. Accordingly, the Church was seen as protecting itself. Consequently, this reduced its soft power against the war. These belated attempts at resolving the crisis eviscerated the Church's moral credibility and capacity to successfully pursue its *milieu* goals. Subsequent efforts to use moral arguments against the war, by both Holy See and bishops, were largely irrelevant to the debate.

Allen argues that the scandal strained relations between Catholics in the United States and the institutional Church.¹²³ A 2002 poll showed respondents answering 79% saying the Church was dealing badly with abuses.¹²⁴ One 2015 poll suggested that a reduction in confidence in religion was due to lower religiosity and scandals.¹²⁵

Cultural differences were crucial in revealing the tensions between the actors. Allen suggests that continuing disagreements may lead to “American Catholics more and more hostile to any exercise of authority from Rome and an administration in Rome increasingly irritated with American exceptionalism and assertiveness”.¹²⁶ Rising tensions and misunderstandings between the United States and the Holy See existed. Clearly, Catholics did not listen to their bishops or pope on Iraq.¹²⁷ These cultural differences made it harder for Rome to not only resolve the sex abuse crisis, but more generally, attract Catholics to its *milieu* goals. At the same time US culture framed, and alienated, the Holy See from the Bush administration’s possession goals.

These cultural differences reflected differing moral codes between the US and Holy See which made it harder for the Holy See to resolve the crisis and thence maximise its soft power. One example of these tensions is when Cardinal Castrillon Hoyos, then prefect of the Congregation for the Clergy, implied the sex abuse problem was an Anglo-Saxon one.¹²⁸ Officials in Rome viewed the US reaction as “puritanical” while “others saw it as an extension of the historical anti-Catholicism”.¹²⁹ References to the Puritans, part of Reformed Protestantism, is particularly apt as it also explains the US binary mentality between good and evil. Grzymala-Busse posits mixing morality and politics, religion and nationhood “helps to set the stage for the prominence and religious framing of “morality” issues that place individuals as responsible for “sin,” such as abortion and same-sex marriage”.¹³⁰ Transposed onto the sex abuse crisis, a sort of “morality nationalism” formed. This pitted an individualistic, consequentialist and utilitarian United States against the Church’s virtue ethics and deontological approaches. These outlooks also helped frame US-Holy See approaches to

¹²³ Allen, *All the Pope’s Men*, 224.

¹²⁴ Jeffrey M Jones, ‘Americans, Catholics Continue to Criticize Church’s Handling of Sex Abuse Cases’, Gallup.com, 6 June 2002, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/6154/Americans-Catholics-Continue-Criticize-Churchs-Handling-Sex-Abuse-Cases.aspx>.

¹²⁵ Jeffrey M. Jones, ‘Confidence in U.S. Institutions Still Below Historical Norms’, Gallup.com, 15 June 2015, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/183593/confidence-institutions-below-historical-norms.aspx>.

¹²⁶ Allen, *All the Pope’s Men*, 225.

¹²⁷ McAndrews, *What They Wished For*, 347.

¹²⁸ Allen, *All the Pope’s Men*, 244–45.

¹²⁹ *Ibid*, 229.

¹³⁰ Grzymala-Busse, *Nations under God*, 234.

foreign policy and partly explain a lack of Holy See influence. All of this was before the war, which only exacerbated tensions, making the Holy See less relevant to the debate of US possession goals.

More fundamentally, the crisis showed deep ideological divisions within the Church. Differing ideas of community between the Church and laity, added to other reasons such as its high burden of when war could be just in the face of what was seen as a threat, the Holy See's favouring neutrality over soft power and questions over its disinterested nature all cast doubt on the bishops and Holy See's moral authority. Some scholars have noted, "because moral authority is diffused, so is the cost to individual church reputations".¹³¹ However, the scale of the scandal and the problems of religion's broader relevance to traditional possession goals meant that even if the scandal had not occurred, the Church would probably still not have been successful. For example, many Protestant denominations also opposed it and were equally unsuccessful in utilising their moral authority against the war.

The crisis exacerbated existing divisions. Liberals saw outdated sexual teachings and incompetent bishops as the problem, conservatives saw doctrinal dissent and homosexuality as the causes.¹³² The abuse scandal rather than widen the debate as to the causes, hardened the divide.¹³³ In July 2002 the cardinal-archbishop of Guadalajara, said that the Church was being attacked and linked the crisis to homosexuality.¹³⁴ These self-pitying comments only entrenched divisions and liberal views of an incompetent, morally bankrupt, hierarchy.

Rupture between the community of US Catholics and the pope occurred. This breakdown may have been more widely felt by liberal Catholics. These Catholics felt more detached since *Humane Vitae* in 1968 which despite an expectation of accepting artificial contraception, forbade it. Had the pope condemned the actions of guilty priests and disciplined complicit bishops, it would have mitigated some of the Church's problems in the scandal and could have restored some of the Church's moral credibility and a sense of community. As this did not occur it reduced the Holy See's attractiveness.

Such views reflect differing conceptions of community within both US society and the Church. Rather than being Catholics, two communities in one Church existed. Generally, the liberal laity sought a greater role for themselves and diminished the place of Church teaching

¹³¹ Grzymala-Busse, *Nations under God*, 254.

¹³² Allen, *All the Pope's Men*, 227.

¹³³ Robert Putnam and David E. Campbell, *American Grace: How Religion Divides and Unites Us*, First Edition (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010).

¹³⁴ Allen, *All the Pope's Men*, 258.

and the bishops. Conservatives sought obedience to Church teaching and episcopal authority. Theologically one Catholic community existed but the reality was different.

After the *Boston Globe*'s story, Rome only issued a comment in March 2002, in the pope's "annual Holy Thursday letter to priests, the language was indirect, circumspect, and unsatisfying".¹³⁵ Questions about the bishops' moral authority were raised.¹³⁶ Similarities exist with Holy See diplomacy in both wars, as long delays existed between the event and response. Poor advice or an inability to decide are possible reasons for this. If this is the case, the Holy See should not expect to be treated as relevant in fast moving geopolitical crises. Although the pope may have seen the issue relating just to the United States, a long silence did little to buttress the Church's soft power and its attempts to advance its *milieu* goals.

Two major events attempted to resolve the crisis. All the US cardinals met in Rome to discuss the crisis. Out of this meeting a letter was sent to all US priests. Neither the meeting nor the letter helped buttress the Church's moral credibility. The letter was sent to the priests in the United States from the cardinals¹³⁷, regretting "that episcopal oversight has not been able to preserve the Church from this scandal".¹³⁸ This implies that some bishops were unable to stop the abuse, rather than being the source of it. A contemporary news report argues "that sentence can be read in at least two ways, as regretting the failure to control abusive priests or as regretting the failure to protect the church's public image".¹³⁹ At the same time a press statement was issued as the letter to priests. Some argued "it has the qualities of classic public relations and litigation-avoidance statements, the passive voice, the action plans, the factual quibbling and the distinctly conditional acceptance of responsibility".¹⁴⁰ This did little to improve the Church's, and Holy See's, soft power and credibility of its *milieu* goals to Catholics. The statement urged the priests and bishops to "promote the correct moral teachings of the Church", which has been interpreted by some as seeming "to blame doctrinal dissenters".¹⁴¹ The statement ended noting that the bishops and faithful should join "in observing a national day of prayer and penance, in reparation for the offenses perpetrated".¹⁴² They seemed to be attempting to spread the guilt to include the laity. Liberal Catholics may

¹³⁵ Allen, *All the Pope's Men*, 229.

¹³⁶ Ibid.,

¹³⁷ 'Text: Cardinals' Letter to US Priests', BBC 24 April 2002, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1949677.stm>.

¹³⁸ Allen, *All the Pope's Men*, 251.

¹³⁹ Adam Liptak, 'Scandal in the Church: Damage-Control Mode', *The New York Times*, 26 April 2002, <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/04/26/us/scandals-in-the-church-news-analysis-damage-control-mode.html>.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² Allen, *All the Pope's Men*, 254.

have felt little, sense of community with these statements. This is particularly important as the pontiff is seen as “the perpetual and visible principle and foundation of unity of both the bishops and the faithful”.¹⁴³

The abuse of minors’ coverage fundamentally undermined the Church’s moral authority against the war. As it seemed more likely, the pope and bishops were unable to credibly communicate, “They are less capable of bringing a critique to social questions because their moral standing has been compromised”.¹⁴⁴ The profound US-Holy See cultural divide have been highlighted. Furthermore, the growing divisions within the Church, between bishops and laity, between bishops and between bishops and Rome were noted. It was contended that these weakened any attractive power the Holy See possessed. Allen has maintained that both the US and Holy See misunderstood each other.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴³ Paul VI, *Lumen gentium*: Dogmatic Constitution on the Church, 21 November 1964, http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_const_19641121_lumen-gentium_en.html. Sec. 23.

¹⁴⁴ Allen, *All the Pope's Men*, 229.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid*, 284–98.

Polls: Supporting Bush's Order

Fundamentally, the war had public support. Any attempts by the Holy See, or bishops, to persuade the public against the war were unsuccessful. The relationship between religion and nationality is crucial but as this thesis, and section, contends nationality and politics takes precedence over religion. Therefore, priests speaking on political issues were largely ignored by lay Catholics, which in turn made Holy See anti-war statements mostly irrelevant. After this, a section will analyse polls supporting the war. The level of backing, though variable, consistently favoured war. Hence Holy See attempts to alter these polls, given the twin strictures of its neutrality and CST, was an impossible task. The succeeding segment will posit that polls showed a public desire for allies to work with the United States. Such polls illustrated US citizen's limits on true unilateralism. Thus an aspiration for community with, and under, US leadership existed. As part of this, partisanship will then be analysed, with Democrats closer to European stances on war. Consequently, Holy See inability to convince any sizable portion of Republicans weakened its lobbying efficacy for its *milieu* goals against the war. The penultimate section will argue that John Paul II's charisma did not assist his opposition to the war. It will be maintained that he may have been treated as just another non-American opponent of the war rather than a religious leader with claimed greater moral authority. Finally, it will be postulated that US public belief that linked Saddam Hussein and terrorism strengthened Bush's possession goals against Iraq. Concurrently, claims of disinformation will be rejected. Belief in these links weakened Holy See soft power and made war more likely.

How religion and nationality intersect is central to this work. Catholics were among the least influenced by their priests, at just 29%, compared to other Christians in the United States.¹⁴⁶ The sex abuse crisis is one explanation for this. Another is how Catholics moved from being self-enclosed¹⁴⁷ to integrating.¹⁴⁸ Furthermore, only 12% said religion "frequently" guides voting patterns.¹⁴⁹ A 2002 poll reported that no link was found between religion and stance taken on the war.¹⁵⁰ This lends evidence to the strength of the Jacksonian (national)

¹⁴⁶ Stephen R. Rock, *Faith and Foreign Policy: The Views and Influence of U.S. Christians and Christian Organizations* (Continuum: New York, 2011), 29.

¹⁴⁷ Morris, *American Catholic*.

¹⁴⁸ William V. D'Antonio et al., *American Catholics Today: New Realities of Their Faith and Their Church* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007), 139.

¹⁴⁹ Rock, *Faith and Foreign Policy*, 34.

¹⁵⁰ 'Faith and War: Conflict for Religious Americans?', Gallup.com, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/7186/Faith-War-Conflict-Religious-Americans.aspx>.

community and its possession goals over the wider, and more nebulous, global Catholic community with its *milieu* goals. The poll showed that 55% of Catholics *supported* the war. In tensions between religion and politics, politics takes precedence.¹⁵¹

Eshbaugh-Soha and Linebarger argue that the more a president speaks about an issue, greater public awareness exists.¹⁵² Holsti argues “every survey yielded a majority that would support the use of force to topple Saddam’s government”.¹⁵³ Approval peaked in November 2001 at 74%. Even in March 1992 it stood at 55%, this is surprising given that the 1991 war ended in April 1991. By the end of 2002, 65% supported war, falling to 59% in March 2003.¹⁵⁴ When the wording changed the size of the majority shifts but not the overall majority favouring war.¹⁵⁵ This illustrates Jacksonianism’s power, with clear implications for the Holy See’s *milieu* goals. Indeed, “the preference for action to effect a regime change in Baghdad dates back to the aftermath of the Gulf War (March 1992) and it also preceded the September 11 attacks (February 2001)”.¹⁵⁶ Thus, it was almost impossible for the Holy See to shift opinion. This may have been due to the Holy See not being seen as relevant because of its religious status, neutrality and because of the war’s political nature. Yet, these constraints also forced the Holy See to speak out against the war, in favour of its *milieu* goals which reinforced Holy See possession goals. Hence, the Holy See was not able to alter the terms of the debate but could still achieve its ends.

When respondents were asked whether the United States should act unilaterally, “in none of these surveys did the “go it alone” option gain a majority”.¹⁵⁷ Moreover, Holsti reports that “more than a quarter of the 59 percent who favored military action conditioned their approval on the agreement of major allies to join the effort”.¹⁵⁸ UK, Spanish and Polish support were essentially political. Evidently, the US understanding of community did not extend to explicit global leadership, placing limits on exceptionalist narratives.

Partisanship was a significant factor. The September 2001 attacks united both parties on Afghanistan.¹⁵⁹ Hayes and Guardino posit that policy preferences and cultural differences

¹⁵¹ *ibid*

¹⁵² Matthew Eshbaugh-Soha and Christopher Linebarger, ‘Presidential and Media Leadership of Public Opinion on Iraq’, *Foreign Policy Analysis* 10, no. 4 (1 October 2014): 351–69.

¹⁵³ Ole R. Holsti, *American Public Opinion on the Iraq War* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2012), 30.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid*, 37.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid*, 30.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid*, 36.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid*.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid*, 36–37.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid*, 84.

are important, with Democrats closer to European views.¹⁶⁰ Republican support “was overwhelming; no less than 78% of GOP identifiers endorsed the war at every point in the time series. By March 2003, that figure had risen to 90%”.¹⁶¹ The Holy See was unable to convince any sizable portion of Republicans because of its focus on *milieu* goals, neutrality and because the war was foremost a political issue, and not a doctrinal matter.

Foreign leader’s opinions’ is central to this study. The esteem in which John Paul II was held was important. In 2003, one poll showed 73% “favourability”, with another showing 78% “approval”. In the latter, 93% of Catholics saw him as favourable while 73% of non-Catholics saw him as favourable.¹⁶² Yet, Gibson notes, “clearly, while Catholics loved the singer, they were not in love with the song. That would have been true even absent the terrible clergy sexual abuse scandal”.¹⁶³ Both Catholics and non-Catholics agreed on his charisma but little evidence exists it had an effect on his soft power *milieu* goals. The complexity of Holy See “actorness” is illustrated and its utility in this situation. Hayes and Guardino advance “the case against an invasion of Iraq as reported in the mass media was made primarily by non-Americans”.¹⁶⁴ Those who opposed the war saw foreign voices as relevant, with Democrats and Independents “responded to increases in opposition from foreign elites”.¹⁶⁵ Their analysis makes no mention of John Paul II but the pope may have been included as simply another non-American voice against the war, rather than a spiritual leader with a presumed moral message. Commonalities existed between Chirac and Schroder and the Holy See’s position, yet many did not view the Holy See as credible.

Administration officials “linked Saddam Hussein with the threat of terrorism in an effort to build public support for war”.¹⁶⁶ Althaus and Largio reject the claim that the Bush administration sowed misinformation linking Iraq and the 11 September attacks.¹⁶⁷ Instead the authors claim such a link already existed, “nearly 8 in 10 Americans believe Saddam Hussein was responsible for the terrorist attacks”.¹⁶⁸ They contend poll respondents would blame Iraq if given the option. More open ended replies would blame bin Laden for the attack. Althaus

¹⁶⁰ Danny Hayes and Matt Guardino, ‘The Influence of Foreign Voices on U.S. Public Opinion’, *American Journal of Political Science* 55, no. 4 (2011): 831–51.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² Gallup, ‘Pope John Paul II’, *Gallup.com*, 2005, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/15481/Pope-John-Paul.aspx>.

¹⁶³ David Gibson, *The Rule of Benedict: Pope Benedict XVI and His Battle with the Modern World* (New York: HarperOne, 2006), 31.

¹⁶⁴ Hayes and Guardino, ‘The Influence of Foreign Voices on U.S. Public Opinion’.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ Althaus and Largio, ‘When Osama Became Saddam’.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

and Largio argue the framing of pollsters questions shaped the responses.¹⁶⁹ They conclude “rather than being duped, as the popular account has it, the American public has gradually grown more critical of the idea that Hussein had a hand in 9/11”.¹⁷⁰ Consequently, the Bush administration had a much easier task. This illustrates the underlying Jacksonian impulse in US society. Under these circumstances the administration’s policies could be portrayed as necessary. The strength of domestic support enabled Bush to pursue his possession goals against Iraq.

Ultimately, the war had wider public support with both bishop and Holy See efforts to dissuade the public failing. Crucially, when faced with choosing between their religion and political opinions, the public prioritised politics. Polls showed a consistent backing for war and the power of Jacksonianism was noted, which together weakened any Holy See soft power against the war and negated whatever benefits the Holy See’s special status may have given it. Public limits on US leadership were demarcated, with the allies support necessary. This revealed where American exceptionalist rhetoric is potentially weakest. Partisan divisions were noted with Republican support for war higher than Democrats. As the war was not a doctrinal matter, the Holy See’s transcendent claims were not relevant. Moreover, its neutrality minimised the actions it could take against the war and its *milieu* goals were unable to counter Bush’s narrow possession goals. Though often attributed with charisma, John Paul II may have been treated as just another foreign voice against the war, with his charisma unhelpful to Holy See attractive power. Lastly, the US public believed in links between the Iraqi regime and terrorism which aided the Bush administration’s case for war.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

Systemic factors that weakened Holy See soft power

Mirroring Chapter IV, this section will argue that elements relating to the international system weakened Holy See soft power. Its special international legal status will be analysed and it will be contended that this status did little to enhance the attractiveness of its *milieu* goals and alter Bush administration policy. After this, Holy See foreign policy principles, deriving from Catholic Social Teaching, will be assessed. CST's flexibility allowed it to emphasise community and the UN in opposing the war. This is a noticeable shift from the 1991 war.

Holy See Legal Status: Mostly Irrelevant

The Holy See's unique legal status mattered little in altering administration policy. A possible exception was President Bush's March 2003 meeting with Pio Cardinal Laghi. However, other factors such as John Paul II's links to the Holy See and the pope's long standing opposition to the war were also relevant to the meeting's occurrence. Cardinal Laghi's meeting with President Bush was a signal of Holy See possession goals, demonstrating its anti-war stance to Muslims rather than a genuine belief in its capacity to exert soft power and advance its *milieu* goals. It will be posited that Holy See goals were thus both spiritual and secular in its mixture of *milieu* and possession goals. The latter may have damaged the Holy See's presumed moral status. That the Laghi-Bush meeting occurred gives evidence to the perception of Holy See morality reflecting its special "actorness". This may have aided its image as a voice in the "wilderness" thereby benefiting its possession goals. The exact discussions of the meeting are not known but it is believed Laghi stressed the UN's role in formulating US possession goals. Laghi was unsuccessful. It will be suggested that the meeting represented the Holy See's preference for dialogue with all actors. After this, those Protestant denominations opposing the war will be examined. It will be contended that they were equally unsuccessful at exerting influence. Finally, the SBC's support for war will be examined. Though Bush did not meet its leader, links will be drawn between a lack of meeting and Bush meeting Laghi.

Archbishop Pio Laghi was appointed as apostolic delegate to the United States just after the November 1980 elections. Laghi built a rapport with then Vice President George H. W. Bush, sometimes playing tennis together.¹⁷¹ Laghi was an obvious choice to present the Holy

¹⁷¹ Rachel Donadio, 'Cardinal Pio Laghi, a Star of the Vatican's Diplomatic Corps, Dies at 86', *New York Times*, 12 January 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/13/world/europe/13laghi.html?_r=0.

See's anti-war position to the president in 2003. From the Holy See viewpoint, little expectation existed that Laghi would succeed. As Allen suggests highlighting elements of the Holy See's possession goals, its aim was "less to change the U.S. position than to shape public opinion in the Islamic world".¹⁷² Holy See possession goals are clear, as it sought to distance itself from US policy. Thus its opposition to the war may have stemmed from both spiritual, but also "secular" reasons, with its possession goals reflecting this.

Three reasons may have influenced Bush's decision to meet Cardinal Laghi, only one of which relates to the Holy See's special status. Firstly, was the appearance of hearing opposition from the representative of a pope who stridently opposed the war. Bush was politically aware not to be seen as ignoring all opposition and may have sought to gain by meeting the representative of one of the chief opponents of the war. By meeting Laghi, Bush echoed his father's assent to secretary of State James Baker meeting Iraqi foreign minister Tariq Aziz, in January 1991, just before the start of that war. Secondly, and where the Holy See's legal status may have had a role, was from the connection between the Holy See and John Paul II. Meeting Laghi, Bush may have admitted the perception of Holy See morality, as Laghi was the only anti-war religious representative Bush met. The final reason may have been due to the friendship between the Bushes and Laghi. Despite their profound disagreements, the meeting may highlight the Holy See idea as representing an ideal notion of the (international) community based on dialogue to resolve disputes unlike in 1991.

Though never fully disclosed, Laghi apparently urged Bush during the meeting that the UN Security Council must sanction any military action. Yet, "the president did not share the pope's faith in the United Nations".¹⁷³ Faith is the optimum word as it reflects its *milieu* goals and its special "actorness" and describes the Holy See's belief in the UN (in 2003). Consequently, it demonstrated its renewed emphasis on *milieu* goals through the international community. Doing so it hoped to protect its interests which connected to its wish to promote a "law" based international order. Maintaining its neutrality, Cardinal Laghi stated after the meeting that Iraq must comply with "its international obligations" on human rights and disarmament enforced through the UN.¹⁷⁴ Seeking to underline the Holy See's differences with the Bush administration, Laghi warned Bush of the consequences of war. Such a view

¹⁷² Allen, 'Mission to White House Sends Message to Islam'.

¹⁷³ McAndrews, *What They Wished For*, 339.

¹⁷⁴ United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, 'Statement of Cardinal Pio Laghi, Papal Envoy After Meeting with President George Bush', USCCB, 5 March 2003, <http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/human-life-and-dignity/global-issues/middle-east/iraq/statement-on-iraq-by-papal-envoy-on-meeting-with-president-bush-2003-03-05.cfm>.

fundamentally damaged Holy See soft power. Moreover, it reflects the Holy See's own possession goals, despite its presumed moral status desiring only the common good. Laghi also called for a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. By doing so he indirectly stressed Holy See possession goals of protecting Christians in the Middle East from being conflated with the US mission in Iraq simply by Laghi, and John Paul II, voicing their opposition to the war. He realised the decision to go to war had been made.¹⁷⁵

Bush's decision to meet Laghi was especially significant because he did not meet with any other religious opposition to the war.¹⁷⁶ This may be a reflection of the Holy See's unique "actorness". In this instance it may have benefited, rather than hindered, its possession and *milieu* goals because of its special status. The meeting, and the extent of Holy See opposition may have facilitated the Holy See's status as an outside actor, in the "wilderness".

Other religious denominations were equally unsuccessful at influencing Bush to alter his possession goals in favour of *milieu* goals similar to that of the Holy See. For example, the NCC took out a full page advertisements entitled, *Jesus Changed Your Heart. Now Let Him Change Your Mind*, arguing it was "inconceivable" that Christ would support the conflict.¹⁷⁷ They ironically suffered from the mirror image view held by Bush as neither could accept alternative positions. Like the Holy See, the NCC was unsuccessful at altering administration policy. Nor did Bush meet the chief spokesman of the Episcopal Church, Frank Griswold.¹⁷⁸ Griswold was part of a delegation, along with then-Bishop Wilton Gregory and Mark Hanson of the Evangelical Lutheran Church that met National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice. The Israeli-Palestine issue was originally the topic but Iraq was also discussed with those present "reiterating the serious moral concerns each had expressed in earlier statements on the use of military force".¹⁷⁹ Neither Griswold nor Hanson met Bush, to protest their opposition to the war. This may have been due to the pope's long held opposition to the war, in addition to his association with the Holy See and Laghi's connections with the Bushes.

¹⁷⁵ Gerard O'Connell, 'When Bush Put John Paul II's Letter on the Side Table without Opening It', LaStampa.it, 17 September 2011, <http://www.lastampa.it/2011/09/17/vaticaninsider/eng/world-news/when-bush-put-john-paul-iis-letter-on-the-side-table-without-opening-it-HV7tYBqmgNTokCOj7OUr9H/pagina.html>.

¹⁷⁶ Peter Heltzel, *Jesus and Justice: Evangelicals, Race, and American Politics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 178.

¹⁷⁷ Neuhaus 'The Sounds of Religion in a Time of War'.

¹⁷⁸ Lee Marsden, 'God, War and Iraq', in Rosemary Durward and Lee Marsden, eds., *Religion, Conflict and Military Intervention*, Har/Ele edition (Farnham, Surrey; Burlington, VT: Routledge, 2009), 79.

¹⁷⁹ 'Griswold Attends Meeting with National Security Advisor to Discuss Middle East Issues', The Episcopal Church, 17 September 2002, <http://www.episcopalchurch.org/library/article/griswold-attends-meeting-national-security-advisor-discuss-middle-east-issues>.

No recorded meeting exists between, Richard Land of the SBC who supported the war¹⁸⁰ and Bush's possession goals. Were Bush to meet Land, Bush could have been criticised for meeting those that supported his position. Like many conservative Catholics, the SBC appeared to prioritise nationality over religion. In October 2002 Land, among others, signed a letter which supported President Bush's actions.¹⁸¹ Unlike the Church, Land "argued that a war against Iraq would satisfy all relevant just war principles".¹⁸² Some evidence exists for Bush's perception of Holy See moral authority which partly led to meeting Laghi. Land supported the war but no meeting occurred. It could be conjectured that Bush met Laghi *because* he represented someone so closely tied to opposition to the war rather than his representing the Holy See specifically. So papal opposition to the war and its intimate connections to the Holy See seemed more important than the existence of its special status. It has been postulated that as the support for the war waned, those denominations that supported it appeared to suffer little reduction in moral authority as "the diffusion of moral authority among many churches means their moral authority is actually more resilient".¹⁸³

It has been maintained that the Holy See's legal status, its "actorness", mattered only in a nebulous sense through its links to John Paul II and his vocal opposition to the war better explained Bush's meeting the pope's envoy. Equally, personal links between Cardinal Laghi and George H.W. Bush may also have had a role. Furthermore, meeting someone so opposed to the war may have benefited Bush politically, with a similar situation occurring just before the 1991 war. Fundamentally, Laghi's mixing of *milieu* and possession goals lacked success in persuading Bush not to go to war but the meeting assisted the Holy See as a voice in the "wilderness" advancing its possession goals. Opposition from several Protestant denominations was examined and it was claimed that Laghi's meeting was more due to the visibility of papal hostility to war than the Holy See's status. The SBC's support for the war was assessed. Though Bush did not meet its leader, the reasons for no meeting shed light on the Laghi-Bush meeting and the corresponding political costs of Bush meeting a group that supported his policies against Iraq.

¹⁸⁰ Southern Baptist Convention, 'On The Liberation Of Iraq', Southern Baptist Convention, <http://www.sbc.net/resolutions/1126>.

¹⁸¹ Richard Land et al., 'The So-Called "Land Letter"', The The Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission, 3 October 2002, <http://erlc.com/article/the-so-called-land-letter>.

¹⁸² Rock, *Faith and Foreign Policy*, 57.

¹⁸³ Grzymala-Busse, *Nations under God*, 232.

Principles of Holy See Foreign Policy: The International Community Returns

The Holy See sets and interprets CST and implements this in its foreign policy. These principles' form the basis for Holy See implementation of its foreign policy and its formulation of *milieu* and possession goals against the war. Holy See opposition stemmed from the lack of UN sanction. The theme of (international) community was prominent in its foreign policy. The importance given to the UN differed from the 1991 war. This demonstrates uscb's malleability. Mirroring the argument in Chapter IV, the Holy See can find ways to oppose any war, irrespective of its circumstances and perceived justness. This made it almost impossible to attract the United States to its *milieu* goals in 2003 and has been argued damaged its perception as a moral actor.

This section will begin by stressing how CST, apart from a few cases, avoids specifics. Therefore, it can give individual Catholics a framework for thinking about which themes of CST to prioritise in particular circumstances. Thus, CST avoids becoming associated with one partisan group or ideology. The next paragraph will discuss the role of community in the Holy See's opposition to the 2003 war. While CST allows the Holy See to remain neutral on political matters such as war, its lack of precision weakened its soft power to its *milieu* goals. Following this it will be maintained that CST, and thus much Holy See foreign policy, have no clear methods of prioritising one competing idea over another but is left to the individual Catholic. Naturally, this weakens any soft power the Holy See may use against the war to achieve its *milieu* goals. The penultimate paragraph will examine CST as it relates to the UN and forms the basis of Holy See opposition to the 2003 war. Related to this the normally close links between the UN and Holy See will be noted. These close links, and a shared view of international order obtained through "law", will be contrasted with the United States' view of the UN in achieving its possession goals. These starkly different conceptions of addressing Iraq reduced Holy See soft power and thus its capacity to implement its *milieu* goals. Lastly, and related to this, is the UN's legitimacy to act as arbiter.

Holy See interpretation of CST frames the implementation of its foreign policy. Stummvoll discusses the relationship between CST and specifics. He argues disagreement between Catholics is accepted, but defends CST's overview which halts it "from denigrating into a fundamentalist vision that regulates every aspect of human life, thus depriving humans

of freedom, responsibility, and choice”.¹⁸⁴ When not discussing issues such as equal marriage, flexibility is ingrained into Holy See diplomacy. Operating in abstractions on political topics allows the Holy See to avoid becoming dogmatic, ideological and partisan. Fundamentally, this flexibility damaged its capacity to be specific and thus maximise its soft power in advocating for its *milieu* goals.

An example of this malleability is the importance of community. Community was emphasised in 2003 when the Holy See sought both US and Iraqi co-operation with the UN. CST allows, even obligates, the Holy See to remain neutral and not be overly proscriptive in non-doctrinal matters. So while CST is flexible, it may be overly supple. Accordingly, it may weaken Holy See soft power.

CST, echoing the Holy See’s “actorness”, is rooted in a lack precision but does not prioritise some aspects over others, leaving the decision to individual Catholics. This is partly due to the Holy See’s rejection of consequentialism. So, it was concerned about Iraqi behaviour with WMD. However, their interpretation of CST allowed them to focus on *milieu* goals and thus view the UN as the optimal body to resolve the crisis. Holy See soft power was negated almost from the outset but because of this its ability to protect its possession goals were strengthened revealing a complex relationship between *milieu* and possession goals.

A more detailed explanation of the UN’s role in Holy See opposition to the war is needed. Chong and Troy stress the similarities between the Church and the UN, “both are concerned with forging unity among the human race and mitigating conflict”.¹⁸⁵ Holy See support for the UN stems from a desire that “*Political authority exercised at the level of the international community must be regulated by law*” (emphasis in original).¹⁸⁶ The Holy See holds the position of seeing the need for a global public authority but it should be established by consent.¹⁸⁷ Pope Benedict XVI, in a 2008 speech, expressed the close links between the two actors, with the UN fulfilling “a fundamental part of that [common] good”.¹⁸⁸ Consequently, multilateralism is viewed as an important element for foreign policy. Thus, the basis for its opposition to the 2003 war is clearer. Using CST as its basis, the Holy See was able to oppose

¹⁸⁴ Stummvoll, ‘A Living Tradition’, 41.

¹⁸⁵ Chong and Troy, ‘A Universal Sacred Mission and the Universal Secular Organization’.

¹⁸⁶ *Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church*, Vatican, 441, http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/justpeace/documents/rc_pc_justpeace_doc_20060526_compendio-dott-soc_en.html.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*,

¹⁸⁸ Benedict XVI, ‘ADDRESS OF HIS HOLINESS BENEDICT XVI’, Vatican, 18 April 2008, http://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en/speeches/2008/april/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20080418_un-visit.html.

the 1991 war, without abandoning these principles. For 2003, it viewed the UN as the most effective means to oppose it and regulate states behaviour by “law”. This conviction would clash with United States’ possession goals, as the two actors had irreconcilable views on the UN and its legitimacy. A lack of Holy See attraction was therefore not surprising.

Indeed, the Holy See view of the UN, as a reflection of the “international community’s” legitimacy is clear. Connections between multilateralism and legitimacy have been questioned by some American scholars, “Is there then a certain, magic number of supporting nations that bestows legitimacy?”.¹⁸⁹ These disagreements make such disputes unresolvable. The extent of the Holy See’s respect for the UN was demonstrated when, sources reveal it “Left the door open to the use of force if it occurred within the framework of the United Nations”.¹⁹⁰ However, given its opposition to the 1991 war, that did receive UN assent, significant doubt could be passed on this statement. Indeed the cable’s wording is vague, “left the door open” is ambiguous. CST’s flexibility would become useful again if the UN did support the war and Holy See was put in this position again. That it would consider “supporting” a war is significant. How its support would look seems not to have been discussed, but a model where legitimacy met with a lack of opposition, could be Afghanistan in 2001.¹⁹¹

CST avoids specifics yet for the Holy See, the UN was the *only* way war could be legitimated. It was argued that the Holy See returned to its emphasis on the Security Council (as a representation of community) and its perceived legitimacy “for preserving peace and sanctioning the use of force”¹⁹² that formed the basis of its disagreement with Bush. Holy See emphasis on the UN, through its *milieu* goals, may have expected the vote for war would either not proceed or be vetoed. Yet contradictions emerge between the Holy See’s position here and Chapter III. In that chapter, the Holy See was still strongly opposed to Iraqi actions but reflected a different conception of order based on its interpretation of the just war criteria. For the 2003 war the Holy See desired to maintain its neutrality but a lack of precision weakened its soft power. The Holy See view of the UN was contrasted with the United States who saw it as a means to achieve its possession goals.

¹⁸⁹ Kagan, *Paradise and Power*, 2004, 146.

¹⁹⁰ ‘One Year After September 11’, 11.

¹⁹¹ Stake, ‘The Holy See and the Middle East’, 70.

¹⁹² *Ibid*, 66.

Conclusion

This chapter has argued that the Holy See opposed the Iraq War because it lacked UN approval and did not meet all the just war criteria. It has built on Chapter V which set out the stark divisions between the Holy See and US on Iraq. This chapter has many of the same themes as Chapter IV in positing why the Holy See was not attractive during the 1991 war. Before the 2003 war, while opposing US policies, the Holy See also sought to balance maintaining its neutrality and also urged Iraqi compliance of UN resolutions. It has been argued that the Holy See contradicted itself. In spite of drawing an implicit distinction between the two wars, neither apparently met just war criteria. Its opposition to the 1991 war disregarded the UN resolutions. While in 2003 the lack of a resolution formed the basis of Holy See disagreement to the war.

This seemed to place an almost impossibly high burden on the moral use of force, especially when examined alongside the 1991 war. The Holy See's stance received criticism from conservative Catholics and perhaps contributed to its lack of soft power to advance Holy See *milieu* goals. Notwithstanding this lack of successful soft power, it was argued that this aided Holy See possession goals of protecting Christians in the Middle East from being conflated with those in "Western" countries. It has been maintained that the Holy See's "actorness" made it more effective at advancing its possession goals because it was a voice in the international "wilderness" and so distinct from other actors which assisted its opposition to the war.

Fundamentally, the Holy See failed to sufficiently attract the US to implementing its *milieu* goals. It implemented its possession goals. Thus, gaining sufficient attractive power would have been impossible at the same time. Incorporating soft power, this chapter has posited both domestic and systemic (or structural) reasons for a lack of Holy See attraction.

Domestic factors reduced the soft power of the US bishops, and the Holy See, on Catholics in the United States. Cultural factors, namely Jacksonianism and exceptionalism, weakened receptivity of Catholics to the Church's *milieu* goals to resolve the perceived threat from Iraq. Its message was not relevant against these deeply engrained cultural factors. Catholics, placing nationality before religion, were more receptive to Jacksonianism and exceptionalist ideas over those from their bishops and Holy See. Central to this thesis is the place of divisions. These substantially weakened the Church's ability to exert attraction. Though seemingly more united against the war, the bishops and Holy See were unable to overcome a divided and partisan laity. This was reflected, even amplified, by the media with

conservative and liberal outlets taking virtually opposite sides in opposing and supporting the pope. Presidential foreign policy powers, when added to Congressional support, made war more likely in implementing its possession, and *milieu* goals. At the same time the Church's cover-up of sexual abuse in the United States profoundly undermined its moral credibility, and thus its soft power in opposing the war. For an actor portraying itself as moral, this news shredded these claims, particularly when many Americans felt anxious for their security and supported Bush's interpretation of US possession goals. Polling showed consistent popular support for the war. This perhaps more than any other factor reduced the bishops' ability to exert influence against the war.

Systemic factors also weakened Holy See attractiveness. In essence, its message failed to overcome the increased threat perception. With the 11 September attacks still vivid, and popular belief linking Saddam Hussein to terrorism helping the administration, the Holy See was constrained by its own neutrality and theology. Moreover, it was not relevant to those Americans seeking greater security, who looked to their secular leaders before their religious leaders. Unipolarity allowed the United States to act without significant constraints on its behaviour. Not seeking a second, more explicit, UN resolution, illustrates the administration's heightened threat level. Furthermore, the Holy See's "actorness", had little influence. It was not relevant. One exception to this was the meeting between President Bush and Cardinal Laghi. Their meeting was evidence of the Holy See's perceived moral status, even if this was insufficiently attractive to stop the war but may have assisted it in pursuing its possession goals and making itself distinct from the United States. The Holy See's foreign policy principles, stressed the UN as a reflection of the "international community". Holy See arguments against the war had few specifics, as it refused to be drawn on non-doctrinal matters. Cables showed how Holy See officials suggested they could approve force against Iraq, given UN approval. Such approval was given in 1991 and it still opposed the war. This illustrates the Holy See's desire to find a way to oppose the war. Consequently, its ability to fully oppose the war was limited.

Nye's understanding of soft power has been applied to the Holy See. Ultimately, soft power was too weak to overcome US hard power. Theory has been built through this with Wolfers' conception of *milieu* and possession goals. Rather than the Holy See conforming solely to seeking to shape the international environment through advocating for *milieu* goals, it also pursued possession goals. Therefore, Wolfers' distinction blurs. Holy See soft power was questioned. Even though it desired to shape the international environment, seeking a greater role for the UN, it also had possession goals. In these it desired to protect and promote

its interests. These consisted of protecting Chaldean Catholics in Iraq, and Christians in the wider Middle East, through vocal Holy See opposition. Its opposition sought to minimise a wider national and regional backlash against Christians.

Part Four

Chapter VII

Conclusion: *Vox clamantis in deserto?*

The Gospel of John for Gaudete Sunday (the third Sunday of Advent) recounts individuals questioning John the Baptist who he was. He answered, *ego vox clamantis in deserto* (I am the voice of one crying in the wilderness).¹ This thesis has posited that on one level the Holy See has been a voice crying in the wilderness in attempting to use its soft power to advance its *milieu* goals. Yet, it has been suggested that it used its unique place in the international system to seek to protect its possession goals, Catholics and other Christians in the Middle East, from being associated with the US interventions in the region. Its unique status, in the international wilderness, made it more effective at advancing its possession goals. More narrowly, this thesis has asked how can we better characterise the dilemmas raised by power and disunity in Holy See foreign policy? The answer has contended that domestic and international elements weakened Holy See soft power. In turn this resulted in the wars occurring and the failure of the Holy See's *milieu* goals to shape the international environment, but at the same time attempts to protect its possession goals through its opposition. Answers to the research questions will be examined and the main findings will then be stated. The chapter will cover the contributions to research, covering soft power, culture, morality and finally religion and soft power, before concluded with future areas of research.

¹ John 1:19-28

What Domestic Factors Weakened Holy See Influence?

Using soft power, domestic elements are central in understanding the dearth of Holy See attraction. Chapters IV and VI dealt with these domestic factors in each of the two wars. These consisted of culture, divisions, institutions and polling.

Political culture showed clear US-Holy See divergences with their focuses on possession and *milieu* goals respectively. Jacksonianism made war more likely and thus weakened the Holy See's attractive power. Similarly, exceptionalism sharply contradicted Holy See conceptions of the equality of states obeying international law. Exceptionalism helped provide a framework for US possession goals to be merged, at least rhetorically, into *milieu* goals. Divisions were a significant answer to this question. At the same time, political culture had a substantial role in reducing Holy See soft power.

As the thesis title suggests, the pope had more divisions than he would care to admit. In this instance divisions existed between and within the bishops, laity and media. Although the bishops seemed more united against the 2003 war, divisions still existed. In spite of this, and greater unity with the Holy See, these factors were insufficient to overcome other domestic and systemic elements. Lay support in the United States for both wars fundamentally weakened Holy See soft power in their advocacy for their *milieu* goals. Its objections to the wars were largely ignored by them. Liberals, on both occasions, echoed Holy See arguments against the wars. While conservatives, or Catholics who were conservative, either ignored Holy See objections or attempted to minimise, or interpret Holy See arguments differently. Additionally, religious, if not wholly Catholic media, seemed to reflect, even exacerbate, these divisions. For both wars, those conservative publications that were examined largely supported the conflicts, while the examined liberal publications generally opposed them. Liberal publications pointed to a lack of conservative obedience, something which conservatives often pointed to on matters of sexual morality. In essence, the Church was host to internecine culture wars.

Chapters IV and VI have demonstrated the substantial role institutional factors played in undermining Holy See soft power. The president's constitutional powers allowed him wide scope in defining US possession goals. Both presidents used varying factors to push Congress into adopting their positions in 1991 and 2003. Although Congress had a role in foreign policy oversight, empowered to grant appropriations, it seemed unwilling to challenge the president. In 1991 Congress was divided, but societal pressure to support the president was strong. Equally in 2003, notions of checks and balances were minimised. Heightened threat perception after the 11 September attacks coupled with a strong executive and Democratic divisions

enhanced the president's institutional powers. Moreover, Congress weakened its own oversight with memories of the 1991 war's success.

Polling showed support for both wars. In late 1990, substantial support for protecting Saudi Arabia existed but as time passed, approval for increased US involvement lessened. Yet, as US involvement increased, polls appeared to follow administration actions. From the outset in 2003, significant support for war existed. Though some respondents preferred UN involvement, others were content to have allies support. John Paul II, for all his charisma, did not attract sufficient numbers of Catholics to Holy See *milieu* goals. Instead Catholics sought security. They assumed only the Bush administration could provide this. The 2002 sex abuse crisis did little to assist the Church's moral authority. During 2002 and 2003, reports of bishops covering up the rape and abuse of children over decades, were published. Any moral credibility the bishops had evaporated. Concurrently, the Holy See's handling of the crisis was slow and legalistic, doing little to stem the disillusion amongst liberal Catholics.

Specific historical instances were also important to understanding Holy See lack of soft power. The Cold War's end brought a triumphant sense of history, with linear notions of history seemed to be confirmed. Similarly, the 11 September attacks and the 2002 sex abuse crisis substantially impacted the United States government and US Catholics. The 2002 crisis obliterated the Church's moral authority among many liberal Catholics. Conservative Catholics saw the need to uphold authority and the Church's sexual teaching.

Community for Catholics did not match the theological ideal of a world-wide communion but was based around the state. Even those that sided with the Holy See and opposed the war, may not have done so on the grounds of a global Catholic community. US national interests took precedence over any larger definition of interests of the bishops or Holy See.

Which International Factors Weakened Holy See Influence?

Similar to domestic aspects, international factors negated whatever soft power the Holy See may have possessed. Two elements were of either no significant assistance, or actively reduced, Holy See soft power.

Its unique legal status, "actorness", combining aspects of traditional statehood with those of a multinational religious "NGO". This special status made little difference to its attractiveness to US Catholics or the US government. A clear separation between the "domestic" USCCB and the "international" Holy See should not be drawn. Notwithstanding

being able to lobby as both an NGO and state, the Church has not been successful at influencing US foreign policy. Rather, it has been argued that it weakened the Holy See's ability to relate to the United States and simultaneously constrained its capacity to act through its neutrality. Its state-like status meant its neutrality limited its use of resources to oppose the wars, as an NGO might. Equally, its status as a large NGO meant it could not use expertise to advance one position over another. Although the Holy See's status may have been a factor in Cardinal Laghi's 2003 meeting with George W. Bush, Laghi's personal relationship to George H.W. Bush, and strident papal opposition to the war may have made the meeting more likely to occur as both Bush and Laghi would gain in different ways from it. For Bush meeting a representative of one of the main opponents of the war made him look like he was not rushing to war. Laghi could also have been said to gain. By stressing Holy See opposition to the war and weakening the belief that all Christians support the US wars.

Secondly, Holy See foreign policy principles, based on CST, were flexible enough to allow it to oppose both wars for contradictory reasons. Centred on notions such as the unity of humanity, the common good and the primacy of international law. Although it saw neither war as meeting the just war criteria it never explicitly couched its opposition to the wars in these terms. Moreover, it viewed its opposition to both wars as distinct, but it has been argued that this was contradictory. In 1991 its opposition seemed to be based on the war not meeting all the just war criteria. For 2003, it said any war must be sanctioned by the UN Security Council despite the 1991 war receiving Security Council support.

What Insights Can Soft Power Bring to Analyse Holy See Foreign Policy Within the International System?

Soft power was useful to this study for three reasons: showing the importance of hard power, the corresponding limits of soft power and connecting the domestic and international levels of analysis. Soft power illustrated the importance, and lack of, hard power. The Holy See rejected the possibility of the moral use for coercion. Indeed, it contradicted itself in order to reject the possibility that power could be used morally. Its solution to both crises rested on dialogue, where power inequalities among states had implicitly been banished. The Holy See advocated dialogue to resolve the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Yet, this was without any further specifics. This may have been why it was seen as largely irrelevant in the administration's discussions. For the 2003 conflict its stance was the same, stressing the role of the UN to decide on the legitimacy of the war but seemingly without engaging with the moral complexities of those for and against the war.

The limits of soft power have also been shown. Although soft power is an important factor in International Relations, the Holy See's relationship with soft power has been under-examined. This study has suggested that the Holy See's soft power is contingent on very specific factors that do not occur in this study. Factors that made the Holy See influential elsewhere, for example in Poland at the end of the Cold War, were very specific and should not be extrapolated to broader Holy See influence. It has been suggested that knowing when the Holy See is not successful can lead to a better comprehension of when and why it has soft power.

Lastly, soft power linked the domestic and international spheres resulting in a more comprehensive analysis. Unlike other theories such as structural realism, soft power is well suited to examining not just the Holy See but the Church in a state specific context. Without soft power the complex relations between the Holy See and both the USCCB and Catholics would be underappreciated. Related to this, soft power enables the inclusion of culture but also institutional factors to allow for a fuller analysis between the subtle links between power and disunity.

What Contribution Can *Milieu* and Possession Goals Make to Understanding the Holy See?
The thesis has demonstrated that Wolfers' lens of possession and *milieu* goals were useful for two reasons in contributing to understanding how the Holy See operates. As expected the Holy See stressed *milieu* goals by seeking to shape the environment in which the United States operated. However, it also had possession goals. Through its opposition to the war it wished to separate Iraqi Chaldean Catholics, and Middle East Christians, from any backlash from non-Christians living in the region from being linked to the actions of a broader "West" led by the United States.

Firstly, as would be expected, the Holy See mostly stressed *milieu* goals to shape the international environment. Its calls for dialogue and opposition to the wars based on just war principles, and in 2003, its seeking to bind the United States through international law were indicative of these *milieu* goals. The Holy See's reliance on *milieu* goals was unsurprising as it has neither the tools nor resources to adopt possession goals as its primary outlook and strategy. Moreover, its religious status meant it was more likely to seek to change the environment.

Secondly, and more surprisingly, possession goals are important for the Holy See. They can help explain Holy See behaviour in its opposition to the two wars. Its possession goals are not "traditional" in the sense that they are not security or territory. Rather, they were traditional

in that it sought to protect Iraqi Chaldean Catholics and other Christians from a backlash. Consequently, possession goals can help understand the Holy See as a more “traditional” actor that would otherwise be assumed.

In seeking to “protect” Christians by distancing the Holy See from those who supported the wars, the Holy See used the visibility of the papacy to advance its possession goals. Before the 1991 war it used the “clash of civilisations” concept as a vehicle to avoid Christians being associated with the war. Similar to 1991, possession goals help understand how in 2003 Holy See opposition was used to suggest that it opposed the war to protect Iraqi Chaldean Catholics, as well as other Christians in the wider region, from any association with “Christian” nations that advocated war against Iraq.

Thus, possession and *milieu* goals contribute to how the Holy See operates. For the latter, the Holy See acts as expected by seeking to change the setting in which others operate. In this way, the Holy See conforms to the behaviour of many other religious actors and organisations such as the UN. This thesis has argued that possession goals also contribute to explaining Holy See foreign policy. Although its possession goals are not equivalent to that of a state, in the two wars it sought to protect its “population” by vociferously opposing both wars. In doing so, it hoped to reduce the possibility of a regional backlash against Christians. Consequently, possession goals can blur the Holy See’s unique status and make it act like a traditional state with traditional interests.

Main Findings

Three findings stem from this thesis under the empirical, theoretical and conceptual headings. The two empirical arguments are that divisions weakened Holy See soft power to attract others to its *milieu* goals and secondly, Holy See soft power was not sufficient to alter US foreign policy with soft power’s limits demonstrated. The third, theoretical finding, is that the Holy See has an almost blanket ban on the use of force with no circumstances seeming to warrant its usage. When added to its behaviour during the sex abuse crisis leads to its morality being questioned. This lends evidence that it was not the disinterested actor it may have appeared to be. Fourthly, and conceptually, the thesis has demonstrated that culture has a vital role in shaping a state’s foreign policy. At the same time the president’s role in interpreting this culture can justify a radically altered foreign policy by appealing to divergent traditions. Neither president did so which shows the durability of its current interpretation and the president’s own power in supporting this interpretation. The last finding, which is also conceptual, is the

paradox that while Church theology teaches all Catholics are united, irrespective of location, the reality illustrated in the two case studies is that they are more influenced by their culture and nationality than any broader religious affiliation.

Firstly, and empirically, divisions fundamentally undermined the Holy See's soft power and its ability to attract the United States to its *milieu* goals. These divisions existed in the Church in the United States where bishops, laity and media were divided about the justness of the wars. Bishops could not agree on the justness of the wars, though they seemed more united in 2003 against the conflict. It has been argued that lay Catholics were more attached to political party and mostly viewed the wars through these lenses and not through the eyes of the Holy See. Religious media was examined, it was argued that over both wars they may have exacerbated these political divisions by serving their respective ideological constituencies instead of challenging them. On a broader level, divisions existed between Catholics in the United States and the papacy which will be explored in the final point. Although divisions existed within the US, in Congress for example, these were able to be overcome by the strength of those supporting war and executive dominance and the narrower US possession goals which overcame weaker *milieu* goals.

The second empirical point made was that soft power has clear limits. Holy See *milieu* goals were not able to overcome US possession goals in the wars against Iraq. Although Nye never disavows hard power, the power of attraction was not either strong enough, or suitable, to the Holy See's wishes. Stopping a war was not within soft power's potential. Yet its failure also informs scholars about when the Holy See has, and more importantly, does not have soft power. Automatically, associating soft power with the Holy See is unwise as the number of cases where it has impacted may be smaller than expected. Only in specific cases and at specific times does religion have sufficient soft power to make a difference. Halting states waging war is not one of these.

A third, theoretical point was argued. The Holy See's presumed moral status has been questioned for three reasons: it consistently chose neutrality over attempts to bolster its soft power against the war; though understandably, all but rejected the moral use of force by setting it impossibly high; lastly, its desire to protect Christians complicated its image as a disinterested actor. Thus, it may never have actually believed it could have attracted enough Catholics to pressure the government to alter its policies but may have prioritised its possession goals. Due to the Holy See's special nature, it should not be expected to behave as a normal neutral state. By prioritising its neutrality it undermined its own ability to attract. Nye suggests the Holy See could be seen as the "global conscience" encouraging states to strive for higher ideals. During

the 1991 war, when there was a clear case of aggression, it may have been seen as odd that the Holy See *opposed* the war. High ideals are important but a balance needs to be struck between ideals and advocating implementable solutions. However, due to its limitations it only ever spoke in generalities. In the 1991 conflict, a case could be made for interests and morality converging, with the United States as the moral actor. Pope John Paul II, trapped between neutrality and the broad strictures of CST, was largely ignored. Stating general moral principles does little to maximise soft power. Much of the Holy See's image comes from its association with the Church and not a state. Yet, it can sometimes act like a traditional state. Its pursuit of its possession goals, protecting Christians, gives it traditional interests that it seeks to shield through the papacy's visibility. Advancing these possession goals, however important, complicates its claims to speak for a transcendent morality with a focus on the "common good".

Fourthly, and conceptually, culture shapes, and is shaped by, a state's foreign policy. Both presidents chose continuity over different interpretations. The "interpreter-in-chief" can set the tone and justify, even a radically altered foreign policy through previous cultural legacies. Although less surprising in 1991, after the 2001 attacks a different interpretation could have been justified, even understandable. That George W. Bush maintained, even strengthened, previous interpretations after the 11 September attacks is noteworthy. How both presidents buttressed the same broad interpretation illustrates the significance of his role in defining the dominant political culture. These interpretations often justified the policies chosen. No policy is conducted in a culture-free vacuum but applying Jacksonianism with its binary mentality, total war and ideas of the folk community were easier in wartime. This leads to the last, similarly conceptual, finding.

Finally, Church teaching insists on seeing Catholics as united, being only divided by state. Nominally they are Catholics *in* the United States. However, this study adds weight to the conclusion that they are *US* Catholics. That is, they place greater emphasis on their nationality than their religious affiliation. Even conservative Catholics who see themselves as loyal to the pope, move Church teaching to suit their prevailing political and ideological convictions. Catholicism is flexible enough to adapt to cultural contexts but questions emerge whether it is either too flexible, or whether it can withstand whatever culture it interacts with. The Church's emphasis on sexual morality damaged its ability to engage Catholics on its anti-war stance. Moreover, its own framework, viewing life issues as absolute, appears to hinder its abilities. This may explain why the Church has so little traction on issues of the environment and immigration over abortion and equal marriage. Lastly, religion may be a too nebulous an identifier in comparison to nationality. This may more especially true during war.

Research Contribution

This thesis has made an empirical, theoretical and conceptual contributions to research. Two empirical contributions, two theoretical contributions and two conceptual contributions have been argued. No studies have examined Holy See foreign policy in the 1991 *and* 2003 Iraq Wars and the contradiction at the heart of Holy See opposition to these two wars. Few studies have analysed the theological and political constraints on Holy See foreign policy as they relate to a post-Cold War setting, which this thesis does.

Two empirical contributions have been made. How divisions weakened Holy See soft power was explored. Secondly, Holy See soft power was not sufficient to alter US foreign policy.

A theoretical contribution has been made through the application of *milieu* and possession goals to the Holy See. It has been argued that the Holy See is as expected, weak on countering possession goals and relies on *milieu* goals. However, it has been contended that the Holy See has more traditional possession goals, like a state, that it seeks to protect through the visibility of strident papal opposition to the wars.

A second theoretical contribution has been made as the thesis has contributed to the study of religious actors and soft power. It has often been applied to states. Even less has it been applied to the Holy See with its mix of both state and NGO. A presumption of Holy See soft power seems to exist among the public and some scholars. Although stopping war is an extreme case, it demonstrates the challenges it faces in attempting to use its soft power. Where it failed to attract will shape debate as to when and where its soft power may work in future.

Conceptually, despite the difficulties in defining culture, differentiating it in this instance has been easier. American exceptionalism and Jacksonianism gave the administrations and, to some extent Catholics, a language to frame both Iraqi and US actions. Although hard to associate the Holy See with a particular culture, in this case it reflected an unsurprising hostility to violence but also placing its own interests (maintaining its neutrality) above all else. Even if this meant opportunities to avoid war. Cultural differences are most apparent during war. Exceptionalism and Jacksonianism gave Americans an ability to unite with each other, divide the world between good and evil and see themselves as leading the world for the better. National boundaries are clearly not cultural boundaries but when choosing between “religious” culture and “national” culture, Americans prioritised the national over the religious. Moreover,

without reference to culture, the 2003 war would see French or German opposition as the same as US opposition.

Finally, a contribution to perceptions of morality has been made. Generally individuals associate religions with morality. The child sex abuse crisis undermined this. However, the Church's viewing sexual morality in absolute terms, leaving everything else to be debated, weakened the strength of its opposition. At the same time its association with these issues reduced its own relevance before the wars. In 1991, its hostility to the war meant it was isolated from the rest of the international system. Domestically support for the war was lower but the Church's hostility seemed to be irrelevant as a locus point for opposition. At the same time the United States saw itself as carrying out both its, and global, interests. The assumption of religious organisations acting morally was tested. It was constrained and unable to make an imperfect choice.

Future Research

Several avenues emerge from this research. Broadly they fall into the US and Holy See categorisations. This work has analysed the limits of Holy See soft power but other cases where it has been credited with affecting change have not been examined in this light. For example, what was the relationship between the Holy See's soft power and the 2014 resumption of diplomatic relations between Cuba and the United States? Similar to the questions posed in this thesis, how important was the Holy See's presumed moral standing in changing Obama administration policy or was it simply a trope used by Obama to help justify his policy. Alternatively the same question could be posed about the Beagle Channel dispute. The US is the sole superpower since the end of the Cold War. Its wars with Iraq illustrate this. As such it has played a role in enforcing global order and norms. Naturally the Holy See does not have such a role currently. Out of this comes the question, what was the Holy See's role before the Reformation? Was it analogous to the United States now as it was the only actor that "united" then then world powers? In effect, did a *pax Ecclesia* exist, after the *pax Romana*? More modern research could easily be conducted on the Holy See's foreign policy, especially its notion of just war. If the Holy See opposed the 1991 Iraq War, did it view *any* war as just? One possible case study for this would be the 2001 Afghanistan War. Other avenues of research include the relationship between classical realism's understanding of tragedy and progress in its foreign policy. Throughout this thesis it was wary of significant change that war would

bring. The pope spoke about war in apocalyptic terms. Does this reflect or diverge from a “Christian view” of progress? Is such a view discernible in Holy See foreign policy? How different is this from secular liberal Enlightenment conceptions of progress and how might this shape its foreign policy? A clear contradiction on Holy See treatment of the UN is evident. Some research has been written on the close relationship between the Holy See and the UN, but less has been done on their tensions. How these differences emerge and are dealt with would be a worthwhile project.

Equally for the United States many questions emerge. Before the 1991 war, but particularly after the 11 September attacks why did an alternative interpretation of US culture not emerge? A long history existed of being a “city on a hill” but this could mean an example to others. Why did “traditional” engagement “win” over other interpretations at this critical historical juncture given the flexibility of exceptionalism and other related concepts? How important was the president as “interpreter-in-chief” in setting the scene for the future of this cultural stability, or change in the future? Recent scholarship has suggested the problems caused by US civil religion but have there been any benefits or advantages to it, has it influenced the US to act where otherwise it might not? What decisions has it helped legitimise or justify in popular imagination? Similar to the Holy See, notions of tragedy and progress are important in explaining US policy in these case studies. How have these ideas shaped US self-perception and thus the world? Tragedy plays an important role here but could it explain other actions. For example, did President Obama have an overly tragic world-view in Syria which then helped shape his decisions? Naturally, this could also be applied to other less recent historical cases, Vietnam being on example. Another area is the idea that tragedy can be managed with problems never being resolved. In turn this could have implications for the definition of a problem. This could be applied to many areas, nuclear proliferation being just one example. The chosen nation myth could be examined in relation to a since diminished divine conditionality and using this to potentially reformulate US foreign policy. Lastly, the differences between a Niebuhr’s Protestant and Lebow’s pagan tragedy could be explored to establish a distinct Catholic tragedy.

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